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EDITOR'S COMMENTS

WE begin this issue with Lionel Casson's *Rome's Maritime Trade with the Far East,* in which this distinguished authority on ancient seafaring traces the maritime trade of the Roman Empire in the Indian Ocean and beyond towards the Far East. This article seems an interesting introduction to that era when New England and the eastern United States were engaged in the same type of commerce during the century following the end of the American Revolution. And it is this period, of course, which is celebrated in the new wing just opened at the Peabody Museum here in Salem.

We then turn our attention to two articles on fisheries, another important aspect of New England enterprise on the sea. The first by Olaf Janzen, entitled *The American Threat to Newfoundland Fisheries, 1776-1777,* explains why American privateers during the Revolution were unable to do much damage to Britain's fishing fleet operating on the Grand Banks, despite plans to do so. Indeed the author explains that it was the British Royal Navy which did the most harm to this fishery by competing with it for a limited supply of sailors needed to man its warships. He thus emphasizes the special limitations in any naval operation which depends primarily on privateering to accomplish strategic naval objectives. The second such offering, William Welch's *Lorenzo Sabine's History of the Fisheries* explains the interest and writings of Sabine's dealing with the American fishing industry in the North Atlantic during the nineteenth century. To no small extent he makes it clear that it is to this able citizen of Maine that we owe much of our knowledge of the fishing industry and its importance to the Republic during these years.

Then we turn our attention to a short, but important study by Mark Aspinwall called *Passenger Ships in the Coastwise Trade: American Public Policy Since 1789.* In this offering, the author explains why the United States failed to reserve for American ships the movement of passengers along the coasts. Careful reading of it will also explain in some measure why foreign vessels and not those flying our own flag now dominate the lucrative cruise business which television programs like "Love Boat" have made so popular.

Next we have Timothy Runyan's *Publishing in Naval and Maritime History: A Report.* This article surveys the present status of the major journals published today in the United States dealing with naval and maritime history, as reported in a symposium held at the Naval Academy in Annapolis last September. It also includes some data on similar journals published elsewhere in the world. This symposium emphasized the strong interest existing in this field and the quality of the journals concerned, as well as the hope that the material they contain could more speedily be integrated into the work of non-maritime minded American historians.

Finally we have a brief piece by Victor Lewinson on *Sam Crocker, Boat Designer* which explains the importance of this designer and the collection of his papers and design plans now located at the Peabody Museum. It is hoped that this article will encourage others to donate material of this sort to other maritime museums, so that we can better understand the contributions of naval architects to the maritime scene.

We then close our issue with a number of book reviews and add here our thanks to those who have supported our efforts to end the plundering of underwater wrecks off our coasts. For thanks to all our efforts, President Reagan has just signed into law a bill which it is hoped will end all of this in the future.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, Massachusetts

Rome's Maritime Trade with the Far East

LIONEL CASSON

"IN earlier times not twenty vessels dared sail out of the Red Sea to get a look beyond the straits; now great fleets are sent as far as India . . . whence cargoes of the greatest price are brought back to Egypt." So wrote the noted geographer Strabo[1] around the beginning of the first century A.D. Half a century later Pliny the Elder delivered his oft-quoted remark about the vast amount of cash that purchases from India annually drained from the Roman Empire.[2]

Our knowledge of trade in the ancient world is mostly fragmentary and haphazard, based largely on random remarks by ancient writers, random statements in inscriptions, miscellaneous archaeological finds, and the like. One exception is Rome's trade with India. We know a great deal about this, thanks to a unique and precious document, the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, "Sailing Guide to the Red Sea." It is a little handbook, drawn up probably around the middle of the first century A.D., for merchants and skippers who left from the ports of Roman Egypt on the Red Sea to trade with the eastern coast of Africa and with Arabia and India (under the term "Red Sea," the ancients included the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and part of the western Indian Ocean, as well as what we call the Red Sea). It lists the ports to stop at and the objects of trade to be bought or sold in each. The language is Greek; both the author and his audience were almost certainly residents of Egypt, then part of the Roman Empire, and, to judge from the preciseness and firsthand sound of his information, he was himself a merchant or skipper.[3]

What played a key role in Rome's trade with India were the winds that dominate the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and western Indian Ocean, the so-called monsoon winds. From roughly October to May they blow from the northeast; in the summer months they switch about to exactly the opposite direction, the southwest. Thus a skipper who plied between Roman Egypt and India, by picking the proper time to set sail, could count on favorable winds both ways. However, the conditions he would meet during the two were far from being the same. The southwest monsoon is violent and stormy, with winds that frequently rise to gale force. Along the coast of India it compels ports to remain closed from May until September, when finally it begins to quiet down. The northeast monsoon is just the reverse, a period of clear skies and balmy winds.[4] The author of the *Periplus* states that the time to leave the Red Sea ports for India is July.[5] This makes perfect sense: a vessel shoving off in that month would catch northerlies in the Red Sea to bring it down to the straits and reach the Gulf of Aden in time to pick up the southwest monsoon to carry it to India for arrival in September when the ports there reopened. The return could be made anytime after October, when the northeast monsoon set in. The round trip, in other words, must have taken less than a year.

Arab writers of the fifteenth century note that their ships sailed only during the beginning or end of the southwest monsoon, ensuring that most of the voyage would take place when it had lost its bite or under the

1. Strabo, 17.798.

2. Pliny, *N.H.* 6.101.

3. The best text is H. Frisk, *Le Périple de la Mer Érythrée*, Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 33 (Göteborg, 1927). The standard translation, by W. Schoff (*The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, New York, 1912), is hopelessly out-of-date, and a recent translation by G. Huntingford (*The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, Hakluyt Society, New Series No. 151, London, 1980) is woefully inadequate. I have prepared a new translation with comprehensive commentary which will be published within a year or two by Princeton University Press. On the date, see *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986), 179, n. 1.

4. On the monsoons, see L. Casson, "Rome's Trade with the East: The Sea Voyage to Africa and India," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 110 (1980), 21-26, especially 24, 26, 31-34.

5. *Per.*, 39, 49, 56.



benign northeast monsoon, and they long continued this practice.[6] Their craft, with relatively feebly built hulls and carrying lateen sails, whose canvas is not easily shortened, prudently avoided its buffeting winds and storms. Roman seamen, however, used vessels that would have had no trouble handling them. The hulls boasted massive strength, since they were built in the special fashion unique to the ancient world: the planking was not nailed to frames in the manner traditional in Europe from the Middle Ages on, but each plank was fastened, edge to edge, to its neighbors above and below by means of thousands of close-set mortise and tenon joints which were then transfixed by dowels to prevent their ever coming apart. The rig, too, made for safety, its major component being a vast broad mainsail set on a relatively short mast, a sail whose canvas was easily shortened by the ancients' ingenious system of vertical brails that rolled it up like a Venetian blind.[7]

It took the West a long time to learn of the existence of the monsoon winds. Strabo, as noted above, observed that "in earlier times" most western sailors did not dare go beyond the straits of Bab el Mandeb. The author of the *Periplus* is more precise. Discussing Eudaimôn Arabia, the ancient predecessor of Aden, he remarks that it was called Eudaimôn ("prosperous") because "in earlier days . . . , since vessels from India did not go on to Egypt and those from Egypt did not sail to the places further on but came only this far, it used to receive the cargoes of both, just as Alexandria receives cargoes from overseas as well as from Egypt."[8] In other words,

6. Casson (op. cit. n. 4 above), 23, n. 6 and 28-30, nn. 12, 15, 16, 19.

7. On Arabian ships, see G. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring* (Princeton University, 1951), pp. 89-97. On Roman ships, see L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton University, 1986), pp. 201-8, 239-43.

8. *Per.*, 26.

westerners did go through the straits but only as far as Eudaimôn Arabia, some one hundred miles to the east. The Indian vessels with which they exchanged cargoes unquestionably had been carried there by the northeast monsoon and would go back with the southwest monsoon. Indeed, Indian and Arab skippers had been using the monsoons for over a millennium at least.[9] Somehow they managed to keep the existence of this convenient wind pattern a secret from Greek seamen, thereby maintaining for themselves a lucrative monopoly on the transport of Indian goods. It has been argued that the West did not learn about the monsoons till as late as the beginning of the first century A.D.,[10] but a story told by Strabo points to an earlier date. He reports that toward the close of the reign of Ptolemy VII, that is, around 120 B.C., a shipwrecked sailor, sole survivor of his crew, was picked up in the Red Sea, brought to the court at Alexandria, and, since he spoke an incomprehensible language, at the king's order was taught Greek. He claimed he had come from India, offered to guide an expedition there to prove it, and did so. Guiding an expedition there could have meant but one thing: revealing the nature of the monsoon winds.[11] The subsequent century might well have been the "earlier times" that Strabo refers to, when but a handful of Greek ships sailed to India and back. It was not until Rome annexed Egypt toward the end of the first century B.C. that western freighters in numbers made the voyage and took over the commerce between the empire and India.[12]

They departed from two ports on the Egyptian shore of the Red Sea, Myos Hormos and Berenicê. Goods to be exported first had to get to these none-too-accessible places. They went up the Nile to Koptos, located on the great bend where the river comes closest to the Red Sea, and were there transferred to camels for the crossing of the eastern desert to the coast. Whatever was brought back from India did the journey in reverse: by camel to Koptos, and then, save for what was used locally in Egypt, down the Nile to Alexandria for distribution all about the Mediterranean.[13]

From Myos Hormos and Berenicê skippers headed straight down the Red Sea to its exit at Bab el Mandeb.[14] Here they split to follow one or the other of two major lines of trade, to northwest India or to its southwest coast.

Those following the first skirted the southern coast of Arabia and then, sailing directly before the southwest monsoon, made for two major ports, Barbarikon, somewhere at the mouth of the Indus River, and, more important, Barygaza on the Gulf of Cambay, where Broach now stands.[15] India supplied the West with most of its precious stones, and at these ports buyers could pick up a wide variety: turquoise, lapis lazuli, onyx, agate. Africa and India were the prime sources of ivory; the Indian variety was available at Barygaza. Both ports exported silk, which had come there by both land and sea from China; Barygaza in addition exported cotton cloth. Both offered costly items for the drug and cosmetic trade—costus and nard and bdellium—and Barygaza offered one form of the spice that was India's export par excellence, pepper, in this case long pepper. The items westerners sold in exchange were for the most part cheap raw materials—lead, tin, copper, and raw glass—but there were some that were on the expensive side: coral, which was very valuable and much prized in India; silverware and glassware; multicolored textiles; certain drugs and cosmetics (antimony, red sulphide of arsenic, storax). And, for sale to the court, they brought in items that were very costly: fine ointments, fine wine, fine garments, handsome slave girls for the harem and slave boys trained in music.[16]

Skippers who followed the other major line of trade went straight for India's Malabar coast, with the southwest monsoon on the starboard quarter.[17] Here too there were a pair of major ports, Muziris, probably

9. Traders had plied between India and Mesopotamia as early as 2000 B.C.; see S. Ratnagar, *Encounters. The Westerly Trade of the Harappa Civilization* (Delhi, 1981).

10. See, e.g., E. Warmington, *The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India* (Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1974), pp. 42-48.

11. Strabo, 2.98-99. For a thorough discussion, see J. Desanges, *Recherches sur l'activité des Mediterranéens aux confins de l'Afrique*, Collection de l'École Française de Rome 38 (Rome, 1978), pp. 151-59. The sailor probably came from the south of India and spoke Tamil or the like. Northern India was well known to the Greeks, and Indians from there served as trainers for the elephant corps of the Ptolemaic army; see W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 94.

12. Cf. Strabo, 2.118.

13. See S. Sidebotham, *Roman Economic Policy in the Erythra Thalassa*, 30 B.C.-A.D. 217 (Leiden, 1986), pp. 50-53 (the ports), pp. 58-67 (desert roads).

14. *Per.*, 20-21.

15. *Per.*, 57 and cf. L. Casson in *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984), 475.

16. *Per.*, 39 (imports and exports of Barbarikon), 49 (Barygaza). Long pepper, today considered inferior to black, was used by the Romans for pharmaceutical purposes (see Warmington, op. cit. n. 10 above, p. 182) and commanded a much higher price than the black (Pliny, *N.H.* 12.28).

17. Casson (op. cit. n. 15 above), p. 476.

where Cranganore now stands,[18] and Nelkynda, about fifty miles south of it.[19] Here too merchants bought the same or similar costly items: ivory; tortoiseshell, both a local variety and a very fine grade shipped in from regions much farther east, Malay or the Dutch East Indies; gems (diamonds and sapphires) and pearls, which must have come from the rich beds in the Gulf of Mannar. The chief export of both ports, however, was black pepper: it was in demand all over the Mediterranean world, and the sole source was India's Malabar coast.[20]

What westerners could offer for sale here was limited to raw materials—tin, copper, lead, raw glass—cheap clothing, and some drugs. These could not possibly match the cost of what they bought, so the author of the *Periplus* counsels his readers to bring "mainly a great amount of money."[21] That they did so is amply demonstrated by the multitudes of Roman coins, some six thousand, that have been found in southern India.[22] Pliny knew what he was talking about when he remarked on the amount of cash that India drained from Rome.

The commerce with India could have been open only to shipowners who possessed big vessels and merchants who had access to sizable amounts of credit. This follows from the nature of the voyage and the products involved. Only big ships could brave the rigors of the southwest monsoon, and it took a full purse to buy in the items that western consumers wanted from India—ivory, gems, silk, nard, large amounts of pepper—items that were worth far more than what Rome could offer in exchange. We have a clue to how high in cost a cargo from India could run, thanks to a business document of the second century A.D. that was discovered in Egypt and has recently been published. It is fragmentary, but enough is preserved to reveal that the front face contained an agreement between a merchant resident in Muziris and an agent in Egypt for the forwarding of a shipment from the Red Sea port where it had been disembarked, presumably after arrival from Muziris, across the desert to Koptos and from there downriver to Alexandria. On the back is a listing of some of the items in the shipment. There was at least 700 pounds, and perhaps 1,700, of nard; ca. 4,700 pounds of ivory; ca. 790 of textiles. In other words, the weight totalled at most 7,190 pounds, a little more than 3 ½ tons. The cost of this modest tonnage was just short of 131 talents.[23] If the ship it had been loaded was a 500-tonner—no very great size by Roman standards[24]—there could well have been over 150 times that amount aboard with an aggregate value of more than 20,000 talents. This is a mighty sum, a third more than the total of a cash distribution that the emperor Augustus proudly boasted he gave to the populace of Rome.[25] Since even the wealthiest Romans did not have funds of this magnitude to invest, the cargoes in any vessel must have consisted of dozens of small consignments belonging to dozens of different merchants who borrowed from dozens of different creditors. Yet even the cost of each of these consignments must have involved a considerable outlay. Merchants in the India trade had to be men of standing, men who enjoyed the trust of the rich.

In ancient times the maritime loan was one of the few ways available to turn a quick profit, and men of means for centuries had gone in for them, including such celebrated figures as Cato the Elder, Cicero, and his very wealthy friend Atticus.[26] The India trade, which offered the possibility of large-scale gains, must have had a special appeal. Most lenders no doubt were Egyptian residents. There is evidence, for example, that some high-level Egyptian families maintained personnel at both Myos Hormos and Berenicê; this could only have been in connection with the commerce of those ports.[27]

18. P. Meile in *Journal Asiatique* 232 (1940), 89-95 (located at the mouth of the Periyar river) and G. Woodcock, *Kerala* (London, 1967), p. 42 (subsequent change of course of the river).

19. *Per.*, 54.

20. *Per.*, 56. On the widespread use of pepper, see Warmington (op. cit. n. 10 above), pp. 181-84.

21. *Per.*, 56.

22. M. Raschke in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* ii 9.2 (Berlin, 1978), p. 665; M. Wheeler, *Rome Beyond the Imperial Frontiers* (London, 1954), pp. 137-39. The great trading nations of later ages poured money into the East just like Rome and for the same reasons: see F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century*. iii, *The Perspective of the World* (New York, 1984), p. 490.

23. H. Harrauer and P. Sijpesteijn, "Ein neues Dokument zu Roms Indienhandel, P. Vindob. G 40822," *Anzeiger der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Kl. 122 (1985), 124-55. The listing is on page 132, lines 1-21. On the nature of this text, see L. Casson in *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 23 (1986), 1-7.

24. Casson (op. cit. n. 7 above), p. 172.

25. 20,000 talents = 120,000,000 drachmae = 30,000,000 denarii. Augustus gave 60 denarii each to 320,000 people = 19,200,000 (*Monumentum Ancyranum* xv.iii.15-17).

26. A. Tchernia, "Rêves de richesse, emprunts et commerce maritime," *l'Exploitation de la mer*, VIèmes Rencontres Internationales d'Archéologie et d'Histoire, Antibes, Octobre 1985 (Juan-les-Pins, 1986), 123-30, esp. 126-27; J. D'Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 39-47 (late Republic), 152-53 and 158 (early empire).

27. A. Fuks in *Journal of Juristic Papyrology* 5 (1951), 214-16; Sidebotham (op. cit. n. 13 above), pp. 84-85.

Almost certainly there were investors resident elsewhere who worked through agents in Egypt. There are even indications that the imperial family was involved.[28]

Some of the merchants involved in the trade took up residence in India itself. At Muziris there were enough of them to put up that time-honored mark of the foreign colony, their own place of worship.[29]

What of India's east coast? It was certainly known to the West. Strabo, for example, mentions that Greek traders occasionally had gone as far as the Ganges delta, and the author of the *Periplus* names the more important stopping places right up to the delta.[30] However, he gives them short shrift. He does not provide, in his usual fashion elsewhere, the details about what could be bought or sold in each. He is content merely to point out what objects of trade were transported from the east coast to the west, where the merchants of Roman Egypt could acquire them. This is curious, for there is indisputable evidence of the presence of colonies of westerners along this coast. A Tamil poem makes reference to one in a port at the mouth of the Kaveri River, south of Pondicherry.[31] And, just two miles below Pondicherry, archaeologists have uncovered the ruins of a town where the abundant remains of Roman shipping jars and pottery point to the existence of a foreign colony from the age of Augustus on.[32] The author of the *Periplus* makes it clear that there was a steady flow of goods from one coast to the other carried in local craft. Perhaps these westerners shipped the goods they handled in such craft to the east coast, where the merchants for whom the author of the *Periplus* was writing could pick them up. Thus, so far as he was concerned, details of what went on along the east coast were irrelevant.

Roman merchants were aware of lands lying to the east of India, of Burma and Malay and the East Indies, but practically none ever ventured that far.[33] They imported products from these places, such as tortoiseshell from Malay or the Indies and silk from China, but India served as intermediary; they made their purchases at Barbarikon or Barygaza or Muziris. What they knew about the places themselves came from hearsay. The *Periplus*, for example, describes China in these words: "At the northernmost point [sc. of the eastern world], where the sea ends somewhere on the outer fringe, there is a very great inland city called Thina from which silk floss, yarn, and cloth is shipped by land via Bactria to Barygaza, and via the Ganges River back to Limyrikê (Malabar). It is not easy to get to this Thina; for rarely do people come from it, and only a few."[34]

The highpoint of Rome's commerce with India was the first and second centuries A.D. During this period Arabian, Indian, and Persian vessels shared the waters with Roman, carrying on the trade of their own countries. When the empire's fortunes declined, and Rome's ships were no longer to be seen, they took over all the trade of the area.

28. M. Crawford in *Tecnologia economia e società nel mondo romano*. Atti del Convegno di Como 27/28/29 Settembre 1979 (Como, 1980), pp. 215-17.

29. Warmington (op. cit. n. 10 above), p. 58; Sidebotham (op. cit. n. 13 above), p. 92.

30. Strabo, 15.686; *Per.*, 60, 62-63.

31. Meile (op. cit. n. 18 above), p. 113.

32. Wheeler (op. cit. n. 22 above), pp. 145-50; V. Begley in *American Journal of Archaeology* 87 (1983), 470, 475, 480.

33. Convenient summary of the ancient evidence in J. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography* (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 313-19.

34. *Per.*, 64.

Lionel Casson, professor of classics at New York University, has published numerous books and articles on the maritime history of the ancient world. He is at present working on a study of the trade connections by water between the Roman Empire and the far east.

The American Threat to the Newfoundland Fisheries, 1776-1777

Olaf Uwe Janzen

DURING the War of American Independence, American privateers and warships caused grave concern among the fishermen, merchants, and naval and military authorities at Newfoundland. Strenuous steps were taken to defend the fishery against their activities. The larger outports were provided with gun batteries, while British warships patrolled the fishery, capturing a few dozen American vessels, although not without suffering some losses of their own. Despite these efforts, many fishing vessels suffered at the hands of the privateers, especially in the opening years of the war. Sails were plundered, rigging, supplies, even their men were taken, and the fishing vessels themselves were often destroyed. By 1778 the bank fishery virtually ceased to exist. It has therefore been reasonable for most historians to assume that Newfoundland and its fishery were a favorite target of the Americans, and that only through the determined efforts of British military and naval authorities, and with the cooperation of the people of Newfoundland, were they beaten back.[1]

This interpretation is now coming under scrutiny and revision. Instead of being the principal objects of privateer attention, it appears that fishing vessels and settlements were "targets of opportunity" as the Americans cruised the busy trade lanes linking the West Indies and North America with Europe. Supporting this contention is the fact that most American activity was reported to the south of St. John's, in those Newfoundland waters which lay adjacent to the trans-Atlantic trade lanes. Hardly any privateers were reported to the north. Fishing vessels were meager targets for privateers, who were intent on only one thing—capturing merchantmen with rich cargoes which would bring a profit to their crew and their owners. Plundering a fishing vessel rewarded the privateer with only one precious thing—time. The stores, gear, and men taken from the victim would permit the privateer to extend its cruise and improve its chances of capturing a truly worthwhile prize. The American threat to Newfoundland was therefore almost an incidental one.[2]

Nevertheless, it is also true that on at least one occasion Patriot leaders planned the destruction of the British fishery at Newfoundland, while less than a year later two Continental frigates actually did attack the fishery. The value of the Newfoundland fishery to England, as a source of wealth and as a "nursery for seamen," was a truism of the eighteenth century. So, too, was the principle upon which Great Britain had based her defense of the fishery, that Newfoundland "will allwayes belong to him that is superior at Sea."[3] Since the fishery was supposed to be a migratory one based in England, and since any threat to the fishery came traditionally from England's European enemies, the British government had adopted a strategy of defense that emphasized strength and preparedness in European waters. Local defense at Newfoundland was minimal. To the rebel leadership, an attack upon the fishery therefore seemed not only an obvious means of causing injury to Great Britain, but also one which carried with it a fairly good chance for success. However, despite their intentions,

1. See, for instance, G. O. Rothney, "The History of Newfound land and Labrador 1754-1783" (M.A. thesis, University of London, 1934), pp. 250-55; Keith Matthews, "A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fisheries" (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 1968), p. 480; Glanville Davies, "England and Newfoundland: Policy and Trade, 1660-1783" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Southampton, 1980), pp. 199-202.

2. O. Janzen, "The Royal Navy and the Defence of Newfoundland during the American Revolution," *Acadiensis* XIV (1984), 28-48.

3. Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, 15 April 1675, in W. L. Grant & J. Munro, eds., *Acts of the Privy Council of England. Colonial Series* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1908-1912), I, 622.

the Americans never managed to do more than threaten the fishery. It is the object of this paper to examine and account for this disparity between the intent and the execution of American plans to destroy the British fishery at Newfoundland.

The Anglo-American colonies had a well-established seafaring tradition by 1775, a tradition which had served them well both in peace and in war. According to one authority, shipbuilding had become the largest single industry in the colonies by 1775; one-third of all vessels operating in the British empire were colonial-built, employing thirty thousand seamen. In times of war, some of the colonies would provide provincial naval forces or "sea militia" to protect local trade or even support British naval and military operations in the vicinity.[4] It was therefore both logical and consistent with the colonial maritime experience for the revolutionary leadership to establish a national navy with which to carry their struggle against Great Britain out to sea. However, the colonials were ill-prepared to mount a united effort in 1775 against the foremost naval power in the world. Their seafaring tradition had always been limited to individual colonies; intercolonial cooperation did not occur. Consequently, American efforts to organize a national navy after 1775 were tentative and fragmented. Recently it has even been suggested that the Continental Navy might have been a mistake.[5]

From the start, the Americans fought not with one navy but with several. In 1775 George Washington's army maintained its own warships to capture desperately needed gunpowder from the British. Eleven states organized their own individual navies. The Continental Congress founded the Continental Navy late in 1775, although for many months it existed mostly on paper.[6] But by far the greatest degree of American maritime energies and resources was poured into privateering, a sort of legalized piracy in which privately owned, well-armed, heavily crewed vessels carrying official permission would attack enemy commerce for profit.[7] Because the enthusiasm for privateering further fragmented the ability of the Americans to carry the war to sea, perceptions of privateering during this period were mixed. Defenders of the practice stressed the disruption which privateers caused to enemy trade, the cost to the enemy in terms of lost shipping and cargoes, and the consequent dispersal of enemy naval resources as steps were taken to protect merchantmen from their attacks. Critics of privateering maintained that they consumed stores and materiel needed by the navy and which the navy would have put to better use. Privateers were also accused of exacerbating the navy's manning problems by luring men with higher wages and the temptation of prize money. Generally, however, privateers had long been accepted as an essential supplement to a weak navy.[8] It has been argued that during the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748), when the Royal Navy had been too heavily committed elsewhere either to check enemy commerce or to protect colonial trade as thoroughly as was desired, "privateering operations played *the* leading role in America's war effort and made a major contribution to British sea power by disrupting Spanish and French commerce."[9] It was therefore both

4. W. M. Fowler, Jr., *Rebels Under Sail; the American Navy During the Revolution* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), chapter 1; J. Bradford, "The Navies of the American Revolution," in K. J. Hagan, ed., *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History 1775-1978* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 3; W. A. B. Douglas, "The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy," *Canadian Historical Review* XLVII (1966), 22-37.

5. J. R. Dull, "Was the Continental Navy a Mistake?," *The American Neptune* XLIV (1984), 167-70. See also W. S. Dudley and M. A. Palmer, "No Mistake About It: A Response to Jonathan R. Dull," *The American Neptune* XLV (1985), 237-43.

6. G. W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913; reprinted, Williamstown, Massachusetts: Corner House Publishers, 1970), II, chapter 19, esp. p. 662; F. C. Mevers, "Naval Policy of the Continental Congress," in Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, *Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 3-11.

7. W. J. Morgan, "American Privateering in America's War for Independence, 1775-1783," a paper presented at the Symposium on Piracy and Privateering sponsored by the International Commission on Maritime History, San Francisco, 1975; P. C. F. Smith, "The Privateering Impulse of the American Revolution," *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, CXIX (1983), 48-62; P. Wickins, "The Economics of Privateering: Capital Dispersal in the American War of Independence," *Journal of European Economic History* XIII (1984), 375-95, esp. 377-8; C. E. Swanson, "American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748," *William & Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., XLII (1985), 357-82. Falconer's *Universal Dictionary of the Marine* (1780), defined a privateer as "a vessel of war, owned and equipped by particular merchants and furnished with a military commission by the Admiralty, or the officers who superintend the Marine Department of a country, to cruise against the enemy, and take, sink, or burn their shipping or otherwise annoy them, as opportunity offers"; cited in W. Minchinton, "Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic 1713-76," a paper presented at the Symposium on Piracy and Privateering sponsored by the International Commission on Maritime History (San Francisco, 1975), p. 299.

8. Minchinton, "Piracy and Privateering," 327; Bradford, "Navies," 6.

9. Swanson, "Privateering," p. 359; see also Capt. P. Warren to Governor Clinton (New York), 6 July 1744, in J. Gwyn, ed., *The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752* (London: The Navy Records Society, 1973), p. 32.

logical and consistent with their own tradition for American colonials to respond with a vigorous revival of privateering when the American Revolution began a generation later. No less determined an advocate of a national navy than John Adams conceded that privateers had an important contribution to make to the cause of revolution.[10]

Yet if Adams was willing to admit that privateers had a role to play in the revolution, he remained adamant that the principal maritime weapon of the Americans ought to be a national navy. He and a few others believed that only such a navy could serve the express wishes and strategies of the American people, as defined by the revolutionary leadership. This navy need not be capable of standing up to the Royal Navy. Adams recognized that the success of the revolution depended upon the ability of the Americans to protect their trade and commerce with other nations. This, in turn, would depend upon secure harbors, rivers, and coastal trade lanes. "To talk of coping Suddenly with G. B. at sea would be Quixotism indeed," he explained to a colleague, "but the only Question with me is, can We defend our Harbours and Rivers? If We can We can trade."[11] Later, Adams would think of other uses to which a national navy might be put, such as harassing the enemy into concentrating his forces. Always, however, the object was the same: to keep oceanic trade lanes and American seaports open to commerce, thereby keeping the revolutionary war effort alive.[12]

The decision by Congress to create a Continental Navy was not made without considerable objection. There were strong misgivings about the expense that a fleet of larger ships would entail. In October 1775 Samuel Chase made the oft-repeated remark that the thought of a national navy was "the maddest Idea in the World, . . . we should mortgage the whole Continent."[13] Apart from its cost, there were strong sectional suspicions that a large navy would mostly serve and benefit New England. Opposition to such a navy was therefore strongest among the representatives of the middle and southern colonies; Chase was himself from Maryland.[14] Sectional misgivings were exacerbated when the navy failed to carry out its first major mission, early in 1776, clearing enemy raiders out of southern waters. The squadron assigned to this task carried out a raid on the Bahama Islands instead, hoping thereby to secure gunpowder and munitions still needed by George Washington's army.[15]

Nevertheless, congressional enthusiasm for the navy grew as it took shape late in 1775 and early 1776. From its inception, it consisted of smaller warships, such as armed brigs, sloops, and frigates. This reflected not just congressional penury but also a confirmation of that initial assumption, that the proper role for an American navy was defensive and best served by such vessels—coastal defense, commerce protection, communications, and intelligence. The first warships were merchantmen which had been purchased and refitted. These were to be followed by a dozen frigates which had been ordered by Congress late in 1775; these began sliding down the ways in May 1776. And, as the navy began to take shape and grow, so did interest in an offensive naval strategy.

It was argued that several advantages to the American war effort would ensue from such a strategy. Early in 1777, Robert Morris, one of the members of the Marine Committee, discussed in a letter to John Paul Jones the idea of attacking and perhaps seizing the British Caribbean island of St. Christopher. Apart from the war materiel which might be captured, such an attack would compel the British government "to provide for the Security and protection of every Island they have & by that means they must divide their Force & leave our Coasts less carefully gaurded [*sic*]. . . ." Morris then addressed the larger question of an offensive strategy:

> disturbing their Settlements & spreading alarms, Shewing & keeping up a Spirit of Enterprize, that will oblige them to defend their extensive possessions at all points is of infinitely more Consequence to the United States of America than all the Plunder that can be taken, if the[y] divide their Force we shall have elbow room & that gained we can turn about & play

10. Smith, "Privateering Impulse," 55.

11. J. Adams to J. Warren, 7 October 1775, in W. B. Clark & W. J. Morgan, eds., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964 and continuing), hereafter cited as *NDAR*, II, 342.

12. Adams to Warren, 19 October 1775, *NDAR* II, 528; Bradford, "Navies," 6-7.

13. Journal of the Continental Congress, 7 October 1775, notes of J. Adams, *NDAR* II, 341n.

14. Bradford, "Navies," 7; Fowler, *Rebels*, 56-57; "Commentary," by W. J. Morgan to Mevers, "Naval Policy," 23-24.

15. Fowler, *Rebels*, 95. When Hopkins set out to attack the Bahamas, he had eight ships and vessels under his command, with about seven-hundred men and over two-hundred marines: frigates *Alfred* (24) and *Columbus* (24), brigs *Andrew Doria* (14) and *Cabot* (16), sloops *Providence* and *Hornet*, and schooners *Fly* and *Wasp*. *Hornet* and *Fly* collided and were forced to return to port before the attack could be carried out. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of guns with which each vessel was armed.

our part to the best advantage which we cannot do now, being constantly cramped in one part or another, It has long been clear to me that our infant Fleet cannot protect our own Coasts & that the only effectual relief it can afford us is to attack the Enemies defenceless places & thereby oblige them to Station more of their Ships in their own Countries or to keep them employed in following ours and either way we are relieved so far as they do it. . . .[16]

An attack on the Newfoundland fishery was perfectly consistent with this logic. According to the conventional wisdom of the day, the British fishery at Newfoundland was an economic and strategic asset of the first order. It was a source of national wealth by virtue of the employment it gave to thousands of fishermen, the trades and industries it supported in Great Britain, and the trade in fish with Southern Europe and the Caribbean which it supplied. It was also reputed to be a training ground or "nursery" for seamen, transforming landsmen into experienced mariners—a most important function for a nation whose principal instrument of war was its navy. Yet the fishery was lightly defended in the belief that British sea power in European waters secured it from any reasonable danger.[17] Thus, at the very least, an attack upon the fishery by the Continental Navy would alarm the British and compel them to disperse their forces, at relatively little risk to the Americans. If it were to succeed, such an attack would severely damage a major source of England's economic strength and sea power.

There were also some specific advantages to be gained by an attack upon the fishery at Newfoundland. Captured fish could be exchanged with the French for products needed by the rebel war effort. This was especially appealing to the New Englanders, whose own fishery had been interrupted by the war, with disastrous consequences to their export trade.[18] The interruption of the supply of fish to the West Indies, where it was used to feed the slave population, might further complicate Great Britain's ability to give the rebellion in the colonies its full attention. Finally, there was the emotional satisfaction such an attack would give the Americans. As a correspondent of John Adams explained, "the Poole Men, who meant us much Harm, will be rewarded according to their Deeds. . . ."[19] Consequently, on 22 August 1776 Esek Hopkins, the commander-in-chief of the fleet, was instructed to attack and destroy the British fishery at Newfoundland.[20]

This, however, was easier said than done. It had been under Hopkins's leadership that the raid upon the Bahamas had been carried out. As they returned to American waters, Hopkins's ships had fallen in with HMS *Glasgow*, a British frigate which mauled the American vessels before making its escape. For most of the remainder of the year, the Continental Navy remained incapacitated by the need for repairs, deficiencies in arms and munitions, and especially sickness and shortages of men. For instance, over two hundred men, too sick to serve, had had to be landed at New London immediately upon their return from the Bahamas. Then the replacements, which Hopkins had obtained temporarily from the army in order to work his ships round to Providence, had to be returned. Sickness spread through his ships. By May his crews were down to half-strength. Hopkins could send one or two of his ships out on short cruises only by drawing men from all of his vessels.[21]

Adding to his woes, Hopkins was ordered to appear before the Congress in August, to defend his conduct generally, and in particular to explain his decision to attack the Bahamas rather than carry out his instructions to clear southern waters of commerce raiders.[22] John Adams, who spoke in Hopkins's behalf, charged that "the Commodore was pursued and persecuted by that Anti New England Spirit, which haunted Congress. . . ." Adams attributed that spirit to "the Prejudices of the Gentlemen from the southern and middle States. . . ."[23] Hopkins, however, must have been expecting something like this; two months earlier he had confided to his brother Stephen, who was a member of the Marine Committee, that "The several difficulties that attend the Navy are too many to mention & perhaps imprudent to Name, it is too much for my Capacity to Surmount. . . ." Commodore Hopkins then indicated

16. R. Morris to J. P. Jones, 5 February 1777, *NDAR* VII, 1109-11; see also Bradford, "Navies," 13.

17. G. Graham, "Newfoundland in British Strategy from Cabot to Napoleon," in R. A. McKay, ed., *Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 245-64.

18. J. Adams to J. Warren, 6 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 282.

19. J. Lowell (Boston) to J. Adams, 14 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 181.

20. Continental Marine Committee to Commodore E. Hopkins, 22 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 271-73.

21. E. Hopkins (*Alfred*, New London) to J. Hancock, 9 April 1776 and (from Providence) 1 May 1776, in *NDAR* IV, 735-36 and 1358-60; same to same, 22 May 1776, *NDAR* V, 199-200.

22. J. Hancock to Commodore E. Hopkins, 14 June 1776 and to G. Washington, 14 June 1776, *NDAR* V, 528-31.

23. Journal of the Continental Congress, 12 August and 16 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 157, 157n, and 209; extract for 12 August 1776 from J. Adams's autobiography, *NDAR* VI, 157.

that, if it were thought necessary, he would step down from his command.[24] Congress evidently did not feel that so drastic a step was required. Hopkins was censured, but he retained his command. It was shortly thereafter that the decision was made to attack the British fishery at Newfoundland.[25]

According to his instructions, Hopkins was to prepare *Alfred, Cabot, Columbus,* and the recently acquired brig *Hampden* for a six months' cruise to Newfoundland "with orders to destroy the British fishery there":

> they must make Prize of every British ship or Vessel they meet with—they must seize and destroy their Fishing Boats and Stages and make Prisoners of their fisher Men, or such of them, as will not freely enter into our Service, and as it is highly probable they may take more Prizes than they can conveniently spare Men to bring into Port, it may be proper in such case to destroy them. The season is now come when the Newfoundland Men begin to load their Fish Cargoes, consequently no time must be lost. . . .

Once the vessels had "done . . . as Much Mischief as they can" in Newfoundland, they were to cruise in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to intercept the trade making for Quebec, and then hunt down the Hudson Bay Company fur ships.[26] It was an unequivocal departure from the defensive strategy which the navy's last mission had been intended to serve. Perhaps the new emphasis on offense was a deliberate attempt to soften Hopkins's censure, by giving him the sort of mission he seemed to prefer. At least one of the state governments seemed to approve. The Massachusetts Council ordered its own warships to prepare to accompany the expedition, and even tried to convince privateers to participate in the belief that a larger force "may more effectually answer the Purpose of Harassing Our Enemies and Destroying their Fishery."[27] Thus, the planned raid on the Newfoundland fishery had enthusiasm as well as logic on its side. Yet neither were sufficient to overcome the persistent difficulties which Hopkins faced in getting his ships ready for sea.

For one thing *Hampden* had only recently been purchased into the navy and was still being refitted as a vessel of war. Moreover, her hull was in desperate need of a cleaning, as was apparently also the case with *Alfred* and *Columbus*. A further complication was that both *Cabot* and *Columbus* were out on a cruise, *Columbus* not returning before the end of September, whereupon she was immediately sent into the graving dock. Hopkins therefore could never be certain when he would have enough ships to carry out his instructions. Construction of two new warships at Providence was expected to be finished by the beginning of October. These were the frigates *Providence* and *Warren*. But their addition to his little squadron would only worsen his most pressing problem, namely that of providing his ships with men. Throughout the summer Hopkins had labored in vain to bring his complements up to strength. By October, when he should already have been at sea, he was still short four hundred men for the new frigates as well as for *Alfred* and *Columbus*. At one point, *Alfred*'s crew had been reduced to thirty men, when she should have had two hundred more than that.[28] By the middle of the month, with the expedition still in port because of manning difficulties, Hopkins was intimating that it was now too late to intercept the Newfoundland trade.[29]

To salvage something out of the shambles of his mission, Hopkins decided to reduce its scale and redefine its object. He offered the command of *Alfred, Providence,* and *Hampden* to John Paul Jones, whose mission would still be "to Destroy the Fishery of Newfoundland—but principally to relieve an Hundred of our fellow Citizens who are detained as Prisoners and Slaves in the Coal Pits of Cape Briton." Jones was agreeable to the change in plan, but he remained "Under the greatest Apprehension that the Expedition will fall to nothing," given *Alfred*'s continued shortage of seamen.[30] As it transpired, only two vessels would finally sail on 1 November (*Alfred* and *Providence*) and they were content to cruise no farther than the waters of Nova Scotia, where they took several prizes.[31] Several ships and vessels were captured in Newfoundland waters late in 1776, but they were taken by privateers who had nothing to do with the planned raid on Newfoundland, and never threatened to

24. E. Hopkins to S. Hopkins, 8 June 1776, *NDAR* V, 425.

25. Journal of the Continental Congress, 16 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 209n; E. Hopkins to J. Hancock, 17 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 220, 220n.

26. Continental Marine Committee to Commodore E. Hopkins, 22 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 271-73.

27. Journal of the Massachusetts Council, 21 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 248-50.

28. E. Hopkins to the Marine Committee, 1 September and 10 September 1776, *NDAR* VI, 639, 770; E. Hopkins to Capt. H. Hacker (*Hampden*, New London), 9 September 1776, *NDAR* VI, 757; E. Hopkins to Governor Trumbull, 15 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1271; Capt. J. P. Jones to R. Morris, 17 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1303.

29. E. Hopkins to H. Hacker, 14 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1253.

30. J. P. Jones to R. Morris, 17 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1303-4.

31. Fowler, *Rebels*, 96-97.

destroy the fishery as had been intended by the Marine Committee.[32]

Neither Hopkins nor Jones had any doubts about the reason for the failure of the 1776 operation. Both men blamed the manning problem, which they attributed to the popularity of privateering. The difficulties they encountered in manning their warships could, in fact, be traced back to the beginning of the war, when thousands of mariners and seamen enlisted in the state militias and the Continental Army. But responsibility for the persistence of the problem was placed squarely on the shoulders of the privateers.[33] In particular, they blamed prize money, which was much more lucrative among the privateersmen than it was within the navy. The entire value of a prize taken by a privateer went to its owners, officers, and crew. In the navy, half the value went to the captors if the prize was a warship; in all other cases, the captors received only a third.[34] Hopkins argued that if the distribution of prize money were improved, then "it would be a great deal easier to Mann the Continental Vessels."[35] Jones concurred, explaining that:

> It is to the last degree distressing to Contemplate the State and Establishment of our Navy.—The common Class of mankind are Actuated by no nobler principle than that of Self Intrest—this and this Only determins all Adventurers in Privateers; the Owners as well as those whom they Employ. And While this is the Case Unless the Private Emolument of individuals in our Navy is made Superiour to that in Privateers it never can become respectable—it never will be formidable.—And without a Respectable Navy—Alas America!

Jones recommended that all prize money be distributed among the officers and crews of the warship responsible for the capture. The proportion reserved for the public treasury was not so great that the government would miss its absence, yet it would go far to stimulate enlistment into the Navy.[36] To a point, Congress agreed. In October 1776 the prize share which went to captors of enemy warships was increased to 100 percent, while their share of other vessels was increased to one-half.[37] It remained to be seen whether this would have the desired effect of reducing the navy's manning difficulties.

The popularity of privateering was undeniable. It has been estimated that Americans outfitted two or three thousand privateers during the war, carrying eighteen thousand guns and crewed by seventy thousand men—and these figures are probably conservative.[38] At the very time in August 1776 that Congress approved the attack on Newfoundland, a merchant in Boston was remarking upon the enthusiasm with which New Englanders took up privateering. He declared that "the Success of those that have before Engaged in that Business has been sufficient to make a whole Country privateering mad."[39] Everyone seemed to prosper, even the lawyers who thrived on the legal work needed to adjudicate and process the prizes. "They are making Money as fast almost as they Can receive it," remarked one cynic to a lawyer, conceding that "I suppose there never was a better chance for Gentleman of your Profession getting money than the Present, Privateering prevails so much & such a number of prizes are taken that it makes a vast deal of Business. . . ." He added that the demand to outfit privateers was so great "that Cannon cannot be procured, if at all, but at a most extravagant price."[40] It was a situation which could not but complicate the task of the Continental Marine Committee as it tried to prepare its own ships for war.

Within the Marine Committee, however, opinion on the issue of privateering was divided. John Adams noted approvingly how "thousands of schemes for Privateering are afloat in American imaginations." While many of these proposals would probably amount to nothing, nevertheless it was important to provide encouragement knowing that "some profitable Projects will grow."[41] Although anxious that the new Continental Navy should survive its birth and infancy, he was convinced that privateering was also important as "a short, easy, and infallible method of humbling the English," and that it should therefore not be discouraged.[42]

On the other hand, William Whipple, another New

32. Excerpts from the *Public Advertiser* (London), 25 October and 29 October 1776, in *NDAR* VII, 710-11; Gov. J. Montagu to Sec. of State Lord G. Germain, 12 November 1776, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers, Series 194 [CO 194], vol. 33.

33. J. P. Jones to J. Hewes, 19 May 1776, *NDAR* V, 151-53; E. Hopkins to J. Hancock, 22 May 1776, *NDAR* V, 199-200.

34. G. W. Allen, "State Navies and Privateers in the Revolution," Massachusetts Historical Society *Proceedings*, XLVI (1912/13), 189.

35. E. Hopkins to the Marine Committee, 10 September and 22 September 1776, *NDAR* VI, 770, 949.

36. J. P. Jones to R. Morris, 17 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1303.

37. Allen, "State Navies," 189.

38. Allen, "State Navies," 185; Smith, "Privateering Impulse," 50-51; Morgan, "American Privateering," 9.

39. J. Warren to S. Adams, 15 August 1776, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, seventh ser., *The Warren-Adams Letters* (Boston, 1917 & 1925), I, 438.

40. T. Cushing to R. T. Paine, 9 September 1776, *NDAR* VI, 755-56.

41. J. Adams to A. Adams, 12 August 1776, *NDAR* VI, 158.

42. Cited in Bradford, "Navies," 6.

Englander serving on the Marine Committee, was convinced that the self-serving materialism of privateering was more a curse than a blessing, and that the need to nurture American virtue demanded its restraint, not its encouragement. Whipple was a strong believer in the importance of moral integrity and virtue. He warned that "nothing less than the fate of America, depends on the virtue of her sons, and if they have not virtue enough to support the most glorious cause that ever human being were engaged in, they don't deserve the blessings of Freedom. . . ."[43] Although he conceded that privateers caused considerable damage to British trade, he also maintained that even more damage would have been inflicted without them:

> . . . had there been no privateers is it not probable there would have been a much larger number of Public Ships than has been fitted out, which might have distressed the Enemy nearly as much & furnished these States with necessaries on much better terms than they have been supplied by Privateers?

Whipple then declared that "no kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and every kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people. Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right and wrong. . . ." By way of evidence he insisted that "no public ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting out. The reason is plain: Those people who have the most influence with Seamen think it their interest to discourage the Public service, because by that they promote their own interest, viz., Privateering."[44]

Outside the Marine Committee, Whipple's arguments were echoed both by national and state authorities. The navy's manning problems were shared by the various state navies as well as by the Continental Army. This prompted recommendations which generated controversy. For instance, some were prepared to restrain privateering whenever it was felt that public measures of war might benefit thereby. Manning difficulties were more widespread, and judged to be more serious, than were shortages of materiel such as shot, cannon, and gunpowder. William Vernon, a member of the Eastern Navy Board, urged the Marine Committee to declare an embargo on all shipping throughout the colonies until the navy could be completely manned: "The infamous practice of seducing our Men to leave the ships . . . will make it impossible ever to get our ships ready to Sail in force. . . ."[45] Commodore Hopkins had pleaded for such an embargo as early as 1776, and late in that year Massachusetts actually imposed an embargo on local shipping.[46] Such measures were guaranteed to stir up as much controversy as the problem they were intended to alleviate. There was little evidence to suggest that embargoes would have the desired effect, while the suspension of privateering would cause numerous opportunities for damaging British trade to be missed.[47] Worst of all, embargoes were "Shackles upon Trade" which violated the principle of freedom, for which the Americans were fighting, in the name of the public good.[48] Both sides of the privateering issue were therefore quick to appeal to principle.

The collapse of the Hopkins expedition did not put an end to American efforts to destroy the Newfoundland fishery. The American frigates *Hancock* and *Boston* sailed onto the Banks of Newfoundland in the spring of 1777. Their mission, claimed one of the commanding officers, was "to destroy the Fishery by sinking, burning, taking or destroying all I may find, which business I am ordered by the Congress to do."[49] In fact, they had been instructed to place themselves and the frigate *Raleigh* at the service of the states of New Hampshire and Massachusetts who were prepared to help equip, outfit, and man the warships in return for their assistance in clearing local waters of enemy cruisers. They were then to join Hopkins's squadron, which had been ordered on a similar mission on the coast of North Carolina. Only if Hopkins's ships had already left, were the three frigates to remain in northern waters, and then only to cruise between Newport, Rhode Island and the

43. W. Whipple to J. Landon, 7 January 1777, *NDAR* VII, 856n.

44. W. Whipple to J. Bartlett, 12 July 1778, quoted in Allen, *Naval History* I, 48-49. Whipple's opinion was a common one in the eighteenth century. Thirty years earlier, Admiral Vernon had criticized privateers, claiming that "serving the public is the least part of their thoughts or inclinations. The attaining plunder from merchant ships . . . , being the principal motive . . ."; cited in D. Baugh, *Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 20.

45. W. Vernon to J. Adams, 17 December 1776, quoted in Allen, *Naval History* I, 49.

46. E. Hopkins to the Marine Committee, 19 June and 2 November 1776, *NDAR* V, 622-23 and VII, 17; Acts and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court, 26 March 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 203.

47. James Warren insisted that "The amazing damage we should have done them, as well as the advantages derived to ourselves, make me execrate the policy of stopping our privateers. I always opposed it." Warren to J. Adams, 23 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 405-6.

48. J. Adams to J. Warren, 6 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 282.

49. Statement of T. Hardy, master of the banking brig *Patty*, 11 June 1777, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Admiralty Paper, Series 1, Secretary In-Letters [Adm 1], vol. 471, 118-20.

A series of four oil paintings by the British Marine artist Francis Holman for the Captain HMS *Flora*, signed lower left FxHolman 1799. Executed from eyewitness accounts, the series depicts the naval engagement of 7-8 July 1777 between the Continental frigate *Hancock*, the prize ship *Fox* and the Continental frigate *Boston* and the British warships HMS *Flora* and HMS *Rainbow* off Cape Sable. (Courtesy of the Peabody Museum of Salem, Massachusetts.)

This is the first of a series of four oil paintings completed in 1799 by the British marine artist Francis Holman for John McBride, who commanded HMS *Flora* when she and HMS *Rainbow*, Capt. Sir George Collier, encountered the Continental frigates *Hancock* and *Boston* with their prizes, the former British frigate *Fox* and an unidentified sloop. Left to right: *Hancock*, *Fox*, *Boston*, the sloop (which had been set ablaze), and *Rainbow*.

Flora exchanged fire first with *Boston*, Capt. Hector McNeill, who broke away from the engagement to make repairs to his ship. *Flora* then bore down upon *Fox* and *Hancock*, Capt. John Manley, whose resistance to the British frigate was cut short by the approach of *Rainbow*. The bitter enmity between the two American frigate captains would later lead to accusations by Manley that McNeill had stood off while *Hancock* faced the British alone. McNeill insisted that the repairs needed by *Boston* gave him no choice. Left to right: *Fox*, *Hancock*, *Flora*, *Boston*, and *Rainbow*.



With *Boston* out of the fight and *Fox* too lightly manned by her prize crew to provide assistance, *Hancock* was in no position to engage both *Flora* and *Rainbow*. The Americans therefore scattered in different directions. *Flora* remained intent on recapturing *Fox* while *Rainbow* went in pursuit of *Hancock*. Left to right: *Hancock*, *Rainbow*, *Flora*, *Boston*, and *Fox*.

Fox was quickly re-taken by *Flora*. After a 39-hour chase, *Hancock* was taken by *Rainbow*. Only *Boston*, with no pursuer, managed to escape. *Hancock* and *Fox* were subsequently carried into Halifax, Nova Scotia. Left to right: *Hancock*, *Rainbow*, *Flora*, *Fox*, and *Boston*.

Banks of Newfoundland. Nothing was said about destroying the British fishery.[50]

Although these orders had been issued in October 1776, none of the frigates would be ready before May 1777. By then, much of what had been contained in the original orders was no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts government was still determined to have the Continental frigates clear local waters of enemy cruisers. To solve the frigates' manning problems and thereby hasten their departure, the state government had therefore imposed an embargo in December on all shipping. As it became apparent that two, but not three, of the frigates would soon be ready for sea, the authorities decided to lift the embargo for those privateers willing to serve for twenty-five days with the frigates. The privateers must have found the offer attractive. Because of the embargo, they had idled uselessly (and unprofitably) in Boston harbor. The Massachusetts government even offered to pay for their expenses. In return, each privateer agreed to pay a bond to ensure that they "comply with these terms and not to leave the Fleet. . . ."[51] Despite these precautions, neither the privateers nor the frigates were prepared to give more than token support for the type of operation desired by the Massachusetts government. Within a few days of their departure from Boston on 21 May 1777, the nine privateers who joined the flotilla became separated from the frigates.[52] Shortly thereafter, the frigates also abandoned the mission and set their course for Newfoundland.

50. Marine Committee to Captains J. Manley, H. McNeill, and T. Thompson, 23 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1385; Marine Committee to Commodore Hopkins, 23 October 1776, *NDAR* VI, 1384; see also Marine Committee to Capt. T. Thompson, 21 September 1776 and Marine Committee to T. Cushing, 21 September 1776, in *NDAR* VI, 933-35; Acts and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court, 17 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 359-60; Minutes of the Massachusetts Board of War, 22 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 400; Acts and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court, 24 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 416; Journal of Capt. H. McNeill, 21 May 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 1006.

51. Owners of Massachusetts privateers to the Massachusetts General Court, 19 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 375-76; Report to the Massachusetts General Court of the Committee appointed to confer with Capt. J. Manley, 21 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 389-90; Acts and Resolves of the Massachusetts General Court, 26 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 434-36. The *American Tartar*, an unusually large and powerful privateer, paid a £2,000 bond. What the others paid is not know; endorsement of 22 March 1777 by a committee of the Massachusetts General Court on the petition of the agents for the privateer ship *American Tartar*, *NDAR* VIII, 179-80.

52. Gardner, *Naval History* I, 203. By the time the *American Tartar* was captured later that summer, she had taken eight prizes, all in the North Sea or off the Shetland Islands. None were taken in North American waters, her ostensible hunting ground when she set out on her cruise; Capt. J. McBride to P. Stephens, 7 November 1777, Adm 1/2120, #13.

The disappearance of the privateers was not unanticipated. The Massachusetts government had imposed bonds on the privateers to enforce their cooperation. However, the bonds included an escape clause permitting the privateers to leave the frigates "through absolute Necessity," a right which they were quick to exercise. Nor would the privateers have been confident in the leadership of the expedition. A breach had existed for some time between the frigate captains, John Manley and Hector McNeill, with the result that the success of the mission had been in doubt even before the ships set sail. In March 1777 James Warren had likened the two officers to "the Jews and Samaritans [who] will have no connections or intercourse: they will not sail together."[53] The privateers, whose priority was a profitable voyage, would not have been enthusiastic about entrusting themselves to a discontented leadership. Besides, the profit-orientation of the privateers was rarely compatible with the priorities of public service, as William Whipple had warned. In this particular instance, at least, the Massachusetts government evidently concurred, that was why the bonds had been imposed. Finally, the privateers must have known or sensed that the frigates themselves were not committed to their mission but intended instead to mount an attack on Newfoundland. The privateers had never agreed to be part of such an operation. Consequently they wasted little time in separating from the company of the warships.

As for the frigates, it is quite likely that they had cooperated with the Massachusetts General Court in order to expedite the always difficult task of fitting out. Upon their agreeing to the request of the state government, such essentials as gunpowder had quickly been made available.[54] But after patrolling the coastal waters of New England for only ten days, the frigates headed north for the waters off Newfoundland. It is difficult to conceive how they could expect to cause the fishery there serious injury with only two warships. When, after capturing a dozen or so banking vessels, they succeeded in taking HMS *Fox* (28), a frigate belonging to the Newfoundland station, the Americans headed home. Apparently they were overcome by this unexpected triumph. Then, as they neared Massachusetts, they ran afoul of British warships. *Hancock* was captured, *Fox* was

53. J. Warren to J. Adams, 23 March 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 184; see also Gardner, *Naval History* I, 203.

54. Maj. Gen. W. Heath to J. Langdon, 8 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 293; W. Gardner to Capt. W. Furnel, 11 April 1777, *NDAR* VIII, 318.

retaken, and only *Boston* escaped. The destruction of a dozen banking vessels could not disguise the fact that this second American attempt to attack the British fishery at Newfoundland had also failed.[55]

This was to be the last deliberate attack by ships of the Continental Navy upon the fishery. With France entering the war, the Americans had to tread more carefully in planning offensive operations. The new allies were suspicious of each other's intentions regarding Newfoundland, and neither was willing to antagonize the other by pursuing too aggressive a policy against the British fishery.[56] Individual privateers continued to cruise in Newfoundland waters, as did state cruisers, but their aim was always to intercept the trans-Atlantic trade. For instance, in 1780 the Massachusetts state navy ship *Protector* had been ordered "to the Latitude 38 & 39, which we apprehend will be in the track of Vessels bound from Europe to New York or Carolina. . . . then Steer to . . . Cape Race in Newfoundland, which Cape we imagine most of the Vessels bound from England to Canada always endeavour to make. . . ." It was under such directions that privateers and state cruisers that year achieved one of their most spectacular successes of the war, capturing a substantial number of ships belonging to a convoy destined for Quebec.[57] A year earlier, American cruisers had intercepted the Jamaica fleet on the Banks of Newfoundland and captured eleven ships.[58] In neither instance was the British fishery there a target. While American privateers and public warships did occasionally attack fishermen and fishing outports, the fishery was remarkably untouched by them when the war finally ended in 1783.[59]

What conclusions can then be drawn about the failure of the American revolutionaries to strike at the British fishery at Newfoundland? In large measure, the answer seems to rest with the way in which the Americans carried their struggle to sea. Much of the American effort was poured into privateering, which was less significant than was once believed. As one historian explained, the privateers were "a festering and annoying thorn in the British Lion's paw, but they were in no manner the decisive factor in the outcome of the war." British reaction to the privateers was a "cry of rage rather than of pain."[60] The Newfoundland fishery provides an excellent demonstration of the limitations of *guerre de course*. Although its economic and strategic importance was undeniable and despite the fact that it was lightly defended, the fishery did not make a worthwhile target for the privateers. Those of them which cruised Newfoundland waters did so in search of the Canada or Caribbean trade which always crossed the Banks on its trans-Atlantic passage. Fishing vessels were attacked, but more as targets of opportunity. Privateers did attack the Newfoundland *trade* which, in contrast to the Newfoundland *fishery*, provided profitable and therefore attractive targets. However, the privateers preferred to attack this trade in European waters, where shipping routes converged and made targets easier to find, and where captured vessels and cargoes could be quickly disposed in the market ports of friendly European countries like Spain and France. The greatest injury inflicted upon the Newfoundland fishery by the war was caused by the Royal Navy, when its rapid expansion beginning in 1778 interfered with the fishery's supply of labor.[61]

Since privateers were unlikely to threaten the fishery with destruction, responsibility for such a strategy was left to public warships. State navies were usually employed in the defense of local waters. While state warships were occasionally sent into Newfoundland waters, they generally were like the privateers, hunting

55. Statement of T. Hardy, master of the banker brig *Patty*, 11 June 1777, Adm 1/471, 118-20; Capt. R. Pringle to Board of Ordnance, 20 June 1777, St. John's, Newfoundland, Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador [PANL], GB 2/1, Royal Engineers, Correspondence 1774-1777, pp. 102-3; Sir G. Collier (Halifax, HMS *Rainbow*) to P. Stephens, 12 July 1777, Adm 1/1611, #2. The cruise of *Hancock* and *Boston* is described in some detail in Allen, *Naval History* I, 202-16; while the description in Bradford, "Navies," 15 is much briefer, it recognizes that the privateers were never really a part of the frigates' plan to cruise up to the Newfoundland banks.

56. D. Irvine, "The Newfoundland Fishery: A French Objective in the War of American Independence," *Canadian Historical Review* XIII (1932), 281-83.

57. Board of War (Boston) to J. Williams, commander of *Protector*, May 1780, Maine Historical Society *Collections*, second ser., XVIII, *Documentary History of the State of Maine, Containing the Baxter Manuscripts*, ed. J. P. Baxter (Boston: The Society, 1914), p. 253; Adm. M. Arbuthnot to P. Stephens, 20 August 1780, Adm 1/486: 406; J. Warren to J. Adams, 12 October 1780, *Warren-Adams Letters* II, 141. Ironically, because no Newfoundland-bound ships were taken, Keith Matthews declared 1780 to be the year in which "The American threat was finally mastered" in Newfoundland; Matthews, "A History," 480.

58. Fowler, *Rebels*, 101-2.

59. The problem of the fishery's defense during this war is examined more fully in Janzen, "Royal Navy," 28-48.

60. Prof. Sidney Morse, cited in Morgan, "American Privateering," 11.

61. O. Janzen, "Newfoundland and British Maritime Strategy During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, 1983), pp. 248-49; Matthews, "A History," 475, 480-81.

trans-Atlantic convoys of merchantmen and supply ships whose cargoes would support or finance the revolutionary war effort. Consequently, the only noteworthy efforts to destroy the fishery came from the national navy.

The decision in 1775 to establish a Continental Navy was supposed to have given Patriot leaders not only the means by which to defend American commerce at sea, but also the weapon with which to carry the war to the enemy by attacking targets of strategic and economic value to England, such as the fishery at Newfoundland. But the Continental Navy was an imperfect weapon, as the abortive raid on the fishery demonstrated. The construction, outfitting, and manning of Continental warships was extremely slow and inefficient. This was perhaps the unavoidable consequence of an infant and inexperienced administration, as well as of the necessity to compete with too many private and local public warships for too few men and materiel. Thus, the Hopkins expedition never did manage to sail against the Newfoundland fishery, while the frigates *Hancock* and *Boston* required nearly seven months of effort after receiving their instructions before they were able to put out to sea. Still another problem was the lack of a strong sense of discipline among the navy's officer corps; one historian described them as "fiercely independent prima donnas."[62] It is a description which suits Commodore Hopkins, who ignored his instructions to clear Chesapeake Bay of enemy cruisers in order to attack the Bahamas. It also suits captains Manley and McNeill, who were exceeding their instructions when they attacked the Newfoundland Bank fishery.

Finally, and perhaps most seriously, the Continental Congress seemed uncertain about what the navy was supposed to do. Any navy must fulfill a variety of missions, but for those missions to serve best the national interest, they must conform to a national naval policy which in turn must reflect a consensus among the national leaders. This the Continental Navy lacked. Too often, orders were given but allowed to fall by the wayside or not followed through. Thus, the plan to attack the British fishery at Newfoundland in 1776 was well-conceived. Yet it was poorly executed, and never revived. And even though the effectiveness of the navy suffered by its inability to compete with privateers for men and materiel, the Marine Committee never was able to develop a solution to the problem which was acceptable to all its members. Perhaps the most perceptive explanation for the navy's limitations was that of Cotton Tufts, a Boston physician and Patriot:

> It has been our Misfortune to be plunged into more Business than we could possibly conduct with any Degree of Clearness and to enter upon *new* Business before we had finished *old*. Necessity has often compelled us to this. Wisdom points out what is profitable and necessary to be done, but Means are not always at hand. In this Case We must pass on to what is practicable and content ourselves with a Lesser Good where we cant obtain a greater.[63]

The inability of the Americans to mount an effective offensive against the British fishery at Newfoundland at any time during the war suggests that Tufts was right.

62. Fowler, *Rebels*, 234.

63. C. Tufts to J. Adams, 24 April 1777, cited in Allen, *Naval History* I, 416.

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Lorenzo Sabine's History of the Fisheries

WILLIAM L. WELCH

HISTORIANS of the American Revolution are familiar with Lorenzo Sabine's biographical sketches of the loyalists, the first comprehensive listing of royal partisans in the events of 1776.[1] Less well known are his studies in the fisheries. To Sabine we are indebted for sketches of nineteenth-century coastal life as well as arguments in support of United States fishing interests in the North Atlantic, and a general survey of the fisheries down to 1852. An enlarged view of Sabine's important contribution to American maritime history would seem to be in order.

Sabine was born in New Hampshire in 1803, the oldest son of the Reverend Elijah and Hannah (Clark) Sabine, a poor country parson and his wife. Of his childhood he wrote that his father could barely provide his family with food: "A top, a ball, a hoop, a knife, and a fishing-rod, Weems's Life of Washington, Gulliver's Travels, and Robinson Crusoe comprised every article of property which I could call my own." Yet the boy admired his father if we can judge from another statement he made. "My father was a man remarkable for his common sense," said Sabine, "as full of wise-sayings and maxims as was Franklin himself."[2] Around 1810 the Sabines left New Hampshire when Elijah became pastor of the Bromfield Street Church in Boston. He also served as chaplain to the Massachusetts House of Representatives. A further move down-east ended in tragedy for the Sabines, however, when Elijah died and left his wife and young children destitute. For a time, until his mother remarried, Lorenzo stayed at home. But in 1821 "without education, and just ten dollars and fifty-six cents in money" he set out to seek his fortune "on the eastern frontier of the Union," in Eastport, Maine.[3]

Eastport, located on Moose Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, was home to some two thousand people when Sabine arrived there in 1821. Settled by fishermen from the Portsmouth-Cape Ann area, the community survived by exporting much of its catch—primarily cod, mackerel, and herring, salted or cured—to Boston, New York, and the West Indies. While its boat and shore fisheries and weiring and seining were important, each year Eastport also sent out a large fleet to the fishing banks of Labrador, Newfoundland, and Cape Sable.[4] Sabine began his career by engaging a small clerkship in a local store, and taking his meals at what he called a "sad boarding-house," sleeping in an "unfinished garret among old barrels, boxes, and other rubbish." While yet a minor he tried to set up in business on his own, but failed. Undaunted, he married and provided a home for his younger brothers and sisters, orphans like himself since his mother's death. To recover his financial losses he entered a countinghouse, and agreed to keep the books for a local bank. By dint of hard work and the kind offices of friends he settled with his creditors, and started out in business again. Ultimately he was success-

1. See Lorenzo Sabine, *The American Loyalists, or Biographical Sketches of Adherents to the British Crown in the War of the Revolution* (Boston, 1847); and, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1864).

2. Address delivered by Sabine before the Association of Farmers, Framingham, Massachusetts, January 1851, Sabine's Papers, MS., vol. 9, New Hampshire Historical Society.

3. Sabine to Charles C. Hazewell, 11 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; Isaac Ray to Edward E. Hale, 4 March 1880, quoted in Edward E. Hale, "Memoir of the Hon. Lorenzo Sabine, A.M.," Massachusetts Historical Society *Proceedings* XVII (Boston, 1880), 374-76; "Lorenzo Sabine," *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XVI: 276-77; William H. Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy* (Eastport, Maine, 1888), pp. 263-64; William B. Sprague, *Annals of the American Pulpit* VII (New York, 1861), 306-13.

4. Harold A. Davis, *An International Community on the St. Croix, 1604-1930* (Orono, Maine, 1950), pp. 170-74, 309; Sabine to Edward E. Hale, 15 January 1850, Edward E. Hale Papers, MS., New York State Library.

ful. Of this part of his life he wrote: "For fifteen years I prospered. I built and owned vessels, fitted out fishermen, and was a petty dealer in codfish and molasses."[5]

Meanwhile, he pursued a course in self-improvement, buying books and studying in the evenings. He noted upon his arrival in Eastport that "dissipation was too general to cause remark. Young men employed in stores, with hardly an exception, used stimulants freely even when about their business." In an effort to cultivate the cultural life of the community, he and a few friends formed the Quoddy Forum, a reading and social club, that evolved eventually into a lyceum.[6] It is from Sabine's lectures before the Eastport Lyceum in the 1830s that we have his earliest views on the subject of the fisheries.

Most important is "The Fisheries as a Source of Wealth and Nursery for Seamen" which he delivered in 1832. In a long discourse he traced the rise, progress, and status of New England's maritime industry. "Shrewdness is the reproach and enterprise the glory of New England's people," he began, "and among the many objects of New England enterprise none is more worthy of remark than its success in maratime [*sic*] pursuits." The love of nautical adventure had showed itself early in the region. Within twenty-two years of the settlement of Plymouth vessels 100 to 400 tons were being built, and the fishing interest had started out even earlier. Its existence was known from a Bay Colony ordinance of 1639, which excused fishermen from the performance of military duty, and exempted their property from taxes. So vigorously was the codfishery prosecuted in New England, said Sabine, that within thirty-six years of its commencement there were 665 vessels of 25,560 tons manned by 4,405 men employed in this activity.

In more recent times he claimed that Massachusetts "had no rival among the Codfishers of the world." He presented figures showing that in 1829 the state employed 2,332 vessels of 115,940 tons in codfishing manned by 15,059 hands, who produced 1.3 million quintals of fish and 50,500 barrels of oil. At Labrador alone New England had 1,500 vessels employed, catching a million quintals of fish a year and producing 11,000 casks of oil at a total value of $3.3 million. Mackerel fishing, though begun as late as 1804, accounted for an additional 308,000 barrels at an average annual worth of $1.5 million.

According to Sabine, the whale fishery had started in 1715, and he referred to it as a more important branch of industry than either cod or mackerel fishing since its practice required a "constant and unremitting exercise of the sterner qualities of the human soul." At present there were 39,000 tons of shipping employed in whaling, he said, worth about $7 million, and yielding in oil and whalebone about $3.5 million a year. He believed every country possessing this fishery had built it up with bounties, but in the United States it had become important solely through enjoyment of the home market. Whaling was intimately connected with domestic manufacturing and the import duty on olive oil, he averred, since a quarter to a third of the sperm oil produced in America was used in cotton and woolen factories. Should manufacturing be allowed to languish, or olive oil be permitted to supply the place of sperm oil in manufacturing, American whaling would suffer. The men employed in this business asked for no boon, no protection or bounty, he said. All they asked for employing $7 million worth of ships, training up six thousand seamen and adding $3.5 million to the production of the country was continued enjoyment of the home market.

The subject of the fisheries should be of interest to all, he continued, whether one regarded them as belonging to the nation, or to one of its outposts such as Eastport. Fishing should be a subject of deep solicitude to the statesman, the patriot, the merchant, and the farmer. "In the occupations of fishermen there was something benificent [*sic*] which called for the exercise of noble and exalted qualities." In common with the farmer the fisherman contributed to the subsistence of mankind, and he had the additional merit of working under continual exposure. "Industry, frugality, patience, perseverance, fortitude and intrepidy, souls inured to perpetual conflict with the elements and bodies steeled with unremitting action grappling with danger and familiar with death were the properties to which fishermen were formed by their daily labors."

Sabine claimed that American fish exports totalled $200,000 more than the produce of America's forests in 1831, and $750,000 more than the value of manufac-

5. Sabine to Hazewell, 11 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; Ray to Hale, 4 March 1880 in Hale, "Memoir," 374-76. For various business documents see Sabine's Papers, vol. 1.

6. Sabine memorandum and his lectures on the purpose of the lyceum in Sabine's Papers, vol. 2; Sabine to Hazewell, 11 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; Hale, "Memoir," 376-77; Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, p. 265.

tured cottons. The fisheries also employed more than a tenth of the total tonnage of the country.

Of the worth of the fisheries as a means of supplying manpower to the navy he was more vague. "No calculation could be made in dollars and cents," he said, "nor could the precise degree of the contribution be ascertained." Yet throughout our history the fisheries had afforded the navy "a large supply" of men. "More than 175 of the *Constitution*'s crew in her last battle were fishermen."

He concluded: "The fisheries may be considered as part of the naval force of the country. A part which in peace draws nothing from national resources, adds nothing to national expenditures, and yields a handsome increase to national wealth."[7] It was a worthy performance for a man so lacking in formal education.

As a businessman and lecturer Sabine was a prominent figure in Eastport in the 1830s, and he took an active part in politics as well. He served several terms in the Maine legislature, and was appointed a justice of the peace in 1835. He also became inspector and deputy collector of customs for the Passamaquoddy district in 1841.[8] Yet he longed for a literary life, or as he put it, "to write one, just one, article for the 'North American Review.'" Thus he was fortunate in his friendship with Dr. Isaac Ray. Born in Massachusetts in 1807, Ray had taken his medical degree at Bowdoin in 1827, and opened a practice in Portland before moving to Eastport. In later years he would serve at several hospitals in the New England area which specialized in the treatment of mental illness. He became an accomplished psychiatrist, "a giant among men of his specialty," and an expert in the medical jurisprudence of insanity. His biographer calls him a man accomplished in the humanities as well as the sciences. A prolific writer, Ray produced more than a hundred titles in fifty-three years of authorship.[9]

Of his years in Eastport, Ray described himself as a "fledgling doctor," and Sabine as a "great reader and shrewd observer of men and things." Close in age and similar in intellectual tastes, which were stimulated no doubt by the ruggedness of their surroundings, the two young men became fast friends. After a while Sabine began to put his thoughts on paper, said Ray, and bring the results to him for examination. "Many an evening we spent together over his pieces, scrutinizing the grammar, phraseology, and construction." The joint efforts of teacher and student bore fruit in the 1840s and 1850s when Sabine published, not one, but a dozen articles in the *North American Review* and *Christian Examiner* on topics ranging from American colonial history and the Maine timber trade to the Indians of New England and Canadian affairs, in addition to a life of Preble for Sparks's library of American biography and the first edition of the *Loyalists*. Yet his basic love remained the fisheries, for as Ray said:

> Surrounded as he was in Eastport by a peculiar race of seamen, rough, resolute, and fearless, inured by a lifelong struggle with the elements to the sharpest use of their faculties and the strongest forms of self-reliance, Sabine was led to place a high estimate on the value of the mental constitution thus developed.[10]

In the 1840s Sabine published two pieces on the fisheries. In the first he called prophetically for a history of the American fisheries, and went on to discuss the status of the cod, mackerel, and herring trades.[11] His word-pictures of nineteenth-century coastal life, especially the working techniques of "herring-fishers" in Maine's Passamaquoddy Bay, were particularly descriptive. Herring have been caught for many years in Quoddy Bay "by means of lighted torches," he wrote. The practice is for fishermen to place a light in the bow of a small boat and drift about the favorite resorts of the herring on dark nights, bailing in with a dip-net all that are attracted to the surface of the water. Islanders in the bay have a story that the discovery of the attracting properties of light was accidental. "Years ago, a fisherman who lived on Campobello and who chanced one night to be on the side of one of its little harbors opposite to his own house, on remembering that he had no fire at home, took some chips and coals in a skillet to carry across." During the passage the chips took fire and blazed up, and on landing he found that a large number of herring had followed him to shore.

7. Sabine's Papers, vol. 2.

8. His commissions are in Sabine's Papers, vols. 3 and 6; see also Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, pp. 136n., 263, 266.

9. "Isaac Ray," *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XV: 404-5; Fred Jacobs, "Isaac Ray and the profession of Psychiatry," *Rhode Island History* XXXIII (November 1979), 99-111; Sabine to Hazewell, 11 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11.

10. Ray to Hale, 4 March 1880 in Hale, "Memoir," 375-76. See also Ray to Sabine, 6 January and 15 November 1846, 14 November 1847, 4 February 1849, 11 February 1855, 6 October 1856, 26 February, 2 April, and 29 August 1864, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13.

11. "The Fisheries: Cod, Mackerel, and Herring," *The North American Review* LVII (Boston, 1843), 58-86. See also Francis Bowen to Sabine, 24 March, 24 May, 1 July, 2 August, and 11 November 1843, and 23 January 1844, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10.

To watch from the headlands and beaches in the Eastport area the movements of the "herring-drivers" is a pleasurable recreation, Sabine continued. "I have seen a spacious harbor most beautifully lighted up with hundreds of lamps, each light heaving and falling with the motion of the sea. Far in the offing, the torches, no larger than a candle's flame, would move and dance, approach and cross each other, and then vanish, while nearer the red flare would reveal every act of the fisherman as he drew in the fish which he had lured to destruction."[12]

His portrait of the "herring-driver" was equally colorful. "He is neither so moral, so intelligent, so willing to pay his debts, or so temperate or industrious as he might be," said Sabine. But bred to boats he displays astonishing skills in their management. He will cross in the stormiest weather from island to island in Quoddy Bay, and go from passage to passage through its frightful whirl of tides, driving headlong upon its rocks merely to show how easily he can "go about."

The fisherman knows little about the hours of day or night, he continued. Everything with him is reckoned by the tide. If you ask him what time he was married, he will answer, "on the young flood last night." He will tell you that he saw a certain man about "low-water slack," or "just at half flood," "as the tide turned," or "at two hours to low water." Of nautical instruments he was also contemptuous, for the state of the moon and the predictions of the almanac, the sound of the sea and the size or shape of a "cat's-paw" or "glin" in the sky led him to far surer results.[13]

In his second article Sabine defended United States fishing rights in the North Atlantic against British encroachments resulting from colonial competition in the 1840s. He reviewed diplomatic guarantees on the subject in the Anglo-American treaties of 1783 and 1818. Together with a series he wrote as editor of the *Eastport Sentinel*, which was widely reprinted, he was able to publicize the issue for a national audience. Judging from his correspondence during this period he was recognized as an expert on the fisheries on the British side of the border too.[14]

Sometime in 1849 Sabine left Maine for Massachusetts taking up residence in Framingham. He seems to have hoped for some kind of academic employment, but if so, he was disappointed.[15] Problems with Britain on the North Atlantic fishing grounds had continued, however, and in 1852 he was asked by the government to prepare a position paper for the United States on the subject. To facilitate the project he was appointed a confidential and special agent of the treasury to the general approbation of Boston's intellectual community.[16] During 1852 he worked on his report which appeared the following year as the *Principal Fisheries of the American Seas*. Some three hundred pages in length, and based on "materials he had collected for twenty-five years," Sabine's magnum opus was divided into four major parts. First, he detailed the history of the French codfishery at Newfoundland, which he followed up in part two with a discussion of the British fishery at Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. He described the number and types of vessels used, crew sizes, and fishing techniques employed. His inclusion of statistical tables quantifying ship tonnage and the total number of men engaged in fishing, and the amount and value of fish produced annually by each nation gave his work a remarkably modern cast.[17]

In part three he presented his history of United States fisheries. The Pilgrim fathers had redeemed their debts through the fisheries, he began, and Maine was founded

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12. "The Fisheries: Cod, Mackerel, and Herring," 65-66.

13. Ibid., 69-70.

14. "The American Fisheries," *The North American Review* LXII (Boston, 1846), 350-79; Bowen to Sabine, 31 October 1845, 5 January, 6 February, and 2 April, 1846, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; Jared Sparks to Sabine, 23 April 1846, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13. See *Eastport Sentinel*, 18 June, 6 August, 17 September, and 5 November 1845, and 18 February 1846, reprinted under various dates in the *Boston Courier*, *Augusta Age*, *Gloucester Light and Telegraph*, *National Intelligencer* (Washington, D.C.), and *New York Tribune*. See also Moses Perley to Sabine, 19 October and 24 November 1846, and 31 July 1849, Sabine's Papers, vol. 12.

15. He had been awarded an honorary M.A. by Bowdoin in 1846, and the same degree by Harvard in 1848 in recognition of his publications. See Sabine's Papers, vol. 5. See also Sparks to Sabine, 21 March 1849, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13; Sabine to George E. Ellis, 20 May and 3 June 1847, George E. Ellis Papers, 1844-1848, MS., box 12, Massachusetts Historical Society; Ellis to Sabine, 27 May 1847 and 20 November 1849, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; Bowen to Sabine, 14 and 23 May 1849, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; Luther Severance to Sabine, 24 October 1845, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13.

16. His commission is in Sabine's Papers, vol. 6. See too Philip Greely, Jr., collector of the port of Boston, to Thomas Corwin, secretary of the treasury, 8 January 1852; Corwin to Greely, 27 January 1852; Greely to Sabine, 29 January, 2 February, and 11 December 1852; Sabine to first auditor of the treasury, 2 June 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 6. Also see Daniel Webster to Sabine, 7 August 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 4; Sabine to Charles Francis Adams, 28 October 1852 and CFA to Sabine, 4 November 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; and, Edward Everett to Sabine, 7 and 20 September, 15 October, and 1 November 1852 and Sabine to Everett, 16 September 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11.

17. Lorenzo Sabine, *Report on the Principal Fisheries of the American Seas* (Washington, 1853), pp. 7-91.

by fishermen at Monhegan, Pemaquid, and Richmond's Island. New Hampshire too was peopled because of an interest in fish. The Isles of Shoals, New Hampshire's first settlement, were admirably situated for fishing, said Sabine, and as early as 1661 there were forty families at the Shoals prosecuting the trade. Beginning in 1730, three to four ships a year were loaded at the Shoals for Spain, and large quantities of fish were also shipped to the West Indies. Before the Revolution Shoals dunfish had attained "universal celebrity," and even the minister's salary was paid in fish, being assessed at a rate of "a quintal of merchantable winter-fish per man."[18]

The settlement of Massachusetts could also be traced to the fisheries, he wrote, citing writers such as Winthrop, Higginson, and Johnson to show the richness of the codfishery in Massachusetts Bay in the seventeenth century. He reviewed the Bay Colony's system of protectionism beginning with a 1639 act that limited property taxes on fishermen and exempted them from military duty during the fishing season. In 1652 the colony had also appointed "fish viewers" to guarantee the Massachusetts product.

He went on to trace the later progress of the fishing industry at the Bay. In 1633, he said, fish were exported from Boston for the first time, and in 1643 a cargo was sent to Spain in exchange for wine, fruit, oil, iron, and wool. At the close of the seventeenth century Massachusetts was exporting 100,000 quintals of dried codfish a year to Portugal, Spain, and Italy worth about four hundred thousand dollars. In 1731 the Massachusetts codfisheries employed between five and six thousand men, and by 1741 annual production stood at 230,000 quintals worth seven hundred thousand dollars in exports. The average size of fishing vessels in Massachusetts in 1741 was fifty tons, said Sabine, and 160 ships were owned in Marblehead alone. The whole number of fishing *vessels* in Massachusetts in 1741 was 400 with an equal number of what he called ketches, shallops, and undecked boats.[19]

Passing quickly over the vicissitudes of the codfisheries in the Revolution, he went on to detail the operations of the industry in the nineteenth century, the period with which he was most familiar. There were three principal codfishing grounds, he wrote, at Newfoundland, Labrador, and the Bay of Fundy. The Newfoundland fishery was the oldest, Boston vessels having gone there as early as 1645. The "great bank" of Newfoundland was two hundred miles wide and six hundred miles long; its seas were high and its fogs dense. "Bankers" anchored in the open ocean and pursued their employment exposed to all the perils of the weather. Fish were caught with hooks and lines, then split, dressed and salted in bulk.

Fishermen much preferred the Labrador shore, said Sabine, because of its greater security and the certainty of obtaining a catch. An American ship generally arrived at Labrador in June; it was moored and remained so until it made a "full fare." Fishing was done from boats, and if fish were plentiful boats were expected to catch two loads a day. The return of the boats to the vessel was a signal for a dressing crew to perform a series of operations which when completed left the fish in a form ready to be purchased by the consumer. From the dressing table fish were thrown down the hatchway to a salter, who cured them and stacked them in the hold. If the master wished to remain on the coast till his fish were ready for market, the catch was taken on shore and dressed, salted, and dried before being taken to the vessel. If the master's intention was to dry his fish at home, the salter's duty was the last performed abroad. The average production of the Labrador fishery was ten quintals per ton for the vessels employed in it.

The codfishery in the Bay of Fundy began earlier and was pursued later in the season, usually yielding larger and better quality fish. Also, because of the greater depth of water and rise of tide, it required longer fishing lines. Ships employed at Fundy were smaller and less valuable than those used elsewhere. Vessels fished on the outer grounds, while boats kept within the Bay's passages and about its ledges. "Two hundred boats were sometimes in sight at Eastport," said Sabine, "and when by a turn of the tide or change of the wind the little fleet drew together and floated past the town, the scene was not without interest." He provided statistics on the codfishery which included a town-by-town and state-by-state listing of the number and tonnage of vessels engaged annually as well as the men employed, and the amount and value of fish produced.[20]

Sabine also surveyed the mackerel and herring fisheries of the United States. The former had begun in the seventeenth century, he said, but had been pursued commercially only since 1804. Mackerel fishers "made

18. Ibid., pp. 93-117.

19. Ibid., pp. 117-32.

20. Ibid., pp. 169-78.

fares" in the Bay of Fundy in July and August, in the Bay of Chaleurs in September, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in October. Serious depressions were common in the industry, however, since mackerel did not always appear. In conducting this fishery, the master of a vessel, after reaching some well-known resort of the fish, furled his sails, brought his bow into the wind, ranged his crew along one of her sides, and without a mackerel in sight, tried to raise a *school* or *shoal* by throwing over bait. If he succeeded, a scene ensued which could hardly be described, said Sabine: "I have heard more than one fisherman say that he had caught sixty mackerel a minute." Eight, ten, and even twelve thousand fish were often caught in this way, and "dressed down." When a vessel returned to port, the fish were landed and sorted, then weighed, and packed, salted, and pickled again.

The herring fishery also began early in America, he said, having been known to the Pilgrims. But herring like mackerel were subject to annual fluctuations. Principal fishing grounds for them were in the waters of eastern Maine and the Bay of Fundy, as well as in the Magdalene islands. Herring were cured by salting and smoking, and by salting and pickling.[21]

Having demonstrated the historic and commercial value of the fisheries to the United States, Sabine made his case in part four for American fishing rights in the North Atlantic. Under the treaty of 1783, he said, Yankee fishermen retained the right to fish in the waters of British America, restricted only by the convention of 1818 to territory three miles at least from the colonial shore. Until the 1840s both Britain and America had construed the three-mile line to run in conformity with the colonial coast. More recently the British government, at the behest of its colonists troubled by American competition, had insisted that the three-mile line was to run from "headland to headland," thus excluding Yankee fishermen from the bays of British America. American "transgressors" straying inside the new line had been seized, and American industry had suffered. Such outrages must cease, said Sabine, as a matter of right and justice.

Yet he urged moderation and called upon both governments to resolve their differences through diplomacy. There were fish enough in the American seas for all. He hoped England would not maintain a position so likely to produce troubles like those that had formerly existed between us and her. Fishermen were poor interpreters of international law and of "unreal and fictitious distinctions," he went on. To them the open sea and "great bays" were one and the same, a continuous fishing ground. Few of them would see or respect a line constructed by colonial ingenuity.

If the new construction were persisted in, Sabine said, the United States would lose a third of its cod and mackerel fisheries. "Let not our Colonial brethren press us too far; the Colonists must subdue their hatred of the Yankees. The children of the patriots of 1776 demanded free access to all the seas of British America, and would be satisfied with nothing less."[22]

Response to Sabine's report was uniformly positive. Whig party leaders in Massachusetts were especially effusive in their praise. Congressman Robert C. Winthrop of Boston thanked Sabine for his "curious and instructive" study, while E. R. Hoar of Concord was delighted with its "thorough and elaborate" content. A. P. Peabody of the *North American Review* termed the report "admirable," and Charles W. Upham of Salem wrote that it was an "instructive and valuable volume. You have done good work for your country." Democrat Caleb Cushing remarked that he knew Sabine's work and esteemed it highly. Hugh J. Anderson, commissioner of customs, concluded in a letter: "I congratulate you upon having furnished a work so much needed, which in point of research and execution reflects so much credit upon its author."[23]

East Coast newspapers were no less adulatory. The *Baltimore Sun* termed the report "full and valuable. Mr. Sabine has given much attention to this subject for a number of years, and is more familiar with it than any other man in the country. He strongly supports the rights of American fishermen, and his report embodies information which will be of great value to the government." The *Barnstable* (Massachusetts) *Patriot* complimented Sabine for "deep research and thorough

21. Ibid., pp. 178-97.

22. Ibid., pp. 215-317; Sabine to Sparks, 9 December 1852 and Sparks to Sabine, 15 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13.

23. Robert C. Winthrop to Sabine, 20 April 1853 and 13 November 1859, Sabine's Papers, vol. 14; E. R. Hoar to Sabine, 2 May 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; A. P. Peabody to Sabine, 10 December 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 12; Charles W. Upham to Sabine, 18 April 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 14; Caleb Cushing to Sabine, 29 August 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; H. J. Anderson to Sabine, 16 June 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; George S. Hillard to Sabine, 4 November 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 11; John G. Palfrey to Sabine, 14 May 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 12; John L. Sibley to Sabine, 15 April 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13.

investigation." For many years he has "commanded the admiration of the best minds in the country."[24]

More gratifying to Sabine was his election to Congress on the Whig ticket in 1852 as the "indefatigable friend of the fisherman." Chosen to fill the broken term of Benjamin Thompson, who had died, the press waxed enthusiastic about his elevation. "No one is so well acquainted with the subject of the fisheries," said the *East Boston Ledger*. He is "a self-made man and will meet many in Congress not half so worthy to be there as himself." The *Mercury and Salem Weekly Gazette* agreed. The *Boston Courier* opined that Sabine was a man whom every person engaged in fishing in every seaport from eastern Maine to the city of New York rejoiced to see in Congress. "He has acquired a thorough knowledge of the business and by study and research has made himself acquainted with the history of the fisheries. While at Washington he was consulted by gentlemen of all parties and we know Mr. Rantoul[25] considered him *the source* of information on the fishery question." Though his district was not "*directly* interested in the business," the *Courier* continued, "whatever affects one portion of New England affects the whole."

The *Boston Transcript* caused smiles with its comment that "the fishermen of Gloucester and Marblehead would barbecue a whale in honor of the election of Mr. Sabine," while the *Lowell American* could not resist a pun: Sabine's election is considered "a *net* gain to the fishing interest. His name is so intimately connected with the question that one newspaper has called him Mr. Sardine." Way down-east the editor of the *Belfast* (Maine) *Republican Journal* declared: "Sabine's published papers sustain our rights, and in congress Mr S will have an opportunity to endear himself anew to the people of his native [*sic*] state, and to make them proud that Maine has raised a strong defender of her great interest." The *Gloucester Telegraph* suggested that Sabine's election was "gratifying to that portion of New England engaged in the fishing business." There is probably no man who understands the trade both practically and theoretically so well. He knows the wants and grievances under which it is laboring. "If he does not stir up the blood of Southerners in regard to the insults offered to our flag we are very much mistaken."[26]

During his brief term in Congress Sabine supported legislation to reduce tensions in the North Atlantic fisheries, and ultimately he was pleased with the reciprocity treaty of 1854 which resolved territorial disputes in the waters of British America. Yet he loathed Washington life ("Confound the chills and fevers of this climate," he wrote a friend, "which take a man down as if shot, and hurry a poor fellow to his grave."), so he declined all overtures to stand for reelection.[27] Still he agreed to perform one last chore for the Whig party. A proposed constitution in 1853 threatened Whig hegemony in the Bay State, and he was asked to persuade voters to reject it. On 9 November he made his most important speech on the subject at Gloucester. It shows his attempt to convince a largely sympathetic audience:

> Fishermen of Cape Ann: [he began.] More than half of my life has been passed among men of your toilsome and uncertain avocation. I was bred to buy and sell the products of the sea. "At my island home on the eastern frontier of Maine, my vessels visited the waters of distant, desolate Labrador, the Bay of Chaleurs, and the Bay of Fundy for the cod, and they pursued the mackerel in its many haunts from May to November." As a practical man I know something of the perils and hardships to which American fishermen are exposed. You all know that the people of Middlesex, though not owning a single fishing smack, sent me to the councils of the nation in the hope that I might lend *some* aid to those who were attempting to adjust our controversies.
>
> I am constrained to say tonight that the authors of the proposed constitution "have made a lubberly job of it. Depend on it, they were men who never 'learned the ropes'. There was not an 'old salt' among them."
>
> Massachusetts was too good a vessel to be sent to sea under such papers [he went on]. Perhaps she did need some examination. After all, she had seen much hard service since 1780. But as Hancock and the Adamses had built her, and as Webster and Story and Parker had given her a "thorough overhauling"

24. *Baltimore Sun*, 4 January 1853; *Barnstable Patriot*, 16 November 1852.

25. Robert Rantoul served in Congress from Massachusetts in 1851-1852.

26. *East Boston Ledger*, 18 December 1852; *Mercury and Salem Weekly Gazette*, 6 October 1852; *Boston Courier*, 5 October 1852; *Lowell American*, 1 January 1853; *Belfast Republican Journal*, 17 December 1852; *Gloucester Telegraph*, ? December 1852. See also *Boston Atlas*, 1 November 1852; *Boston Courier*, 4 December 1852; John S. Ladd to Sabine, 21 October 1852 and Sabine to Ladd, 23 October 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 6; Sabine to Palfrey, 17 December 1852 and Palfrey to Sabine, 20 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 12; Sparks to Sabine, 23 December 1852, Sabine's Papers, vol. 13.

27. *Congressional Globe*, 32d Cong., 2nd sess . XXVI (Washington, 1853), 161, 567-68, 777; Donald C. Masters, *The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* (Toronto, 1963), pp. 29-61, 118-20, 140-44; *Baltimore Republican and Argus*, 9 February 1853; Lorenzo Sabine, "Framingham in the Revolution" (Framingham, Mass., 1933), pp. 26-27, 30-32; Luther V. Bell to Sabine, 26 October 1853, Winthrop to Sabine, 20 April 1853, and Upham to Sabine, 18 April 1853, Sabine's Papers, vols. 10, 14.

in 1820, "her frame was sound." Compared with her builders in 1780, and the men who "opened her timbers" in 1820, the men of '53 were "greenhorns." They had not done the job "ship-shape and Bristol fashion." They didn't "know the keel from the transom," "the taff rail from the cut-water," or "a half-hitch from a granny knot."

Our duty is clear, [Sabine continued]. Let there be a "call of all hands." Let's get the old ship into harbor, and have a "new survey." Let the word be—"Up fore-sail, and scud away for Squam!" When safely at anchor, we'll make an examination of her, and—in due time—if she needs it, give her a "new fit out."

While any influence Sabine may have had on Massachusetts voters is conjectural, Whig leaders at least were pleased with election results. Bay Staters rejected the proposed constitution of 1853.[28]

In 1859 Sabine left Framingham for Boston to be closer to his job as secretary to the city's board of trade, a position he had assumed two years earlier. He continued to write and lecture on historical subjects, and serve in various scholarly societies.[29] In 1862 President Lincoln appointed him American representative to a joint commission made up of England, France, and the United States to act to preserve the fisheries. The Eastern press was delighted. "An excellent appointment," said the *Boston Transcript* and the *Daily Advertiser* agreed. "Preeminent fitness for a post is rarely a qualification for political office." The *Commercial Bulletin* called him "the right man in the right place," while the *Boston Post* remarked that it was as good an appointment as could have been made. The *Boston Journal* said that Sabine was "eminently fit" for the post, and the *Philadelphia Inquirer* called him "well qualified." *The Barnstable Patriot* concluded that his appointment was deserved. "Mr. Sabine is the best informed man on the subject of the fisheries in the United States, and is pre-eminently qualified for this important office."

Unfortunately, France failed to appoint her representative, and the fisheries commission died aborning. As late as 1870, however, Sabine continued to communicate with Washington on the subject of the fisheries.[30] He died at Boston in 1877, and was buried in Eastport.[31]

Lorenzo Sabine made an important contribution to the history of the fisheries. A self-made man, he spent some twenty-five years of his life in the fishing business and knew the operations of the trade intimately. When he turned to a literary life he used his practical knowledge to describe fishing scenes with remarkable clarity. His statistical information—gathered in a pre-computer age—makes his studies even more valuable. Historians of maritime America owe a debt of gratitude to Sabine, a pioneer in the history of the fisheries.

28. *Extract from, and Concluding Part of, the Speech of Lorenzo Sabine, at Gloucester on November 9, 1853, on the New Constitution* (N.p., n.d.), 1, 2, 6, 7; Bell to Sabine, 18 January and 26 October 1853, Sabine's Papers, vol. 10; A. B. Hart, ed., *Commonwealth History of Massachusetts* (New York, 1927-1930), IV: 19-22; Samuel Shapiro, "The Conservative Dilemma: The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853," *The New England Quarterly* (June 1960), pp. 220-21, 224; Thomas H. O'Connor, "Irish Votes and Yankee Cotton: The Constitution of 1853," Massachusetts Historical Society *Proceedings* XCV (Boston, 1984), 88-90; *Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of 1853* (Boston, 1853), III: 768.

29. Materials on the Boston Board of Trade, Sabine's Papers, vol. 4. For his scholarly affiliations see Sabine's Papers, vol. 5.

30. F. W. Seward to Sabine, 19 March 1862; Sabine to William H. Seward, 21 and 25 March 1862; Wm. H. Seward to Sabine, 22 March 1862; Hannibal Hamlin to Sabine, 23 March 1862; Sabine to Hamlin, 8 April 1870; Hamilton Fish to Hamlin, 22 April 1870; and newspaper clippings cited, see *Sabine's Works* III, New Hampshire Historical Society. His commission is in Sabine's Papers, vol. 6.

31. Hale, "Memoir," 382; Kilby, *Eastport and Passamaquoddy*, 267.

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Passenger Ships in the Coastwise Trade: American Public Policy Since 1789

MARK D. ASPINWALL*

THE American merchant marine has been the ward of the federal government since Congress first met in 1789, and the reasons then differ little from the reasons now. The promotion of trade and jobs, and the preservation of national security made it prudent that the nation ensure the existence of a U.S. flag shipping industry. Over the years, federal assistance has taken a great many forms. Among the oldest is the exclusion of foreign shipping from the American coastwise trade, a policy that has been in effect without interruption since 1817.[1] This policy was modeled after a British navigation act dating from the mid-seventeenth century, the purpose of which was to "reserve to British ships the coasting trade of the British Isles, from . . . one port or creek . . . to another port or creek. . . ."[2] Excluding all but American ships from the coastwise trade played an important role in the development of the post-Revolutionary War merchant marine at a time when the nation depended heavily on the shipping industry for transportation, communication, and economic and strategic development.

The term coastwise trade has never been adequately defined, although it is generally regarded as the transport and, in some cases, towing, of merchandise and passengers between places in the U.S. Salvaging in the territorial waters is included as well. It is often referred to as the Jones Act trade, though the Jones Act (the Merchant Marine Act of 1920) affected only the transport of merchandise, and had no impact on passengers.

Beginning in 1789, the government monitored ships operating in the coastwise trade by mandating that they first obtain a document, now issued by the coast guard.[3] Only domestically built and operated vessels could be issued a document permitting coastwise operation. Much later, public law went further and stipulated that the vessels be fully crewed by American citizens as well. The purpose of these rules was to ensure that shipbuilding, operating, and managing expertise was retained by Americans to the greatest extent possible.

By 1817 it was clear that foreign ships would have to be explicitly barred from operating between U.S. ports, and Congress acted that year to forbid such activity. The statute prohibited foreign ships from carrying "goods, wares, or merchandise" between American ports. The fact that only cargo carriage was affected apparently was not seen as a problem. Whether this was because passengers and cargo often traveled on the same ships, or because Congress did not care what ships carried passengers between American ports is unclear. However, it is likely that the former was true because of the early interpretations of our commercial law, including Gibbons v. Ogden, an 1824 case before the U.S. Supreme Court where it was held that

> Commerce is not prevented because the object of it is to serve the pleasure of passengers. The business was that of earning money by transporting people on the navigable waters of the United States and, strictly speaking, it is just as much a part of commerce . . . as if these vessels were carrying cargoes of merchandise.[4]

It was noted in this case that there was no law which governed what type of ship could carry passengers, and the court construed this to mean that Congress had felt that existing regulations covered passenger vessel movement in the coastwise trade, and that no additional regulation was necessary.[5]

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1. The Act of 1 March 1817. 3 *Stat.* 351.
2. *Great Navigation Act*, 8 October 1651.
3. Act of 1 September 1789. 1*Stat.* 55.
4. Gibbons v. Ogden 9 *Wheat.* 215-17.
5. Ibid., p. 218.

Contrary to Gibbons v. Ogden, the U.S. Attorney General ruled on 2 November 1843 that foreign vessels *could* transport passengers between ports of the United States. He construed the 1817 act, which stated that "no goods, wares or merchandise shall be imported . . . from one port of the United States to another port of the United States, in a vessel belonging wholly or in part to a subject of any foreign power," as not applying to passengers.[6] In support, the Attorney General cited City of New York v. Miln, where the Supreme Court held that passengers were not the subject of commerce, and therefore did not fall within the realm of Congress's power to regulate commerce. He misinterpreted the gist of the case, though, because the court was actually ruling on whether a state's police power could be used to regulate the landing of alien passengers. The court did not dispute the federal government's total monopoly over the navigable waters, including the carriage of passengers while aboard ship and, in fact, the case reaffirmed that power.

The Attorney General also cited (evidently unaware of an 1838 steamship law) the total lack of any federal legislation regarding the coastwise transport of passengers, except for the act of 12 March 1812 regarding inland steamboats, and stated his opinion that foreign vessels could legally carry passengers between the ports of the United States.[7]

The ruling did not cause much of a stir in government circles. Indeed, little attention was focused on passenger carriage in the mid-1800s in terms of policy initiatives that would reserve the trade for American ships. In fact, it is often assumed that passenger transportation was first reserved to American ships by the Passenger Ship Act of 1886, although this is not quite true. Somewhat by accident, as early as 1838, all steamships in the United States carrying passengers had to be American vessels. The Act of 7 July 1838 required all existing steam-propelled vessels to take out a new enrollment and license. It also stated that steamships could not transport goods, wares, merchandise or passengers in or upon the lakes, bays, rivers or other navigable waters of the United States without first obtaining the license. Among other things, the license stipulated that the ships be built in the United States and owned by Americans.

Newspaper accounts of the time reveal that there were at least two serious accidents on steamboats in June 1838 that resulted in heavy loss of life and that probably provided the impetus for the law. On 14 June 1838, a boiler on the steamer *Pulaski* exploded off Wilmington, North Carolina, destroying the ship and resulting in about one hundred and forty deaths.[8] It was learned from survivors that the *Pulaski*'s engineer had boasted before the voyage that it would be the fastest trip ever between Charleston and Baltimore, and it was believed that the boilers had been strained beyond their limits. Another accident occurred on Lake Erie on 16 June 1838, when the steamboat *Washington* caught fire during a passage from Cleveland to Detroit, with the loss of as many as forty people.[9]

Clearly, the 1838 law was a passenger safety measure enacted in response to at least two steamship disasters, and a reaction to the need for safe steamships rather than the need for domestically constructed and operated steamships in the coastwise trade. Nevertheless, perhaps inadvertently, the law reserved the coastwise transport of passengers for U.S.-built steam vessels until it was superseded by the Passenger Ship Act.

Another statute enacted in 1848 suggested that the federal government considered the carriage of passengers between U.S. ports *in any type of ship* to be coastwise trade. This law allowed vessels ". . . duly registered in pursuance of the laws of the United States . . ." to carry merchandise, passengers and their baggage, letters, and mails between ports of the U.S. with intermediate stops at foreign ports.[10] Assuming the intent was to establish rules pertaining to the coastwise trade, then the carriage of passengers must have been perceived by Congress to be an element of coastwise commerce, including those passengers carried on sailing ships.

The Passenger Ship Act of 1886 signaled the growing recognition of passenger-carrying ships as important transportation modes and indicated a need to regulate them separately from ships carrying merchandise. It stated that foreign vessels found transporting passengers between ports or places of the United States were subject to a fine of two-dollars per passenger landed.[11]

It is the feeling of many observers that the Passenger Ship Act had finally placed passenger transportation within the purview of coastwise trade by explicitly bar-

6. 4 *O.A.G.* 270, 2 November 1843.
7. Ibid.
8. *Providence Daily Journal*, 24, 25, 26, and 27 June 1838.
9. *Providence Daily Journal*, 21 and 22 June 1838.
10. Act of 27 May 1848, 19 *U.S.C.* 293.
11. Act of 19 June 1886. 24 *Stat.* 81.

ring foreign ships from that trade. On the other hand, it might be argued that the statute was passed merely to "put teeth" into a pre-existing policy by creating the two dollar per passenger penalty. Evidence supporting this view exists not just in the 1838 and 1848 laws, but also in Gibbons v. Ogden, heard by the Supreme Court in 1824. At any rate, by 1886, it was clear that foreign passenger ships were not welcome in the coastwise trade.

The two-dollar penalty was increased in 1898 to two hundred dollars per passenger.[12] Two dollars was deemed inadequate to exclude foreign ships from the Pacific Coast to Alaska passenger trade, since it could be added to the price of a ticket with little difficulty.[13] The 1898 amendment also outlawed foreign vessels from transporting passengers "directly or by way of a foreign port" between two U.S. ports or places. This was done to stem the practice of carrying passengers from Seattle to Vancouver on an American vessel and from Vancouver to Alaska on a foreign vessel.

No executive or judicial decision after enactment of the Passenger Ship Act questioned the premise that passenger transportation was an element of the coastwise trade. Further, the lack of congressional action in the face of the changing nature of the passenger ship industry has meant that judicial and administrative decisions have been the primary means of policy formulation. Both the U.S. Customs Service and the Attorney General's office have issued a number of rulings on the Passenger Ship Act and, in general, these have focused on the *continuity* of the voyage and whether the intended *purpose or objective* of the trip was coastwise transportation. In other words, a violation of the act was ruled if a foreign ship transported passengers "continuously," or if the "purpose" of the trip was a coastwise voyage.

The concept of the voyage "purpose" was introduced in 1910, when the Attorney General deemed that tourists who were taken aboard the German steamer *Cleveland* in New York for a world cruise and landed in San Francisco were not transported in violation of the Passenger Ship Act, even though ticket holders were allowed to embark in New York and disembark in San Francisco.[14] The rationale used was that since several ports around the world were visited, and the purpose of the trip was not strictly transportation between New York and San Francisco, the cruise did not violate the spirit of the act.

This ruling is still used by the customs service in regulating the carriage of sea-going travelers. It is legal to transport passengers between U.S. ports on a foreign vessel if a "far-away" foreign port is visited en route.[15] Customs has defined faraway foreign ports as all ports outside North and Central America (except for some of the Leeward Islands).

In 1940 the concept of the purpose of a voyage was used in a federal court case.[16] The case involved a Honduran ship working the banana trade between New York and Central America that regularly carried a limited number of passengers on a round-trip voyage from New York to Mexico. On one particular trip, the ship put in at Philadelphia on the return voyage to get the bananas ashore in a salable condition. The passengers were let off in Philadelphia and given railroad fare back to New York. Judge Bard examined previous Attorney General rulings and distinguished between the carriage of passengers locally (from Boston directly to Philadelphia, for example), and on world cruises. The Attorney General opinion of 26 February 1910 (the *Cleveland* case) was cited as support that the test should be the object of the transportation.

> If one should take passage on a vessel at New York for Liverpool, and after transacting business in that city should again take passage on the same vessel on its return voyage and be landed in Boston, it certainly would not be insisted that the vessel would be subject to the penalty imposed by the statute."[17]

The judge ruled in the case that the object of the transportation in question was a cruise to a foreign port and not coastwise commerce between U.S. ports. This decision reinforced customs's earlier *Cleveland* opinion that had tied the notion of intent, or purpose of the voyage, to the geographic distance the ship traveled between the two coastwise ports.[18]

An example of the "continuous voyage" test con-

12. Act of 17 February 1898. 30 *Stat.* 248.

13. Letter from Secretary of the Treasury L. J. Gage to Sen. William P. Frye, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. *Congressional Record,* vol. 31, pp. 1729-30, 15 February 1898.

14. 28 *O.A.G.* 204.

15. 19 *C.F.R.* 4.80a.

16. The Granada 35 *Fed. Supp.* 892 et. seq., District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 4 December 1940. The courts have traditionally drawn heavily upon customs rulings in this field.

17. 28 *O.A.G.* 204, 208.

18. Foreign cruise ships repositioning between Los Angeles and Miami will take passengers with them and make a stop at, for example, Aruba, which is classified by the customs service as a non-nearby foreign port.

cerned a foreign vessel that picked up paying travelers in Cleveland, took them to the port of Windsor in Canada, and then transported them to Chicago. The Attorney General ruled on 4 September 1886 that the voyage was illegal, since it was "a substantially continuous one" aboard a foreign vessel between ports of the United States.[19] However, he did not rule out the option of the people transferring to a *different* foreign ship at the Canadian port in order to avoid the two-dollar per passenger fine. (The penalty was $2 until 1898.)

In a similar case, the transport of a group of people from Philadelphia to Boston, where they attended a convention, and then back to Philadelphia via two Canadian ports, all on a foreign ship, was found to be a violation of the Passenger Ship Act in a 1924 ruling.[20] The central finding here was that the primary object of the voyage was the attendance at a convention in Boston. Without that convention, the voyage would not have taken place.

Presaging things to come, a 1912 ruling addressed the question of cruises to nowhere on foreign ships. Canadian vessels that were making trips on the Great Lakes to and from an American port prompted the ruling. The Attorney General decided such an activity did not violate the Passenger Ship Act of 1886 because, strictly construed, the act merely bars foreign vessels from transporting passengers *between different U.S. ports,* and does not address the issue of "round-trips" from the same port.[21]

Interestingly, a 1939 Kentucky State Court of Appeals case disagreed with that conclusion.

> Coasting trade embraces commercial intercourse between places in the same district or state on a navigable river. . . . That the object may be to serve the pleasure of passengers and the journey from and to the same port would seem to make no difference in the classification.[22]

Despite this finding, trips to and from the same port (cruises to nowhere) have not been reserved solely for American ships under the coastwise laws.

The customs service has combined the Passenger Ship Act of 1886 with various rulings and established a three-tiered system to control the movement of foreign passenger ships between U.S. ports.[23] In the first tier, a foreign vessel moving passengers between U.S. ports without any intervening stops is operating illegally if a passenger steps ashore at the second port even temporarily. In the second tier, if a foreign vessel touches a "nearby" foreign port between the U.S. ports, the passengers may go ashore while the vessel is in the second U.S. coastwise port, as long as they reboard the ship before it leaves. In the third tier, a foreign passenger vessel may discharge travelers permanently at a second U.S. port if a "non-nearby" foreign port is visited first. However, if coastwise transportation is the primary object, or purpose, of the voyage in any of these three cases, it is a violation of the Passenger Ship Act. The purpose of the voyage is coastwise transportation if the number of U.S. ports visited exceeds the number of foreign ports visited, *or* if the amount of time spent in U.S. ports exceeds the amount of time spent in foreign ports.[24]

Many people feel this three-tiered system is a needless decomposition of a statute that was never intended to apply to the modern cruise industry. While the 1886 law was created to assure U.S.-flag presence in the coastwise transportation market, the industry is no longer concerned with transportation, and in fact is able to sidestep the U.S.-flag requirement by providing a round-trip service to and from the same port. This service is in line with the evolution of passenger vessels into cruise ships, which are essentially floating resorts, rather than liner ships, which shuttle passengers between ports.

No doubt the authors of the 1886 Passenger Ship Act would have shivered with fright at the specter of spending vacation time aboard a ship, and so did not conceive that it would become a popular pastime. If they had known of these vacation cruises, would they have perceived them to be part of the "coastwise trade"? We cannot be sure. What is clear, though, is that the Passenger Ship Act, created to help the American merchant marine, has been dissected to the point of uselessness one hundred years later. Because of the lower costs of using foreign-flag ships in terms of construction and manning, there is no demand for U.S.-built and -crewed ships, and the result has been the virtual extinction of the U.S.-flag passenger fleet. The effect is to damage the promotion of jobs and trade, as well as the national

19. 18 *O.A.G.* 445.
20. 34 *O.A.G.* 340.
21. 29 *O.A.G.* 318.
22. Shannon v. Streckfus Steamers, 131 *S.W.* 2d 836 (1939).
23. 19 *C.F.R.* 4.80 (a)(1)(2)(3).
24. U.S. Customs Service, unpublished decision, File Number 105713, 14 July 1982.

security considerations that have dominated maritime debate for two hundred years.

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Publishing in Naval and Maritime History: A Report

TIMOTHY J. RUNYUN

THE Naval History Symposium held at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in September 1987 featured a special panel on publishing in naval and maritime history. The purpose was to explore the current state of the field, to consider the state of the market place, report on new publications and review the editorial practices and policies of some of the principal publications. As organizer and chair of the session I aimed for a balance between naval and maritime history. Three of the panelists were primarily publishers of naval articles: Fred Rainbow, editor of the *Naval Institute Proceedings*, Paul Stillwell, editor of *Naval History Magazine*, Frank Uhlig, publisher of the *Naval War College Review*. Their maritime correspondents included: James P. Barry, associate editor of *Inland Seas*, Gerald E. Morris, editor of *The Log of Mystic Seaport* and Archibald R. Lewis, editor of *The American Neptune*. In addition, once the news was out that the panel was part of the Symposium program, another eight editors and publishers asked to participate, make reports or requested that information be conveyed to the audience. Several editors appeared at the session and participated: Ulane Bonnel and Anne Kroehl, editors of the *Chronique d'Histoire Maritime* published two times each year in Paris with a circulation of 400; Jaap Bruijn, University of Leiden and a member of the Dutch Society for Maritime History, which publishes the *Tijdschrift voor Zeegeschiedenis*. Founded in 1961, the Society has 600 members. The *Tijdschrift* is of particular value for its extensive bibliography of all works published in maritime and naval history. Also present were Martin Gordon, editor of *Annals of War*, publishers of the Naval Institute Press and Scholarly Resources Press and William Fowler, editor of the *New England Quarterly*. Reports were presented for others who were interested in participating but were unable to attend. Nicholas Rodger, Public Record Office, London, asked that we announce the new series he is editing, "Studies in Naval History." This series of volumes will be published by Temple Smith, which is also the publisher for the Navy Records Society. Manuscripts of about 120,000 words are invited: Dr. Rodger, c/o The Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, WC2A 1LR, U.K. Klaus Friedland of the University of Kiel, and president of the International Commission for Maritime History, encouraged submission of books for review and articles on Hanseatic history to the *Hansisches Geschichtsblatter*. The journal includes a lengthy bibliography, many reviews and has wide circulation in eastern Europe and the Baltic. The recently formed Maritime Economic History Group publishes a thorough account of members' work in progress and has plans to publish an international maritime history review by 1992 under the editorship of Peter N. Davies, University of Liverpool. To join or receive the newsletter write: Dr. Helge Nordvik, Institute of Economic History, Norwegian School of Economics, Helleveien 30, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway. Reference was also made of to *The Mariner's Mirror*, published in England by the Society for Nautical Research, and edited by Brian Dolley, *The Great Circle*, edited by John Bach and Vaughn Evans for the Australian Association for Maritime History and the *International Journal of Nautical Archaeology* edited by James Kirkman.

The panel was organized so that the three presenters in naval history preceded the three in maritime. Dr. Bonnel would note later, however, that in French, the term *maritime* encompasses both the naval and maritime elements. My opening remarks pointed out a concern about how maritime history was perceived by our

fellow historians who sometimes look upon maritimists as narrow specialists or "boat nuts" and do not give the same weight to the maritime field as say social or intellectual history. Certainly the subject is not widely taught (perhaps the teaching of naval and maritime history should be the subject of a future meeting), nor is it incorporated into the standard survey course texts in either American history or western civilization. Quality remains a concern to all in the field but what can be done to encourage quality work? How and what editorial practices are in existence or evolving which will define and shape this field in the future? Are contributors encouraged by editors to write the "new" history, whatever that may be? Should we encourage new journals? Should we gather forces behind a single new journal to enhance the reputation of our field as done recently by the American Society for Legal History with the *Law and History Review* published at Cornell University?

Frank Uhlig of the *Naval War College Review* fired the first shots for the panel with a rousing description of his likes and dislikes and comments on the appropriateness of an article to a journal. The process of historical understanding is a key element in naval thought he argued, citing Admiral Luce, a founder of the College. A mixture of anecdotal history and serious scholarly articles is an objective of the *Review*. It is published quarterly and distributed at no cost to 15,000 subscribers, with an estimated two readers per issue. For the *Review*, articles ranging from a new look at the Federal blockade of the South in the Civil War to naval aspects of the Vietnam conflict or the effects of the naval revolution of the twentieth century would be welcome.

Fred Rainbow is editor of the Naval Institute's *Proceedings* where he has worked since 1975. There is no editorial policy governing the suitability of articles for the *Proceedings*, he noted, but quality manuscripts of under 4,000 words, preferably based on primary sources, are encouraged. A feature historical article remains a fixture in each issue as well as an "I remember" article. The oral history project at the Institute, which began during Frank Uhlig's association there, has clearly left an impact on the magazine. Circulation is 114,700 but the pass-along rate is a hefty 5 readers per copy.

A new publication of the Institute is the *Naval History Magazine* edited by Paul Stillwell. The editor evoked laughter from the audience with sea tales and salty stories which is a reflection of the color to be found in the new publication. Editors, Mr. Stillwell noted, are viewed by others as those who winnow the wheat from the chaff and then publish the chaff! The editorial policy of the *Magazine* follows that of the *Proceedings* and endorses the same philosophy. More detailed work can be presented in *Naval History Magazine*, as evidenced in the first issue of fall 1987. There are currently 11,500 readers, most of whom were subscribers to the *Proceedings*. Expectations are to achieve 25,000 readers by 1989. The objective is to balance scholarly and anecdotal history. Mention of the latter once again stimulated Mr. Stillwell to recount Admiral Nimitz' advice to a young officer concerning the difference between a diplomat and a lady: If a diplomat says yes, he means maybe. If maybe, he means no. If a lady says no, she means maybe. If she says maybe, she means yes, and if she says yes, she's no lady! We are going to enjoy reading this new publication!

After a good laugh we turned to the maritime side of the panel and heard first from Jerry Morris, editor of *The Log of Mystic Seaport* and librarian at the G. W. Blunt White Library. From a humble origin in 1948 as a quarterly for the Marine Historical Association with about 1500 members, the *Log* evolved to its present form with a circulation of 18,000 including subscribers in 50 states and 20 foreign countries. A major change in format came after 1970 when the *Log* became less "newsy" and more information oriented with longer serious articles. The format changed in 1975 and quality printing and illustrations became standard. An honorarium of $100 is offered to contributors. An annual prize award of $500 is given for the best article on an American maritime subject. The purpose of the prize is to encourage quality submissions and original research in the field. The *Log* focuses on non-naval subjects including yachting. The editors take pride in their success at introducing new authors to the field through publication in the *Log*. Reader surveys have shown that something in the magazine caught the reader's attention. A varied format increases the likelihood of such contact. The Mystic Seaport gift shop sells the *Log*, as well as books and videotapes. Morris noted that books published by Mystic Seaport have sold twice as well recently as in the past. He is encouraged by the public interest in maritime subjects.

James Barry is director of the Ohioana Library in Columbus, and associate editor of *Inland Seas* pub-

lished in Cleveland, Ohio by the Great Lakes Historical Society. With 3500 members and a publication history beginning with issue one in January 1945, the Society is the oldest marine historical body on the Lakes and operates a museum in Vermilion, Ohio. A new museum with a focus on maritime and environmental history is planned for Cleveland's lakefront. The journal publishes all manner of articles related to the Great Lakes. Society members receive the journal and about 250 colleges and libraries. There are, however, about 70 publications of various types on the Lakes. The ambition of *Inland Seas* is to remain the flagship of Lakes' publications. The editorial policy is to publish quality works on the maritime history of the Great Lakes. The publication of first-hand accounts by ship captains and others continues, but articles of a scholarly, readable nature are encouraged on all subjects. Pieces which put "hats on the people", as Lakes' author Walter Havighurst once remarked, are in demand. An ideal length for a manuscript is 14 double-spaced typed pages plus notes. Longer pieces are usually serialized. Only black and white reproductions are published.

Barry noted that in conferring with author/editor William D. Ellis, the audience for *Inland Seas* was changing. The numbers of mariners have declined and those associated with the marine trades. The new constituents are interested in the Lakes through their experience in recreational boating, diving and other contacts. This signalled a need to address the interests of these subscribers which the quarterly journal is attempting to do. Ellis' own concern about the present state of publishing is that many contributors seem "to be wading deeper and deeper into shallower waters." The search for pieces of broad significance and originality continues.

We were reminded of the pitfalls of publishing by Barry when he related his own experiences in publishing a book on maritime history. The lack of specialized maritime publishers led him to a general publisher in New York who was eager to do a volume on the Great Lakes. However, the press hired a "fact finder" who promptly chose a notoriously inaccurate book as the standard for Barry's facts. In time, all of his carefully researched facts and dates, were "corrected" by the reader. He had to intercede to put it right. Apparently, the publisher knew of no well qualified readers to review the manuscript. Once set right on the facts it does not mean that a general publisher will concede to maritime stylistic practices with which he or she may be unfamiliar. A female editor in the Big Apple decided, after reviewing his text, that the work was sexist. All ships were referred to in the female gender. No Sir! This was out and all such "she", "her" references were removed. Only after embracing the philosophy of women's liberation *and* threatening to withdraw the book did he salvage the traditional female address for vessels.

The editor of *The American Neptune,* Archibald Lewis, batted clean-up for the panel and delivered some telling blows. His own experiences as author of a dozen volumes and numerous articles coupled with long experience in academic and general publishing permitted him to make some poignant comments. The *Neptune* will reach its fiftieth birthday in 1989 and is superseded in years only by *The Mariner's Mirror* whose first issue appeared in 1911. Rather ignominiously, and paralleling the Christmas story, the *Neptune* was born in a barn. The owner was Walter Whitehill who was encouraged to produce a journal of naval and maritime history, mostly American. About two-thirds of the material was maritime, one-third naval. Today the quarterly is much broader in its scope with a printing of 1,000 copies and publishes articles on all aspects of naval and maritime history. The *Neptune* must be worldwide in its focus today, Lewis remarked, because American naval and commercial interests are worldwide. This, of course, makes it difficult to satisfy readers with special interests. But these technical pieces are valuable. An article on the development of the fiberglass yacht was an example of the sort of article sought for today. Pieces on ship models, underwater archaeology and the teaching of maritime history have been and are encouraged. These complement the staple of historical pieces covering ships and seafaring from the ancient to modern eras.

The *Neptune* has published special issues on particular topics, an innovation by the present editor. A recent example is the winter 1986 issue which was devoted to Americans who sailed beyond Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope. The papers were presented at a meeting of the North American Society for Oceanic History held at the Peabody Museum. Articles have appeared in recent issues on topics ranging from medieval shipping in northern Europe and the Muslim-controlled Mediterranean to the storage of commercial fleets in the Patuxent River during the 1930s. "Scholarly but readable", is the key phrase used by the editor to describe the content of the journal. Lewis recognizes the existence of

a broad public audience which wants soundly researched and accurate historical accounts by knowledgeable authors in a form and style readers can readily grasp and appreciate.

Professor Lewis had some insightful views concerning the place and appreciation of maritime history by Americans. He posited that the [Frederick Jackson] Turner Thesis in American history, which emphasized the frontier as the key factor in the shaping of America and American institutions, diverted the attention of historians from the coasts. The result was, and is, the production of texts with little maritime history between their covers. Even the text produced by maritime historian Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager failed to emphasize the maritime aspects of the American past. It is as if researchers forgot, for instance, that during the westward movement most travellers reached California by sea and not in covered wagons. Lewis feels there is a serious need to enlighten our fellow historians by demonstrating the impact and value of naval and maritime activities on the shaping of American history. In sum, knowledge of the seas and waterways is essential to an understanding of American and World history.

If a conclusion could be drawn from the results of the two hours of presentation, comment and questioning by a standing room only audience, it must be that there is strong interest in the maritime field and a number of capable minds are at work to assure that the quality and originality of this work continues. The problem identified by several participants was how to communicate the significance of maritime studies to colleagues and the public. Success in this endeavor would mean nothing less than a rewriting and reinterpretation of American and World history. Meanwhile, these editors will continue going about their business of publishing the articles which will form the basis for this new paradigm.

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Sam Crocker, Boat Designer

VICTOR A. LEWINSON

SAMUEL S. Crocker (1890-1964), a distinguished boat designer, worked in Boston MA and on the North Shore from the 1920s until his death. After training at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1909 to 1911, he was employed as a naval architect by George Owen, by the military during World War I and, from 1919, by his cousin, John G. Alden[1]. In 1924 he opened his own office. Sam Crocker's son, S. Sturgis Crocker (1916-) built boats from many of Sam's designs at the boat yard which Sturgis started in 1946 in Manchester, MA.

In 1986, Sturgis Crocker "retired" and turned operation of the yard to S. S. Crocker IV, his son. As this Note is written in August 1987, however, Sturgis is still active building a boat there; it is partially based on one of Sam Crocker's designs. To honor his father's career, he published a design catalogue[2] in 1985. He generously gave Sam Crocker's drawings and papers to the Peabody Museum of Salem, where the writer has recently completed processing and detailed cataloguing of the collection. The purpose of this Note is to describe the contents of the collection, so that those interested can use it.

In brief, the collection consists of three parts: *plans, papers,* and *miscellaneous* documents. The *plans* include 1600 design drawings, almost all signed by Sam Crocker. *Papers* (contracts, orders, bills, letters, specifications, and so on) are in over 400 folders. The *miscellaneous* materials include: three lists of the designs, together with some related data; simple computer data bases that serve as indices to the hard-copy files; three volumes of Sam Crocker's account books, which start with the beginning of his business career in 1924 and

1. A biography of Alden is available: "John G. Alden and his Yacht Designs," by Robert W. Carrick and Richard Henderson, Camden ME, 1983, International Marine Publishing Co.

2. "Sam Crocker's Boats: a Design Catalog," by S. Sturgis Crocker, Camden ME, 1985, International Marine Publishing Co.

Sam Crocker, Boat Designer
1890-1964
Photo courtesy of author

extend to 1958, near its end; and two card catalogues that provide a key to the *plans* and *papers*. The whole collection is integrated by means of Sam Crocker's own series of Design Numbers, which identify drawings, folders, bills and so on.

The *plans* are 1600 drawings, housed flat in five drawers of a large map case in the storage area of the Maritime History Department. About 95 percent of the 1600 drawings are marked with Design Numbers. Some 10 percent of the designs have subdesigns (for example,

marked #76, 76A and 76B), differing slightly as to rig, dimensions, or details. When the data show that more than one boat has been built to a single design, the catalogue indicates them with decimals, such as #88 and 88.1. Many of the unnumbered drawings are not Crocker boats. The earliest drawing is of #6, dated 1914, built and named SAMARI for Sam Crocker's mother Mary and father (ca. 1856-1932), the second of the S. S. Crockers. The last is #344, on which Sam Crocker was working almost up to his death. Coverage is good but not complete; drawings exist for only 20 of the first 50 design numbers, but for almost 80 percent of the remainder. A design number may be represented by a single drawing or by up to two dozen. Occasionally, both sides of a sheet are used.

In the cataloguing process, each drawing was marked with an identifier: SSC-XXX Y, where XXX is the design number and a letter Y specifies the particular drawing. The printed catalogue cards call for the following information: vessel name; date; hull type; propulsion; rig; plan type; medium; sheet size; scale; original work or copy. In addition, the catalogue cards record the boat's length overall with any comments (written on the drawings) that point toward the owner's or builder's name or toward similarities with other boats. It is worth noting that the original order of the drawings was changed in cataloguing. As received, the file was organized by type of drawing (lines, profiles, sections, etc.) and by design number within those classes. Probably this was convenient for the designers using it, who would be asking for such things as "lines like those of #XXX or #YYY." But it would have been confusing in a card catalogue, so the drawings and the catalogue cards are now stored by design number, with drawings of a given design number grouped together.

The 400 folders of related Crocker Shipbuilding Papers (MSS# MH-13) were received in six file drawers or boxes and stored in the Museum's Library. They are now being transferred to archival folders and boxes for permanent safekeeping. Almost all folders are identified by a design number, with up to half a dozen folders per number. The collection's coverage is less complete; folders exist for only seven of the first 50 design numbers, and for 70 percent of the others. There are two types of folders, "design" and "bills." Design folders contain such items as contracts, specifications, weight calculations, photos, clippings from newspapers or boat magazines, or sketches of lines or details. Bills folders include mainly the correspondence, orders, bills and receipts for all the equipment to be supplied, according to the contract, by the boat's owner. This material was usually purchased by Sam Crocker. Such equipment ranged from a dollar's worth of hardware to sails or an engine costing hundreds or thousands. In a few cases there are bids for major items or for the construction contract. Letters from owners discuss design or construction details. Sometimes they describe the owner's satisfaction with the boat's design, performance, or long life. Occasionally, a folder or its contents indicate that a design was not built. Voluminous bills folders are separated into orders and receipts, and there are often additional folders for subdesigns or refits.

Plain ruled catalogue cards, five inches by eight, were used for data from the folders. They are arranged by design number. The cards list the kinds of materials in the folders and present data of special interest, especially boat name and characteristics, type, date of build, and builder's and owner's name. Contract price and total cost to the owner are listed when available (30 and 15 percent of designs, respectively). Sometimes there is a separate folder for a refit, including date and bills. It was an interesting guessing game to associate a boat's later names and owners with the original ones and, when there are several subdesign numbers, with the correct one.

Amongst the *miscellaneous* materials, a 1940 diary contains a listing of most of Sam Crocker's designs, including names of boats and owners and some characteristics. There is also a list of magazine articles on the boats. Since the Diary is still in use at the Manchester yard, a photocopy has been added to the Museum's collection, together with two other lists. One of the latter specializes in the names and owners of boats that went through many hands; it also supplies a list of boat names from the 1956 edition of "Lloyd's Register of American Yachts."[3]

In addition to the two catalogue card files, there are four simple computer data bases. Each entry in each of them contains: design number; date; names of boat, builder, and owner; and space for any relevant notes. The first file is an index to "Sam Crocker's Boats" (Ref. 2), since the book itself has no index. It also includes the page reference and indication of similar designs. The second is derived from the *plans*, recording their number

3. "Lloyd's Register of American Yachts," 1956, Lloyd's Register of Shipping, New York NY, Waverly Press.

At the launching of the "Fearless II"
Left to right: Eben B. Phillips of Georges Mills, NH, and Marblehead, MA, owner of the boat; Mrs. E. B. Phillips, sponsor; W. I. Reid, builder; and S. S. Crocker, Jr., designer. Photo courtesy of author.

and emphasizing the characteristics of the boats: hull form, propulsion, rig, and length overall. The *papers* are the subject of the third. When available, contract price and total cost are included. The fourth is drawn from the *miscellaneous* listings, and concentrates on the names of boats and owners (original and subsequent). An Apple IIC computer and associated software (Appleworks) were used; their limitations prevented combining the files into one. However, simple searches are possible, for instance, "what were the names of boats over 40′ long, designed by Sam Crocker and built by Sturgis for S. E. Morison?" These computer files have already proved helpful in the cataloguing process, in the effort to identify material without design number, or to weed out inconsistencies and errors.

Of what use is this collection? Following are some suggestions by the cataloguer. The reader will probably have other perceptions, based on his or her own specialties.

First, many of the drawings have artistic interest in themselves. They are elegant, or show lively details. One lines drawing was copied for an architect. It hangs in the entrance atrium of an office building in Manchester MA, where it has the double function of a handsome abstract and a reminder of local maritime history.

There will be technological content for boat designers and builders. Sam Crocker was a successful designer, and one who took into account the needs of the builder. Hence his solutions to design problems will be helpful to students. The drawings and papers contain boat characteristics, calculations of weights and center of buoyancy, and similar items for the analyst. Also, the folders show the characteristics and identities of major purchased items, such as engines and sails.

For the economist, the papers give a wealth of data on prices and costs, both of boats and of purchased items large and small. Suppliers of these items are identified, too. In occasional cases, quotations are preserved from several bidders for a boat or a major component.

The historical importance of the collection is obvious. It lists most of Sam Crocker's boats, dates them, and identifies their names, builders and owners. Thus it links him to builders and sailmakers. It identifies suppliers of components, equipment, hardware, furnishings and insurance. On the personal level, the contents of the papers change one's picture of Sam Crocker's professional life. He was not solely a drawer of lines on paper, nor boss of a drafting room, nor even perfectionist supervisor of construction for his clients. A strong impression also emerges of meticulous attention to an enormous amount of detail in ordering the equipment he purchased on behalf of owners and paying and accounting (down to pennies) for it. Occasional letters add personal details of warmth and consideration between Sam Crocker and his clients and suppliers. There are also a very few complaints. Some examples follow, of which the first is the saddest, given the dates, only months before Sam Crocker's career ended.

–On #337, DIONE, built in 1964 for Samuel Eliot Morison, a client since 1927: Several acrimonious letters, plus bills and a chronology, because the builder did not follow the plans and worked slowly and poorly.

–On #105, QUEST, October 14, 1929, from the owner to Sam Crocker: "To say that I am enthusiastic over her performance . . . is an extremely mild way of expressing delight and satisfaction in the wonderful design you have turned out for me. . . . She has the easiest motion in the water . . . I was wishing for you Saturday to feel the helm and try her out."

–June 25, 1937, from Sam Crocker to Thomas Manchester, one of his regular sailmakers: "Was laid up two weeks with erysipelas, and God knows, I don't want any more of that. It was the most painful two weeks I ever spent . . . However, I am feeling better all the time now."

–On #125, OLD BUTCH, ex SEACREST, January 6, 1961, from owner P. B. Sheldon to R. F. Duncan: "... I traveled in about 1936 from Maine to the Chesapeake looking at boats already built. I found just what I thought I wanted. She was designed by the senior Sam Crocker. I bought her and now, after having owned no other boat in those 25 years, or nearly that, if I lost her I'd hope to duplicate her."

–On #176, SIRIUS, November 21, 1957, from H. H. Meyer to R. F. Fulton: "As the former owner and builder of SIRIUS, I was tremendously interested in your projected voyage from Norfolk to San Francisco ... this morning my secretary, who is Mr. S. S. Crocker's daughter, showed me your letter of November 18 to her father. Naturally I am delighted that my ship has found such an appreciative new owner ... I was actually the builder because I hired a crew of shipwrights and supervised the work by a trip each Saturday to the boatyard. Sam Crocker went with me almost every week."

–On #256, OLD BUTCH, August 9, 1949, from one owner to the other (E. S. Welch Jr. to F. C. Welch): "I am most thoroughly satisfied with her general design. I think that Sam Crocker is ahead of his time and has produced something truly revolutionary for the likes of us who want a composite of economy, comfort, and speed ... What I am worried about, however, is the overall lack of finish ... of the final phases of construction."

–However, on the same boat, May 6, 1980, from F. C. Welch to Sturgis Crocker: "One word sums her up. Perfection. This includes working with your Pa on the design. His patient and understanding attention to detail was incredible. I'll not forget simulating sitting on the head to check space needed for knee room (I'm long legged) ... It also includes her construction by you. Watching her go together was a precious experience ... all presided over by you and your Pa, happy memories ... The next 23 years she was the home afloat and the seagoing training ground for our kids and grandkids. This is what particularly endeared us to her. She was a member of the family. As such she played a vital part in the development of the family as a whole. This is the single most important thing about OLD BUTCH."

Victor A. Lewinson, who worked for more than 30 years as a consultant and researcher in maritime freight transportation, received his A. B. from Harvard College and Ph.D. from Columbia University in Chemistry and Physics. Victor is a volunteer in the Maritime History Department of the Peabody Museum of Salem, and gratefully acknowledges the guidance and help of S. Sturgis Crocker and of colleagues at the museum: Paul F. Johnston and Stuart Morgan in the Maritime History Department; Gregor Trinkaus-Randall and Robert Spindler in the Phillips Library.

Book Reviews

L. FRANCIS HERRESHOFF, *Captain Nat Herreshoff* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Sheridan House, 1953, reprinted 1986). 9″ x 6″, cloth, 349 pages, 58 pages of illustrations, list of Herreshoff-built boats, index. $22.50.

This reprint of the biography of Nathaniel G. Herreshoff will be welcomed alike by avid yachtsmen of the present generation and those of the past generation who missed the opportunity to read it or to add it to their libraries.

Written by Captain Nat's son, who was also a competent yacht designer and racing yacht aficianado, it serves not only as a biography of one who has been hailed as the greatest yacht and marine designer and builder this country has ever produced, but also as a reference book on steam and sail yacht design and yacht racing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

While the detailed descriptions of many of the hundreds of yachts designed by Captain Nat and built by the Herreshoff Manufacturing Co. may be tedious reading for the ordinary yachtsman, the book serves as a valuable work for nautical engineers, yacht designers, owners of racing yachts, and others interested in the sport.

Among Captain Nat's claims to fame are the following: designed and built yachts that six times successfully defended the America's Cup; invented the type of sail track and sail slides which are in use today throughout the world; turned out more successful one-design classes than any other designer; designed and built the first U.S. Navy torpedo boats; and invented more types of steam engines than any other designer. It is also said that from 1890 to 1938 his yachts in all important yacht races probably won more prizes than those of any other yacht designer.

One important secret of his success was his unremitting devotion to his designing and his supervision of the operation of the Herreshoff Manufacturing Co. With few compelling interests apart from this work, other than sailing some of the boats he built for himself, he spent nearly sixty years working long hours every day including Saturdays and often Sundays and holidays in his workshop in his home or his office at the shipyard. His prescription for success was hard work, exactitude, and integrity.

Aside from the mass of statistical data, description, and listing of his most famous yachts, inventions, and novel designs, this book is a fascinating biography of a fantastic genius.

WILLIAM B. SLEIGH, JR.

Marblehead, MA

JOHN B. HATTENDORF, B. MITCHELL SAMPSON III, and JOHN R. WADLEIGH, *Sailors and Scholars, The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1984). Illustrated, xv + 354 pages.

All institutions have lives of their own; they are created, grow, flourish, and then sometimes expire. The best probably manage to survive because they serve a useful purpose to society. The United States Naval War College may well be considered a triumph to the courage and intellectual persistence of one individual, namely, Stephen B. Luce. This serving officer—he ultimately rose to the rank of rear admiral—saw what few of his contemporaries could understand: that the United States naval forces were those of a major and potentially great world power and that as such its officers needed more training than simple seamanship; they required a thorough knowledge of strategy and tactics.

The college had humble beginnings—it was located in what had originally been the poorhouse of the town of Newport, Rhode Island—and the first class that began their studies—a month's duration only—was small in

number. The next most significant event of the newly-founded institution was the appointment of Alfred Thayer Mahan as a lecturer in the following year. Mahan's tenure of office at the college was not the easiest, there was opposition to the college in Congress on financial grounds, certain naval personnel thought it should be moved to Annapolis and there was a general indifference on the part of many officers. Nevertheless, when he left in 1893, the secretary of the navy, Hilary Herbert in Cleveland's administration who initially had been hostile, was converted to the need for the college. Essentially it can be said that while there were to be problems, the survival of the college thereafter was never in doubt.

One of the interesting facets of the course—and the staff and students were regarded as equals all participating in a similar endeavor—was war gaming. This was to be invaluable when the navy had to face Japanese sea power after Pearl Harbor. Indeed, almost all of the senior commanders had played "the game" with Japan as an enemy and there was a very proper understanding of what was required.

Initially the course of studies had been brief but in 1911 a longer programme of studies was instituted. This allowed the student the opportunity to consider tactics and strategy in some depth. The short course had served its purpose but for a more sophisticated era this was not very sensible. The arrival of William Sims in 1917 was as memorable an event as the appointment of Mahan some three decades earlier. Following active service during World War I, Sims returned to Newport and managed to reinvigorate the college which had played a relatively passive role during the actual conflict.

Like many similar institutions in the years between 1918 and 1939, the college's fortunes were mixed. Because of the worldwide enthusiasm for disarmament it was lucky to have survived but fortunately it managed to do so. The success of its programme was to be seen with the admirable service its pupils performed in World War II. Following the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945 the college again faced a period when its role was ill-defined. With the advent of Stansfield Turner to become the president in 1972, there was a radical change. Turner had vision and drive, he was willing to risk the concept of change to provide direction and when he left the college's future was assured. Turner had been an excellent choice and his future career showed that he was a man of intellectual eminence.

As the naval war college approached its centennary it could feel more confident. Its role in national defense training was now appreciated. When the college was founded in 1884 the British navy was the supreme naval power, the United States had only a fledgling fleet. By 1984 the United States possessed the largest and most powerful naval force in the world; the officers who were in command had all been the recipients of the training and skills acquired at the United States Naval War College. It would seem in some ways a long distance from the vision of Stephen B. Luce but careful reading of his ideas would be seen to be still the basis for its existence. In 1877 Luce had said that naval warfare demands "a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations" and to accomplish this he was to write that he was advocating the establishment of an institution where "officers [were] not only . . . encouraged but *required* to study their profession . . . and to bring to the investigation of the various problems of modern naval warfare the scientific methods adopted in other professions."

The three authors are to be congratulated in producing a thoroughly scholarly yet readable volume. Collaborative scholarship is never a simple task and may often result in an uneven piece of work. Such, in the present instance, is not the case, the text is "a seamless web" and the result is a book that must be satisfying to the institution that commissioned it and to the shades of the founders of the naval war college.

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JOHN HARLAND, MARK MYERS, *Seamanship in the Age of Sail* (Naval Institute Press, 1984; reprinted with amendments, 1985). 10" x 12", hardcover, 320 pages, many black-and-white drawings and photographs, bibliography, index. $39.95.

Some sixty and more years ago when I was first entering the world of commercial sail an elderly gentleman of the sea told me that no two sailing ships spliced their main braces the same way, that what was done one way on one vessel was not necessarily done the same way on another vessel. The main brace, incidently, was made up of the two lines that controlled the main yard of a square-rigger.

I have now just finished reading John Harland's marvelous book, *Seamanship in the Age of Sail*, a treatise on sail when it was at its zenith, and he backs up the above statement with examples of intriguing differences. He writes: "Methods did not change radically over the centuries, but there was tremendous variations as to detail," and later, "There was variation in the exact way in which things were managed."

Seamanship is a book that should attract anyone with an interest in the days of sail. Although the frontispiece breaks the title down to "An Account of the Shiphandling of the Sailing Man-of-War 1600-1860, based on Contemporary Sources," the book actually has a much wider scope, and there is on occasion reference made to "the Aland ships," the last of the great windjammers that sailed in the years prior to World War II. The author states that after a "brief consideration of masts, sails and rigging" he goes on to study not only the "how" of the gear but also the "why," and this he does in masterful fashion. He fully covers the reasons for the standing rigging, and then the details of the running rigging. This in turn is followed by the sails with a chapter devoted to sail plans from 1580 to 1900.

Harland explores "Some Theoretical Principles Underlying Shiphandling," again the "how" and "why" a sailing ship runs her course, with next a separate chapter on sails, both fore-and-aft and square, plus a description of studding sails. There is a chapter on "Bending, loosing and furling sail," and on unbending square sail, furling square sail not only as done in the early 1700s but also at a much later date. A most informative several pages deal with sending topgallant masts up and down, striking and shifting topmasts, striking lower yards, to be followed by a chapter on making and shortening sail at sea. Here again there is a difference of opinion "on the best fashion of taking in a course in blowing weather," whether to tackle the weather side first on the lee side. Harland quotes numerous writers of the period, some favoring one way, others the opposite. Reefing is fully covered, both square sail and fore-and-aft.

The chapter on steering goes back to the tiller and whipstaff—the steering wheel was introduced as late as about 1704. Helm orders are given as used down through the years when sailing before the wind or steering by the wind.

A chapter is devoted to tacking, wearing, and boxhauling, bringing a sailing vessel from one tack to another, describing all the necessary maneuvers plus the required voice commands, whether it be aboard a small bark, a brig, or the huge five-mast bark *Potosi* which took nearly a half-hour to come about. Towing is discussed as are storm squalls, heaving to, and anchoring. The book closes with a thesis on "Man Overboard," the necessary emergency procedures, and finally a word on accidents, the parting of rigging, steering problems, stranding, and fire.

Harland tells his story of *Seamanship* in a thorough, understandable manner, a pleasure to read. Great credit, however, must go also to artist Mark Myers whose many, many pen-and-ink drawings are so descriptive, dovetailing the Harland's text in happy context. His jacket painting, "Convey Shortening Sail off the Cornish Coast," is a grand piece of work and it is a pity it is not reproduced inside the book to prevent it from being dirtied or soiled. Myers, who is a fellow of the American Society of Marine Artists and the honorable secretary of the Royal Society of Marine Artists, really knows his stuff.

Anyone with an interest in sea and sail, if only a reader of sea-going yarns or an aspiring artist, a ship model maker or a nautical historian, would find *Seamanship* a most helpful book, full of maritime information.

As to splicing the main brace, Harland writes: "Since splice the main brace! is usually thought of, in the Royal Navy, as a fictional command, resulting in a double issue of rum, the question has arisen, from time to time, whether the actual rope was ever actually spliced, rather than being completely replaced. Certainly a 'long splice' would render quite readily through the brace block, and Bardenfleth, for one, refers to the actual practice." The day we rounded the horn in the four-mast bark *Herzogin Cecilie* in 1935, the captain sent forward two bottles of rum, one for each watch, "to splice the main brace." As I recall, I swapped my tot for a bar of candy!

GILES M. S. TOD—A.I.C.H.

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EDWARD BYERS, *The Nation of Nantucket* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987). xvi + 367 p: illust., index. $35.00

This is a study of Nantucket viewed by a student of its great period of 1740 to 1820. Many factors created the

island's way of life in those times, then chiefly concerned with the building of the whaling economy and the emergence of the Quaker faith which engulfed the entire community. It was a period of considerable change but also a time in which the islanders adapted themselves to a way of life that created a unique kingdom in the sea. In this, Edward Byers has brought out the factors that governed the growth of the island and the success of its enterprising people.

The author has given much scope to the slow development of the settlement in the beginning of the English occupation of the island, relying on old records to support his several theories. The estimate of twenty-five hundred Indians on the island when the first white settlers arrived is too high. The use of the land for grazing flocks of sheep was the chief reason for the coming of the white settlers, and their early habitations were built with the idea of solidarity. Tristram Coffin, Thomas Macy, Edward Starbuck, Richard Swain, and the Barnards and company blended into a group that had lived together before on the mainland, and had grown to respect one another. It was a good start for an island community. They avoided political differences, which made for an excellent start in a new part of New England.

Because their start in Nantucket was difficult, their common goals were clearer. They came to a part of the New World that called upon courage and self-denial. It was a lesson they never forgot. As the settlement increased, the problems of land use grew to become an issue. The "half-share men" very naturally revolted. This issue is treated in a fairly impartial manner by the author. The creation of the Proprietors became a telling factor. The sale of the land became an important item for future consideration, and the issues that were raised later plagued the owners or those who controlled the land.

When the islanders decided to adopt shore-whaling as their chief means of livelihood, the decade from 1670 to 1680 became their growing period, and their shipments to Boston boosted the economy to a large degree. Because the migratory routes of the whale passed close to the island, the business soon became the major industry. With the coming of the next century, Nantucket's whale-oil trade extended to England, and the industry was well launched. Trade with mainland ports, aside from Boston, brought the necessities of life, principally wood, so vital to the winter months. When tryworks were placed aboard the whaling vessels a new period was ushered in, and voyages were extended, ranging both north to Greenland and south to the West Indies.

Deep-sea whaling created Nantucket's whaling industry. The decision to create a town on the "Great Harbor" was a direct result, and the present town developed from 1690 into the early years of the eighteenth century, and the business of whaling grew steadily. The town became a solid and stable part of Nantucket life after 1720.

The coming of the Quakers to Nantucket was accomplished from the visits of several "traveling Friends," who introduced the values of the "inner light" and the golden rule. Mary Coffin Starbuck's influence brought a significant phase into the picture. This remarkable woman opened her home to the visiting Quakers, invited her friends and acquaintances, and with her husband Nathaniel Starbuck quickly established a Quaker group. The arrangement of the "business meetings" is well handled by Byers. The islanders adapted Quakerism to their own way of life. It was unlike that of other mainland communities.

What Byers terms as "Elite Control" means the leadership of a certain group of leaders who influenced the life of the town over a considerable length of time. Family ties and alliances were part of the scene. These leaders were well thought of, and most of them did their tasks in an appropriate manner. Family ties were strong, and an elective office was considered. After 1700, Quakerism became a vital force in the island life.

The author seems concerned with what he terms the "Nantucket oligarchy," when what he means is the leadership in families that had intermarried over the many years of island life. American democracy prevailed, but the deferential treatment of the citizens was a matter of their way of life. The women exerted a powerful influence on the daily lives of the people, with the fathers and older sons off on whaling voyages, and the Nantucket merchants were well aware of their importance in the world where whale-oil was a telling factor.

In his chapter, "Life in an American Utopia, 1740-1775," the author introduces the colorful French writer de Crevecoeur as his essayist. When this new American visited Nantucket in approximately 1770, he found a place unlike any he had visited in this continent. No wonder this versatile and knowledgeable traveller revelled in what he found. It was an independent king-

dom in the sea, which "gave a stranger, at his first landing, a high idea of the prosperity of these people," which brought an immediate awareness of Sherborn (the town's name at that time) as "the capital of a very opulent and large province."

Nantucket whalemen concentrated on taking the spermacetie whale, a practice that gave them a superior position in refining the oil and preparing the spermacetic candle. The developments of the whaleship and the whaleboat were products of the growth of the industry, and Nantucket was in the forefront of the industry in the western world. The expansion of trade with the West Indies, as well as coastal voyages in North America, increased the island's economy before the Revolutionary War. Led by William Rotch, the island merchants soon led the world in their field.

The greatness of Nantucket after the trial of the Revolution was the triumph of a community that had been formed by hardships in the past. The Quaker influence was of paramount importance in their lives. The island's recovery after 1785 was remarkable. Mr. Byers covers this period well. During the War of 1812, Nantucket accomplished a pact with the British fleet commanders in North American waters which arranged for a neutral state for the whaleships. Although it came too late in the war it was accomplished, and this has never been officially acknowledged by the historians.

In his epilogue, Byers dwells on the changes in island life that were the result of the collapse of whaling in the 1850-1860 period, although he does not go into this period. The growth of the several religious bodies in the town, the architectural awareness awakening in the town, and the cultural growth of the community in the years preceding the Civil War make a telling chapter in island history.

Nantucket has changed greatly since the great depression of the 1860-1870 period. The island becoming a summer resort, the acceptance of the islanders of this new means of livelihood, the coming of the hotel era, and the growth of the tourist activities all constitute the pattern of the present times. Perhaps the coming treatment of Nantucket in its modern guise would be a proper development for the next study of the island life. Edward Byers's study of "The Nation of Nantucket" deserves attention by all readers of the island scene. It introduces new angles on the island life, and despite it being the old story told in interesting new ways it brings out the stable character of an island, calling for careful reading and analysis by a discerning public.

EDOUARD A. STACKPOLE
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CHARLES B. ARTHUR, *The Remaking of the English Navy by Admiral St. Vincent—Key to the Victory Over Napoleon* (New York: The University Press of America, 1986). 8½" x 5½", paper, xi + 265 pages, 1 illustration, 5 maps, notes, and bibliography. $13.75.

The history of the British navy during the era of the Napoleonic Wars is a topic of endless fascination for many maritime scholars and buffs. It was, in every sense, an heroic age, a time when great admirals and gallant captains steered whole fleets of great wooden ships-of-the-line into battles where the stakes were desperately high, the rewards for success great, and the penalties for failure too dismal to contemplate. Dominating this great epoch is the figure of Adm. Horatio Nelson who must rank as one of the most seasoned and fortunate sea commanders of all time.

In a new and sweeping reinterpretation of the Nelsonian period, Charles B. Arthur has chosen to focus attention on Nelson's superior, Sir John Jervis, who was the overall fleet commander at the Battle of St. Vincent and went on to command the Channel Fleet and the entire British navy as first lord of the Admiralty from 1801 to 1805. Arthur's thesis is that Jervis was a master of naval administration and strategy who carried out a program of reforms which the British navy desperately needed and without which it is doubtful that Nelson could have accomplished his subsequent victories at the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar.

Contrary to popular belief, the British navy entered into the Napoleonic Wars in a very sorry condition. Its ships were in a poor state of material readiness. Its officers were often self-indulgent and ill-disciplined sons of the ruling nobility and its crews were the wretched scourings of the press gang, ill housed, ill fed, poorly paid, and living in scandalously unsanitary conditions which devastated their health and morale. That such a fleet could sail and win victories was really more of a tribute to the utterly abysmal condition to which the French and Spanish navies had fallen into as a result of

the Revolution than it was to any superiority on the part of the British. The consequences of years of neglect, corruption, preferment, and jobbery were many. Although the British won victories under Howe, Hawke, and Bridport these were rarely complete or decisive. In 1797 a fleetwide mutiny immobilized the entire Channel and North Sea squadrons in the face of an impending French invasion and at another point the British had to abandon the Mediterranean entirely because of a series of fiascos caused by the incompetence and insubordination of several admirals who held their commands by virtue of social rank and political connections.

Sir John Jervis grappled energetically with the conditions that caused these setbacks during his long career as a flag officer. He began with the Mediterranean Fleet, revamping its command structure so that incompetent fops were sent home and solid fighting seamen put in their places. The condition of the crews was improved by rigorous application of sound practices in the areas of diet, health care, and discipline. The material readiness of the ships was enhanced by the refusal to accept rotten stores and materiel and careful attention to ship husbandry. Jervis's reforms bore fruit when his fifteen sail-of-the-line attacked twenty-seven Spanish battleships off Cape St. Vincent and routed them utterly. A short time later, Nelson led this same reformed squadron against the French and won the Battle of the Nile.

Recognizing at last the danger inherent in the poor condition of the fleet, an apprehensive Admiralty brought Jervis home to command the Channel Fleet and work his magic there as well. The crusty disciplinarian repeated his prior performance to such good effect that the Channel Fleet was eventually able to undertake the close and continuous blockage of the principal French naval base at Brest, keeping the seas continuously in all seasons and navigating with almost perfect safety among the rocks, shoals, and other maritime hazards of that hostile and forbidding shore. This strategy, which had been considered impossible by the previous British commanders in the Channel, almost completely nullified the threat of the powerful French Atlantic Fleet and kept Britain physically secure from invasion while it led the coalition that eventually doomed Napoleon.

With this accomplishment to his credit, Jervis, now elevated to the peerage as Lord St. Vincent, was brought to London to undertake the general reform of the entire British navy as first sea lord. Here he met with ultimate failure. His next logical step was the reform of the royal dockyards, the victuallers, the contractors, the influence peddlers, and the entire corrupt and venal system that dwelt in the entrenched privileges of the ruling classes and fattened upon the wholesale looting of the navy's treasury through graft and profiteering. The principal villains of this drama were civilians, not serving officers, and they had their connections deep in the government. After a long struggle they succeeded in ousting Jervis before he had accomplished very much. When he left the Admiralty in 1805 Britain possessed fleets at sea that had reached unprecedented states of efficiency and were capable of carrying out any reasonable mission to which they might be assigned. The Royal Navy was at last an effective instrument of national policy and even the continued corruption and decadence of the shoreside establishment could not altogether undo the good that Jervis had accomplished.

From the foregoing synopsis, it can be seen that Arthur's topic is a worthwhile subject to pursue. Unfortunately, the execution of the project falls far short of the ideal. The University Press of America is not an orthodox publisher. It operates on the supposition that a lot of scholarly manuscripts are valuable additions to knowledge but not commercially viable. Therefore, it provides a format that results in a book that can be marketed at minimum cost. The author sends in a "photo ready" typewritten manuscript which is reduced and bound entirely without benefit of professional printing or conventional editing. The result is marketed at a high cost per unit to offset the anticipated low volume. *The Remaking of the English Navy* conforms to this format and suffers accordingly. It could use some good proofreading and most of all the services of a ruthless editor. The author's prose is sometimes obscure and endlessly repetitious. He states over and over again his basic themes, relating the general messages *ad nauseum* but never really getting down to the specific details. He tells us *what* Jervis accomplished but not really *how* he did it. This reviewer, for one, would have appreciated much more information relative to the specific problems Jervis attacked and how he resolved them. The few details that are provided just whet the appetite for more.

In summation, this is a book that deserves to be read for its novel interpretation of the Age of Nelson but it has a lot of irritating faults that should have been corrected before it was put between covers.

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DUDLEY TAYLOR CORNISH and VIRGINIA JEANS LAAS, *Lincoln's Lee; The Life of Samuel Phillips Lee, United States Navy, 1812-1897* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1986). 9¼" x 6¼", cloth, xv + 245 pages, 14 illustrations, 5 maps, notes, bibliography, and index. $29.95.

That the nineteenth-century American navy has a well-known band of highly publicized "heroes" is no news to any maritime historian. With a few notable exceptions virtually every one of these men shares a single common denominator: they all commanded either a ship or a fleet in a significant battle and won a clear victory. Serving alongside them and often sharing in the dangers and privations of active command was a much larger corps of officers who have never achieved much historical recognition. In the main, these were competent, efficient men with long service records, highly thought of in professional circles and thoroughgoing seamen and navigators. Their personal and professional biographies are buried in packets of family letters, musty departmental files, and multivolume compilations of official reports and documents.

Samuel Phillips Lee was just such an officer. A member of one branch of the prominent Lee family of Virginia, he joined the navy as a midshipman in 1827, rose slowly through the ranks during long years of peacetime cruising, married into the politically active Blair family of Washington, D.C., and managed the merest taste of combat service during the Mexican War and spent many years on loan to the Coast Survey commanding ships engaged in improving the charts of East Coast harbors and estuaries. When the Civil War came he was high enough in rank and seniority to be in line for rapid advancement as the navy underwent enormous expansion. He held important commands in both the riverine forces on the western waterways and the oceangoing fleets blockading the Confederate coast. His most important command was the North Atlantic Squadron which was responsible for Chesapeake Bay, the approaches to Richmond, and the Carolina Coast as far south as the Cape Fear River and Wilmington. At the end of the war he was commanding naval forces on the Tennessee River in support of Gen. George Thomas's Army of the Cumberland.

Despite the importance of the commands that he held, Lee never quite escaped the stigma of being a Virginian even though he remained a staunch unionist and his wife's family were intimate friends of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. He managed squadrons that were larger than the entire peacetime navy but could never get his rank of acting rear admiral made permanent. He and his ships saw action aplenty but never achieved a victory in a decisive battle. Indeed, Secretary Welles rendered the following judgment on Lee's service in 1864: "Acting Admiral Lee has acquitted himself very well, has discharged his duties intelligently and firmly. But he can never be a great commander. While he has administered the affairs of his squadron safely, he has failed to devise and execute any important act. The same opportunities in the hands of Porter, or Foote, or Farragut, and, I think, of John Rodgers, would have shown vastly more important results." Welles's unsparing comment is perhaps the most clear and concise statement ever rendered by a navy secretary defining the difference between great officers and merely competent ones.

To add insult to injury, Welles relieved Lee of his North Atlantic command on the eve of its greatest battle, the attempt to capture the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear River and invest Wilmington, and sent him to join the Mississippi Squadron which had little to do but patrol rivers already secured in earlier campaigns and support army operations in secondary theaters of the war. Repeated requests and importuning on the part of Lee and his wife's relations to get his admiral's rank confirmed and his services recognized met with stony refusal. About all that Lee had to console himself with was a small fortune in prize money and the pleasure of seeing his successor fail in the joint army-navy assault on Fort Fisher. Continued service after the war finally brought him the coveted promotion to rear admiral and he retired at the age of sixty-one, devoting himself thereafter to the management of his investments and a large family farm he had inherited.

In writing this biography of Samuel Phillips Lee, Cornish and Laas have produced a fine example of the kind of scholarship that can fill in the gaps left by a naval historical tradition that places most of its emphasis on the "great commanders" and their battles. In the best tradition of university press scholarship they have made extensive use of primary sources to reconstruct the life of a typical naval officer rather than a great one and thus show us another side of navy life in the nineteenth century. While the result of their efforts does not make stirring or inspiring reading, it is valuable in that it gives

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JAMES E. VALLE

Delaware State College

CAPT. FRANCIS E. BOWKER, *Atlantic Four-Master: The Story of the Schooner* Herbert L. Rawding, *1919-1947* (Mystic, Connecticut: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1986). 8″ x 9″, ix + 96 pages, 72 illustrations, 4 appendices, and notes. $18.00 (paper), $28.00 (cloth).

Few people today can write about the sea and cover the subject of coasting schooners as well as Capt. Francis E. Bowker. Bowker is known as "Biff" to his friends, but hereafter will be referred to as Captain Bowker. Of course, the knowledgeable and prolific Alan Villiers, an Englishman from another world who wrote about different craft and mostly square-rigged steel grain ships, also comes to mind.

Perhaps coming closest was Captain Bowker's friend, John Leavitt. Leavitt, a Yankee from Maine who served many years in the smaller schooners, wrote the story of the coasting schooners in his masterpiece *Wake of the Coasters* and added his marvelous sketches and watercolors. But Leavitt has gone now, and nobody could replace his knowledge and artistry. After Captain Bowker's first two books, *Hull Down* and *Blue Water Coaster*, many of us have been waiting for this, his next book.

We are not disappointed. His subject, like in his two earlier books, is about a Boston-owned, four-masted, Maine-built schooner, in this case, the *Herbert L. Rawding*. Captain Bowker describes the ownership situation that led to the building of the World War I "war baby" *Rawding*, launched just after the end of the war. He next discusses the *Rawding*'s various voyages and its captains and arrives at the point where he joined the vessel as bosun in 1940.

The author stayed with the *Rawding* through 1942, after the United States entered World War II. He next made a few trips on the four-master *Theoline*, became mate on the vessel, but returned to the *Rawding*. Captain Bowker remained on the *Rawding* until World War II limited her service.

During the early 1930s, I used to see the *Rawding* rafted-up in Boothbay Harbor with other four- and five-masted schooners, part of the Crowell and Thurlow "silent fleet" that waited for cargoes that only appeared occasionally.

There were great fleets laid up elsewhere during the depression years—Chelsea Creek, Boston; Eastport, Rockland, Maine; and the backwaters of the Brooklyn waterfront, New York; Port Johnson, New Jersey; Noank, Connecticut; and elsewhere. Such locations were jammed with old coasters that nobody wanted. Some of the sailing vessels were towed away eventually and sunk, or broken up for firewood. Today, few traces of the old vessels of the old coasters remain, except for some sunken, unidentifiable, rotten hulks.

The few that crept out during World War II were usually lost, sunk offshore by lurking enemy submarines, or battered to pieces by North Atlantic gales. The small schooners, of course, survived because they were suitable for use in protected waters.

The *Rawding* survived, but was lost in 1947 off the coast of Spain while returning with a load of salt from Turks Island. She was shaken to pieces by huge diesel engines that she had been refitted with during the war. So passed the last working American four-master.

Captain Bowker has made the era of the four-masted schooner come alive. This, his latest book, is a jewel. It is chock-full of technological information and the running of big schooners and their skippers, mates, and crew. The book also superbly recollects life aboard these last Yankee cargo schooners during their decline. This book is a must for those interested in seafaring.

ANDREW WILLIS

Weston, Massachusetts

JAMES E. COWDEN AND JOHN O'C. DUFFY, *The Elder Dempster Fleet History, 1852-1985* (Coltishall, Norfolk, U.K.: Mallett & Bell, 1986). 8″ x 11⅝″, cloth, xvi + 528 pages, illustrations, appendices, index. $50.00.

It has in recent years become the custom in treating the histories of larger and more important shipping companies to separate the material into two volumes, one dealing primarily with the history of the company and its operations, and one with the histories of its ships, a procedure that has substantial advantages for both

writers and readers, and this reviewer can think of no better example than the two excellent volumes on Elder, Dempster & Company and the Elder Dempster Lines: P. N. Davies, *The Trade Makers* (London, 1973; reviewed in *The American Neptune* for July 1975) giving a thorough history of the company to 1972; and the book presently under review, giving the histories of its ships. The earlier book includes a complete fleet list, based on a list compiled by M. H. Smye, then secretary of the company, in 1957, but the information there given is necessarily limited, and the present work complements and greatly expands it by giving for each ship, insofar as possible, technical details and a full history of the vessel to the end of her life (or to 1985, if she lasted that long).

Cowden & Duffy's work starts by giving the text of the royal charter granted to the African Steamship Company in 1852, and this is followed by a page devoted to the chronology of the companies treated and a page devoted to their funnel colors and flag designs. These are followed by two pages of fleet list notes, and these should be read carefully before proceeding further. The vessels treated are given numbers and divided into groups as follow:

Part 1. Numbers 1 through 419. Ocean steamers in West African and Canada-Cape trades.
Part 2. Numbers 420 through 468. Transatlantic steamers.
Part 3. Numbers 469 through 473. Jamaica service.
Part 4. Numbers 474 through 526. Local coastwise and river steamers in West Africa.
Part 5. Numbers 527 through 562. Vessels managed by Elder Dempster for the British government in World Wars I and II.
Part 6. Numbers 563 through 581. Hulks, etc.
Part 7. Ship numbers 582 through 585, plus 586. Addenda.

The data given for each ship (when available, and in nearly all cases they are) include Official Number, dates of Elder Dempster service, dimensions of hull, tonnages (gross, net, and frequently deadweight), builders of hull, builders of engines, the type and dimensions of engines, nominal horsepower, and speed in knots, frequently also the rig of the ship, further details of the hull (decks, etc.) and information on passenger accommodation and on cargo handling gear. There are also given details of the ships' careers while in Elder Dempster service, together with information on earlier and later names and owners, including the final disposition, which is almost always available, though for some of the small steamers it has been impossible to follow them further than their last appearance in Lloyd's Register. This material has been collected with great diligence and care. It is most thorough and extensive, and represents a vast amount of work, and it would be hard to add anything of importance to it, though it might be noted that in the case of *Athenian* (1854), Number 9, the enginer was two-cylinder geared, 55″, 55″-42″ by her builders, Smith & Rodger (not Rodgers), as appears, e.g., in *Underwriters' Registry for Iron Vessels,* 1873. In such a vast array of material there seem to be very few misprints and those not likely to cause any difficulty for the reader. For instance, giving the length and breadth of *Myrmidon,* Number 416, as 164.62 mm and 26.07 mm respectively, may be an occasion for hilarity but certainly not for confusion.

The foregoing material is, of course, primarily for reference, but it is interspersed with extensive and very readable sections consisting of details of losses while in Elder Dempster service (usually from masters' reports or from accounts of Board of Trade inquiries), reminiscences, abstract logs, the movements of *Aba,* Number 258, as a hospital ship in World War I and the report of her captain. There are also throughout the text many plans of passenger accommodations and some cargo stowage plans and convoy diagrams. There is a section on Elder Dempster ships in the Falkland Islands, and this is followed by Appendix I, listing the small craft fleets in 1949 and in 1972, giving brief details of two- or three-hundred passenger launches, tugs, and lighters. Appendix II contains a large amount of most interesting biographical material on individuals prominent in the development and operation of the company. Appendix III comprises a nautical miscellany, including menus, sailing schedules, and interior views. Particularly interesting are the detailed descriptions of the Cross River trade and of navigation on the innumerable coastal creeks.

The book contains illustrations of almost all the seagoing vessels in Elder Dempster service and of many of the smaller craft, and except in the case of the very early ships the illustrations are based on photographs. The majority of these are of good quality and many are excellent, but some thirty of them (a minor proportion) are of indifferent quality, and in the case of a third of these the reviewer has prints from the same negatives as those used in the book, and while the quality of the reproductions naturally depends on the quality of the

originals, it seems certain that more skilful copying would have produced substantial improvement in the illustrations. Moreover, there are (at least) three wrong identifications: The photograph marked *Congo*(II), Number 56, is not the Elder Dempster steamer of 1882, but the Portuguese *Congo* (ex-*Ingraban*, ex-*Clara Menzell*) (1905) of Cia. Naçional. Again, the illustration for *Mexico*, Number 423, is not of the former *Sobraon* of 1890, but of *Mexico* (1913) of La Compania Mexicana de Nav. (and later Mexical owners). Finally, the illustration for *Montezuma*(III), Number 227, is obviously of a steamer, probably *Montezuma*(I) or *Montezuma*(II), and not of a motorship. Nevertheless, the majority of ship portraits are of good quality and there are seven most attractive colored plates, five based on paintings and two on colored photographs, which add much to the appearance of the book, and in any case the outstanding merit of the book consists of the thorough and extensive information given.

The West African coast gives rise to especially difficult conditions for navigation and this was particularly true in earlier days, so it is not surprising in view of Elder Dempster's large fleet that there were over seventy total losses amongst their deep sea vessels in African service, the larger number on the African coast, as well as seven or eight more of the local steamers. Fortunately, over the years loss of life was usually small. In addition, the company suffered thirty war losses in World War I and twenty-six owned and seven managed vessels in World War II, of which more details are given in the Elder Dempster war histories for the two wars. Furthermore, the climate of West Africa is unfavorable for Europeans and conditions were particularly difficult in the early years, so one cannot but wonder, how many of those, passengers and crew, went out to Africa but never returned. In spite of this, fortitude and persistence overcame difficulties and led to the formation of a great trading enterprise, of which the maritime aspects are thoroughly and interestingly covered in the present work, which can be recommended most strongly to anyone with an interest in steam and motor merchant shipping, especially in the West African and transatlantic trades.

E. K. Haviland

Baltimore, Maryland

James Pritchard, *Louis XV's Navy 1748-1762: A Study of Organization and Administration.* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1987). xiv + 285 pages. $32.50

This is one of the best books of naval history I have ever read. No one seriously interested in warfare during the age of sail should be without it; it revolutionizes our understanding of not only the Seven Years' War, but also the entire 18th-century-long Anglo-French naval rivalry. It is concerned not with battles or even with military strategy, but rather with the underpinnings of naval strength. Pritchard examines everything it took to create the most sophisticated and complex of premodern instruments of war, a gigantic navy of dozens of ships of the line. In each of eleven chapters he considers the mid-18th-century French navy from a different aspect: the naval ministers who directed it and the bureaucrats who assisted them, the "officers of the pen" who ran its arsenals, the "officers of the sword" who commanded its ships, the arsenals which constructed and outfitted these ships, the workers of the arsenals, the ships themselves, the cannon they carried, the material with which they were constructed and the victuals which fed their crews, and finally the finances without which nothing could be accomplished. It is the last of these which he finds the central underlying weakness of the French navy. Because it could not find the money to pay the workers in its arsenals and the sailors aboard its ships, it eventually lost the ability to contest Britain's control of the sea. This approach to the Seven Years' War also is the subject of a book which appeared too late for Pritchard to cite (but whose author acknowledges Pritchard's assistance), James C. Riley's *The Seven Years and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll* (Princeton, 1986).

Pritchard's research has been exhaustive, his power of synthesis is prodigious and his historical judgement is superb. His writing is inelegant but generally clear. I found myself wishing, however, that he had made more frequent comparisons between the British navy and the French. Admittedly he does make occasional use of such superb sources as Daniel Baugh's *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* (Princeton, 1965) and Brian Lavery's *The Ship of the Line*, vol. 1, *The Development of the Battlefleet, 1650-1850* (Annapolis, 1984). (Another fine new book, N. A. M. Rodger's *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy*

[London, 1986] appeared too recently for his use.) He does not emphasize, however, the implications of trying to match a navy of 100 ships of the line with a navy of 60 ships of the line. Under those circumstances all the French navy could do was to buy time to save Canada on the battlefields of Europe—perhaps Canada can be said to have been lost at the Battle of Rossbach. Eventually the weight of numbers was bound to be crushing. What Pritchard does do is demonstrate that the navy's weakest point was its ramshackle system of credit financing and that it was here that the navy began its disintegration. From my own research I have discovered that the same thing was starting to occur in 1782 and that the French navy was saved from its predecessor's fate only by the signing of peace. The navy did perform far better in the latter war, however, and Pritchard makes me suspect that improvements in finance may have played an important role. Perhaps on some future occasion Pritchard will turn his attentions to this topic. Whatever his interests let us hope he writes some more wonderful books like the one with which he has just blessed us.

JONATHAN R. DULL

Yale University

A. J. JAMIESON, Editor, *A People of the Sea, The Maritime History of the Channel Islands* (New York: Methuen & Co., 1987). 8″ x 10″, cloth, 528 pages, 72 plates, 16 in full color, 11 maps, glossary, bibliography, ship index and general index, $89.95.

A People of the Sea, is a multi-faceted, narrative history of the minuscule geographical area known as the Channel Islands, from pre-historic times to the twentieth century. In addition to chronicalling the islands' internal history, the book successfully integrates this unique political entity into international maritime history. It is a fine example of the workings of a competent intra-disciplinary committee, combining archeological, maritime and economic history with the expertise of local antiquarian authorities.

The interesting conceptual difference between active and passive use of the sea is well presented by the several authors, and employed to define the changing nature of the islanders' relationship with their surrounding environment. The greater proportion of the book is devoted to the Channel Islands' three century peak of participation in the maritime trades from 1689 into the present century. Every author has been provided with ample space; each chapter addressing a separate aspect of the total subject, is chronologically complete, amounting to a self-standing essay on its topic. This feature should prove to be a useful format for future researchers.

A reference to the Channel Islands usually generates a sense of mystery and curious unfamiliarity. Weren't they occupied by the Germans during World War II? Are they independent? French? British? The maritime historical researcher frequently encounters vessels with strange hailing ports about which he or she finds little information in their gazetteers: St. Aubin, Creux, La Corbière, Braye, Gorey, Gaspé, St. Peter Port or St. Helier, these are, of course, the Channel Island ports.

The local population, split between agrarian and maritime occupations, turned largely toward the sea from earliest times for their livelihood until the end of World War II, and the advent of modern international travel and communications. Of late, international finance, tourism, and a renewed agriculture, have brought increasing prosperity as the population's maritime activities have begun to wane.

The islands have been closely allied to the fortunes of the distant British Isles, paradoxically, rather than those of nearby France and the economic accomplishments of the medieval period were set back when England lost Normandy, the Channel Islands nearest neighbor. Through both "Hundred Years Wars" (1337-1453 & 1689-1815) the islands experienced shifting fortunes. Participation in the sixteenth century Newfoundland cod fishery was the first attempt by the inhabitants to join the European maritime expansion, beginning an industry that would continue through the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. The mercantilist policies of England and France during the seventeenth century, however, interrupted the maturation of the islands' economy.

In the face of this decline, the second Hundred Years War appeared to have doomed their economy, but the Royal Navy made the difference on this occasion, shielding the islands from French invasion, inadvertently leading to the development of a new industry—privateering. Ships fitted out by local merchants and issued with British letters-of-marque were ideally situated to prey effectively on French coastal shipping throughout the period. The accumulation of valuable

prize goods in the Channel Island ports led in turn to another traditional industry—smuggling. This illicit trade was promoted by English merchants to bypass the payment of customs duties. Smuggling declined rapidly after 1807 as the British revenue service's efforts became more effective.

With the emergence of Germany as a unified nation in the late nineteenth century, England and France turned away from their centuries old pattern of warfare and addressed themselves to this newly emerging central European power. As the attention of these traditional enemies turned northward and eastward, the strategic value of the Channel Islands declined, ultimately leading to Britain's decision not to defend them in World War II, and their occupation throughout the war by German forces.

Dr. Jamieson, functioned in the dual role of editor and contributor writing more than half the book himself, as well as being responsible for recruiting the intra-disciplinary group of academic experts who formed the editorial committee. If there is a significant shortcoming in *A People of the Sea,* it is the lack of larger, full-color charts and illustrations, measured against the price of the volume.

W. M. P. DUNNE

State University of New York at Stony Brook

HERBERT K. BEALS, EDITOR, *For Honor and Country, the Diary of Bruno de Hezeta* (Western Imprints, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon, 1985). xxiii & 167 pages, illustrated, maps, $19.95.

English voyagers such as George Cook or George Vancouver have long had their narrative accounts read and re-read by enthusiastic historians and *afficionadoes* of maritime life. Reports of Spaniards seem generally to be neglected, with Quadra attracting much attention. This is unfortunate, as the diary of Hezeta demonstrates: his journal may not have been great literature, but its story is very interesting.

In October 1774 Bruno Hezeta arrived in Mexico from Spain. A naval officer aged about thirty, he was charged to explore the western coast of North America. He was the senior officer in command of three vessels—the *Santiago,* a brig; the *Sonora,* a schooner; and the *San Carlos,* a brigantine. The expedition was not overly successful—the expectations were probably too high—but Hezeta basically carried out his instructions.

This version of Hezeta's journal is the first to appear in complete form. The author cannot be considered a great stylist, but his narrative is clear and precise. He is not trying to tell a story but rather to keep a record. Tactful in treatment of the Indians, he remained wary in their company. The journal for 18 June is particularly interesting in its description of the indigenous population.

Hezeta and his companions sailed almost to the top end of what was to become known as Vancouver Island (initially Vancouver and Quadra were to have it named "Vancouver and Quadra's Island"). The ill health of the sailors caused them to turn south anew on 11 August. Two months later it was all over and Hezeta was back at San Blas. While he did not receive great acclaim for what he had accomplished—and part of this may well be the consequence of the secretive nature of the Spanish authorities—Hezeta should be better known for his voyage of explorations. In this book, Herbert Beals has gone far to rectify this situation.

The editor has done a highly professional job in producing this present edition. The maps are exemplary, the notes and glossary clear and precise, and the bibliography useful for further study. Once again, the Oregon Historical Society should be complimented for publishing such a useful and unusual source of western maritime history.

S. W. JACKMAN

Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

RAY BRIGHTON, *Clippers of the Port of Portsmouth and the Men Who Built Them* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985). 10¼" x 7½", cloth, 178 pages, 33 illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $19.95.

During the 1850s more than two hundred clipper ships were built in the United States. Major seaport cities such as New York and Boston accounted for most of them, including the most famous and best publicized examples. This state of affairs obscures the fact that smaller communities also contributed clippers that were excellent examples of the type, fast, well appointed, and

often long lived. In this volume, Ray Brighton has endeavored to tell the story of twenty-eight such vessels that were built at various yards in and around the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and launched into the waters of the Piscataqua River. He also provides information concerning the designers and builders of the Portsmouth clippers, their investors, masters, shareholders, and even the shipwrights who fashioned their graceful hulls and lofty spars.

It is unfortunate that this book, which treats such a fascinating subject, makes very dull reading, First of all, as a Portsmouth native the author allows too much regional pride to show in his writing. His treatment is personal rather than objective and he probably claims more for his pet ships than is actually warranted. Most of them were not particularly noteworthy except for longevity. Next, he allows his narrative to be broken up into individual thumbnail sketches of the ships and builders with no real effort being made to link the material into a coherent book-length narrative. This makes for a text that is pedantic and easily forgettable because of its fragmented nature. The absence of a strong unifying theme is another consequence of this kind of structure.

In the matter of illustrations, the publishers have included a fairly large proportion of full-color plates and a very fine jacket cover by John Stobart. Those who are devotees of the formal and somewhat stylized ship portraits of nineteenth-century marine artists will be particularly delighted by the selection of paintings reproduced. This reviewer would have preferred to see modern paintings used more extensively both to take advantage of the latest research and to give contemporary artists greater exposure. The book would also be stronger if contemporary charts of the Piscataqua River and Portsmouth Harbor had been included showing the locations of the shipyards and other features, such as shoals, which the completed clipper hulls had to be gotten over before they could be ballasted and rigged for sea.

Another rewarding category of illustrations that would have strengthened this book consists of hull drawings, rigging plans, deck layouts, and the like. Except for one photograph of half-models and a passing mention of Foster's patent reefing gear which was installed on an experimental basis in the *Ocean Rover,* the technical side of designing and building clipper ships is almost entirely neglected. Perhaps the source material collection available at the Portsmouth Athenaeum contains little or nothing along these lines, but the author should have made some effort to determine if Portsmouth-built vessels had any unique features or distinct regional characteristics. In this connection, one of Brighton's "clippers," the *Dashing Wave,* is particularly worthy of study. Referred to as a medium clipper of 1,239 tons launched in 1853, *Dashing Wave* lasted under sail until 1902 hauling coal and lumber on the West Coast. Her elliptical stern and moderate spar plan seem to indicate that she was really an early version of the downeasters that came after the building of classic clippers had been discontinued.

One strong point of the ship career sketches that make up the bulk of this book is the mention of the many diverse trades that the Portsmouth clippers engaged in. In addition to the California and China traffic that paid premium rates during the 1850s, there was much hauling of southern cotton to Europe, a strong demand for carriage between the East Coast and Australia, tea and jute from India, and the transatlantic immigrant trade. In lean times the clippers tided themselves over with Peruvian guano charters and one, the *Nightingale,* even briefly entered the African slave trade.

Clippers of the Port of Portsmouth is obviously a labor of love written by a man deeply rooted in his native city. It would have been much stronger and more engrossing if it had been tied more closely into the total picture of maritime activity as it existed in the 1850s. Most of the book's readers who are not from Portsmouth would be far more interested in an integrated treatment of the subject that covered technical and economic matters illustrating how the Piscataqua ships fit into the overall scheme of things and whether or not they were of distinctive design or purely derivative and orthodox in conception.

JAMES E. VALLE

Delaware State College

BRIAN LAVERY, *Deane's Doctrine of Naval Architecture 1670,* (Annapolis, Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 1981 reprinted 1986). 10″ x 12,″ cloth, 128 pages, 125 half-tone and line illustrations (85 of which illustrate Deane's own text), introduction, Deane's Doctrine, appendix, $22.95.

Brian Lavery has performed a valuable service in presenting Sir Anthony Deane's *Doctrine* to the public,

and has enhanced it with important background information on Deane and his times. Lavery is author of the two-volume *Ship of the Line* and *74 Gun Ship Bellona;* his research and communicative skills make him eminently qualified for this work.

In the first part of the introduction Lavery covers Deane's career. He was appointed master shipwright at Harwich Dockyard at the age of twenty-six, on the recommendation of Samuel Pepys, having risen from assistant in four years. Although his sponsorship by Pepys aided Deane's rise in status and responsibility, it culminated in the imprisonment of both men in 1679 on charges of treason resulting from exposure to political crossfire. They were shortly released, and Deane succeeded as a private shipbuilder until Pepys, reappointed secretary of the admiralty, maneuvered his placement on a special commission replacing the old Navy Board. Pepys and Deane were again jailed when William of Orange drove King James into exile. Imprisonment was brief, after which Deane disappeared from public life. He died in 1721 at the age of eighty-three.

The *Doctrine* was written in 1670 at the request of Samuel Pepys, presented to him, and, although known to scholars, remained unpublished in complete form until this presentation. Deane's sources of technical information are not documented and his originality may be questioned. However, his responsibility for the design of an impressive list of ships built between 1666 and 1675 firmly establishes his authority. Preceding the text, Lavery explains in general terms how Deane developed proportions and drafted a set of lines. He was reputedly the first marine designer to calculate displacement and reconcile it with weight to determine draft of water. However, he does not claim this in the *Doctrine*. Lavery refers to Edmund Bushnell's *Complete Shipwright,* published in 1664, from which Deane seems to have obtained ideas.

The *Doctrine* itself commences with "Part I, Arithmetic," an interesting display of geometry used in laying down a draft, making scales, and measuring volumes. Deane's method of measuring the volume of a butt, or barrel, is intriguing and appears to be quite accurate. The method of determining board footage of timber appears more an entertaining trick than a practical application of geometry.

"Part II, Hull Design," takes the reader through all stages in the development of a hull form. Arcs of circles are used for most curves, in many cases compounded curves of different tangential arcs. The mathematics is based on the Pythagorean theorem and is also illustrated, in greater detail, by Bushnell, who attributes his knowledge to "Mr. Gunter's Book" (Edmund Gunter, English mathematician [1581-1626]).

It is under the heading "To Measure a ship's body underwater, and the reason of the ship's swimming and sinking" that the *Doctrine* fails to support Deane's reputation. His methods for measuring the areas of cross sections of the hull are crude but detailed, where Bushnell leaves this to the student's own devices. Like Bushnell, Deane advises calculating volumes in increments of two frame spaces and then adding these to obtain the whole. It appears that Deane attempts to describe the calculation of volume of an increment of three frames (two spaces) by the same method he uses to calculate the volume of a barrel. The area of the first frame is multiplied by one-third, that of the middle by two-thirds, and that of the third frame by one-third again. The sum of the three products is then multiplied by the total distance between the first and third frame. Assuming that the sectional areas are correct, this procedure gives a result very close to that obtained by use of Simpson's First Rule, which is commonly used today. The volumes of all of the three-frame increments are then added to obtain total displaced volume. But there are apparent errors in the numbering of frames in Deane's text, which brings the student to a perplexing halt in his attempt to understand.

Deane multiplies the volume of the hull in cubic feet by 64 pounds for salt (or 63.75 for fresh water) to obtain total weight. He then states that the ship in his example will draw twelve feet six inches forward and eight feet eight inches aft, but without telling us how this was determined, since there is no discussion of a weight calculation or calculation of the position of centers of buoyancy and gravity. He briefly describes determination of final loading by calculation of the displacement between the launching and desired load waterlines.

Deane's final statement on the subject is, "I could tell you why this ship draws no more light, but in another place it shall be done to prevent much trouble here, where I would have taken good notice of this work." This curiously parallels Bushnell, who at the end of "Concerning Measuring of Ships" in his sixth edition similarly denigrates the calculation of displacement.

> I shall not need to say anything more concerning the measuring, for it will be understood by those that have any

judgement in the measuring of solid bodies, the matter itself being but a nicety rather than useful: I only touched it to show those that are curious-minded which way they may accomplish their desires; I shall forbear to give examples, because it will much increase my Treatise, and augment the price, which might prove more prejudicial to young men than advantageous.

These statements by two contemporary authorities lead us to believe that they trusted more in the use of proven ratios of dimensions than in highly detailed calculations. Both seem ill at ease with mathematics, and it seems certain that less educated shipwrights, if they drew plans at all, relied more on proportions and scaling than on derivation of the offsets for arcs of circles involving calculation of square root. Mungo Murray in 1754 calculated displacement by addition of small increments of the ship's body, each bounded by the center line plane, cross section planes, water planes, and the skin of the ship. He appends work of M. Duhamel, who discussed the weight calculation, center of gravity, and stability. From all of the above it appears that Deane and his assistants knew how to locate a ship's flotation plane with reasonable accuracy. However he does not really tell us how.

The latter part of the *Doctrine* contains excellently detailed diagrams and tables showing principal parts of a ship, principal dimensions, spar dimensions, sizes and lengths of cordage for ships first to sixth rate, and a detailed inventory of ship, outfit, and stores (including weights and costs) for a large number of ships.

Lavery adds an appendix, which supplements Deane's work with contemporary scantlings for a third-rate ship, a completion-inspection report on the *Warspite* of 1666, a manifest for carved work for a third-rate ship, and a brief history of *Resolution,* possibly Deane's most famous ship. A reconstruction of *Resolution*'s lines and arrangement is presented, together with details of similar ships.

Brian Lavery kindly answered some of this reviewer's questions regarding Deane's reputation as compared to his proven performance. Whereas Deane is positively credited with an impressive fleet, he was known to be egotistical and sometimes arrogant, and may have deliberately avoided credits to sources of information and to his assistants.

There is no bibliography, but credits for sources are given by Lavery with the illustrations and in the text. This is a scholarly work, attractively presented, and is recommended to all those interested in nautical history.

Serious students of early naval architecture will find help in understanding Deane's system in William A. Baker's "Early Seventeenth-Century Ship Design," appearing in the *American Neptune,* October 1954.

EDWARD G. BROWNLEE

Cherry Hill, New Jersey

PAUL FORSYTHE JOHNSTON, ed., *Proceedings of the Sixteenth Conference on Underwater Archaeology* (Society for Historical Archaeology, Special Publications Series, Number 4, 1985) 7″ x 10″, illustrations and charts. $15.00, paperback. Available from the Society for Historical Archaeology, P.O. Box 231033, Pleasant Hill, CA 94523-1033.

The conference, devoted to the New World, heard over forty papers that covered the gamut of topics, from a way of using sucrose to preserve wood (83-95) to new light on the 17th-century trade in ceramics from China (26-30). The lion's share went to papers dealing with wrecks, and these, too, covered the gamut: a gunboat of revolutionary times pulled out of Lake Champlain (10-12); an 18th-century fishing schooner found in the waters off Halifax (13-26); the *King Philip,* a ship-rigged vessel launched in 1856 that came to grief off San Francisco (30-36); hulls that, during the Civil War, were filled with bricks and sunk in front of Mobile to discourage attack (40-47); and the artifacts found off the island of St. Eustatius in the Netherlands Antilles which are being scrupulously classified and analyzed in an effort to locate the anchorage there that was of prime importance during the 17th and 18th centuries (60-76).

A third of the volume is devoted to the papers delivered at three symposia: one on what underwater archaeology can contribute to the study of the exploration and discovery of the New World (109-19; the papers covered the nature of the ships involved and their equipment and cargoes, what can be derived from archival research, what wrecks have already been found and what sites look promising); a second on the maritime trade of the Confederacy during the Civil War (119-37; the papers covered the nature of Confederate blockade-running, how the Confederate government gradually worked out ways of regulating it, the nature of the ships used, where wrecks of these have been found and where they are to be found, the programs of research on the

topic and ways to organize them); and a third on state programs for the study and preservation of historic shipwrecks (138-56; the papers covered North Carolina, Michigan, South Carolina, Virginia, Vermont).

The volume, inevitably, is intended strictly for specialists in the various fields—but it is a fact-crammed one that they will find of prime value, and the modest price puts it easily within their reach.

LIONEL CASSON

New York University

STANTON GARVEY, *The Captain's Best Mate: The Journal of Mary Chipman Lawrence on the Whaler Addison 1856-1860. (University Press of New England, Hanover, N. H. 1986)*, pp. xxii & 311, illustrated , $10.95.

In this very sophisticated and urbane world, the simple and the primitive have a special charm. Consider for the moment the particular appeal of the paintings of Grandma Moses or Beryl Cooke; each of these artists brings a vision of a less complicated and less uncertain world. The same may be said of Mary Chipman Lawrence's charming journal. It would seem that while life was hazardous enough in the physical sense in the middle of the last century, there was a sort of innocence which is now totally passé.

Mary Chipman Lawrence is not one of those individuals who would be described as a great diarist but she has a sense of language and an ability to capture the moment. The four years recounted in this volume tell of the whaling industry in its great days—an epoch that was soon to vanish, and with its magical ethos of Moby Dick. The journal does not attempt to report on the mundane existance on the *Addison*, the daily routine of the whaling vessel, or the actual technical details of the business. However, the author sees it all in a larger sense, and with it her own, her husband's, and her child's prosperity. Regretfully the Lawrences do not make a fortune, but they were to have experiences which future generations were not to know.

Mary Chipman Lawrence is very much a part of her age. She is careful, frugal, affectionate, and pious. She is amusing in her nineteenth-century prudishness about the native population, 'there is a vast deal more to be done to raise them very high in the scale of morals. From what I saw and heard of them . . .they are a very low, degraded and indolent set . . .frightful looking creatures, . . .They are all great thieves; nothing can be left within their reach.' They are frequently nude, but she dose add that their uncivilized behavior is not improved by many of the sailors who visit them. One always thinks of whaling as an isolated activity, yet the way boats were sighted and often visited gives the reader the sense that the wide ocean was less lonely than might be imagined. The meetings with various ships' captains (and with them the possibility of receiving letters or newspapers) dimished the sense of isolation.

Samuel Lawrence, Mary's husband, is described in enough detail for the readers to recognize that he was highly professional. It is evident that she is very fond of him, but typical of her background., she doesn't indulge in romantic fancy. Minnie the daughter is less clearly delineated, although it is obvious that her mother was concerned for her welfare and happiness. In September 1857, Mary reports that she was making a new doll named Mary Stuart for her little girl. The latter's original doll, Sarah Price, "seems to have seen her last days." One wonders what did Minnie think of it all, how did she react to a world without contemporaries?

This is an engaging volume. It is the sort of book one keeps at a bedside to read before faling asleep, and perhaps to inspire dreams of "derring-do," the simple life, and—to paraphrase John Masefield—"to go down to sea in ships again to the wider starry sea." The editor is to be commended for the neat and thoughtful introduction, the careful notes and glossary, and the maps and illustrations. This is an excellent source for any comprehension of the whaling industry before the American Civil War.

S. W. JACKMAN

Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

JOHN NIVEN, *The American President Lines and its Forebears, 1848–1984.* (Newark, University of Dela ware Press, 1987). 6 1/4" x 9 1/4", 328 pages, cloth, illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index, table of illustrations. $39.50.

This is a very thorough and interesting history of American President Lines, one of the most important

shipping companies of the present day, and of its corporate predecessors, going back to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, founded by the New York merchant, William H. Aspinwall, a partner in the firm of Howland & Aspinwall, in 1848. While the venture was at first sight highly precarious, the California gold rush put it on a secure foundation. The resulting increase in both passengers and cargo attracted competition, which the original company duly overcame. In addition to the purchase of competitors' steamers, Pacific Mail undertook an extensive program of new building, so that by 1865 they had a fleet of some twenty steamers. The effective monopoly of Pacific Mail in intercoastal service was brought to an end by the completion of the Union Pacific-Central Pacific system, which provided rail service across North America, whereupon Pacific Mail inaugurated a TransPacific Service in 1867, maintained by immense wooden paddle steamers, outdated from the outset and replaced by iron screw vessels in 1873–1875. The Company reached its peak between the turn of the century and the First World War with a fleet that included the splendid *Korea* and *Siberia* of 1901, the larger, though less powerful, *Manchuria* and *Mongolia* of 1904, and the *China,* built in Britain in 1889 as a replacement for the wrecked *City of Tokio.* In 1915 Pacific Mail sold its TransPacific fleet as its future seemed doubtful in view of the new La Follette Seamen's Act. The sale, though profitable, proved premature so three smaller passenger and cargo steamers were purchased from Dutch owners. Control of the Pacific Mail passed from the Southern Pacific R. R. to W. R. Grace & Company and the American International Corporation in December 1915. In 1920 the Pacific Mail fleet reached a maximum number of forty-six ships, some chartered from the United States Shipping Board (USSB), and in March 1921 began as managing operators of five "535" type passenger and cargo steamers for the Shipping Board. When these ships were offered for sale, Pacific mail bid on them but lost out to the Dollar Line, which in 1926 purchased the Pacific Mail name, house flag and good will. The first two chapters of the book give a good account of the Pacific Mail S. S. Co., though adding little or no information to that given by John H. Kemble's more detailed *Panama Route, 1848–1869* and his papers in *The American Neptune,* to which Niven is much indebted.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the rise and earlier years of the Dollar Steamship Company, founded in 1895 when the Scottish-born lumberman, Robert Dollar, bought the steam schooner *Newsboy* (1888). Subsequently he built up the largest fleet of steam schooners on the West Coast and about 1899 chartered the large cargo steamer *Arab* built in 1890 by Palmer's at Jarrow on the Tyne (and not, as stated in the present book, at Hunter's Point, California) for the Bedouin Steam Navigation Company (W. & R. Thomson) for a voyage to the Orient. The latter was a success, so the Dollar S. S. Co. purchased her and renamed her *M. S. Dollar.* Subsequently they had several large freighters built for operation under the British flag, primarily in tramping. "Capt." Dollar resisted the temptation to expand his shipping operations during the War, but afterward he and his sons, Stanley and Melville, acquired a large, though not controlling, interest in H. F. Alexander's Pacific Steamship Company, commonly known as the Admiral Line, and in 1920 purchased four foreign-built freighters for operation under the British flag. One of these, *Robert Dollar* (ex-*Kurland*), was the largest cargo vessel in the world.

In the mean time, H. F. Alexander, who controlled two inconsequential lines, merged them under the name Admiral Line, which in 1916 merged with the old-established Pacific Coast Steamship Company under the name of Pacific Steamship Company, which flourished under the overgenerous M04 operating contracts. In 1921, five "535" type steamers were turned over to the Admiral Oriental Mail. But the Shipping Board was dissatisfied with Alexander's operation and the five ships were turned over to the Admiral Oriental Line, controlled entirely by the Dollars, who by using their influence in Washington were able to purchase the Pacific Mail's "535"s and the "President" liners operated by the Admiral Oriental Line for ridiculously low prices. The home office of Admiral Oriental was then moved to San Francisco, but its service between the ports of the Northwest and the Orient was conducted under the trade name of American Mail Line.

In January 1924 the Dollar Line inaugurated a round-the-world service, using seven "502" passenger and cargo vessels and four smaller cargo vessels, all purchased from the Shipping Board at bargain prices. And beginning in January 1927 the Dollars established their "horseshoe" route, using ten "535" passenger and cargo steamers, the whole forming the largest scheduled liner service in the nation. Between 1924 and 1939 the Dollar Line and its successors averaged a net profit

of about $437,000 a year on the round-the-world service. The Jones-White Act of 1928 led to a mail contract for the Dollar Line and liberal financial assistance for the construction in 1930 of the 22,000-ton liners *President Hoover* and *President Coolidge*, and in May 1929 the Dollar Steamship Line, Inc., Ltd. was created to own all the Dollar Shipping assets. In 1932, R. Stanley Dollar, who now controlled the Dollar Enterprises, persuaded his board to buy the near-bankrupt Tacoma-Oriental Steamship Company-a mistake. While the Dollar S. S. Co. appeared in the early 1930's to be most prosperous, it was actually overextended. "Capt." Robert Dollar's death in 1932 brought an end to the era of private control. Competition arose from the Japanese NYK and OSK and the Canadian Pacific Line, whose ships completely outclassed the aging "502"s and "535"s. In 1931 the Dollar Line abandoned the "horseshoe" route and instituted a service from New York to San Francisco and thence to the Orient. In 1932 and 1933 the Company was unable to meet its interest payments, although large sums were being directed to officials of the line, especially to R. Stanley Dollar. The Dollar Line was further weakened by the seamen's and longshoremen's strike of 1934. In November 1936 Tacoma Oriental filed for bankruptcy and the Pacific S. S. Co.'s Admiral Line collapsed in March 1937. About the same time *President Hoover* was lost off the east coast of Taiwan. The financial position of the Dollar Line continued to deteriorate until on 15 August 1938, in return for release from all liability, the Dollar interests assigned their voting stock to the U. S. Maritime Commission, which announced that after 3 June 1938 operation of American Mail (which was also in difficulties) and the Dollar S. S. Line were to be suspended. Stanley Dollar and his immediate associates all resigned on 26 October 1938. The Commission announced that the Dollar Line would be operated as a private company, with William Gibbs McAdoo as chairman of the board, the name of the company being changed to American President Lines, Ltd.

The new management acted quickly, and by the spring of 1939, American President Lines had eleven ships in service. the outbreak of W. W. II disrupted routes and increased costs, but increased both the passenger and the cargo business.

After American Mail suspended operation in the summer of 1938, a group of Seattle business men formed the Pacific Northwest Oriental Co., which in turn created the Puget Sound Line, whose financial position was insecure, and it was immediately challenged by the American Mail Line, which was reorganized on 15 December 1939, but in such a way that Stanley Dollar retained a substantial interest in it. this was eliminated largely with the help of funds supplied by Richard J. Reynolds, the tobacco magnate, after which the Maritime Commission approved the American Mail bid for the trade name and good will of the Puget Sound Line. Reynolds did not interfere with the operation of American Mail and approved of A. R. Lintner, their newly appointed general manager. In early 1941 American Mail replaced three "Hog Islanders" with three new C-41 Maritime Commission vessels.

American President Lines was also making significant progress from near-bankruptcy and in 1940 they took delivery of two C-3 type steamers. As McAdoo (who died in 1941) had not the energy to oversee the detailed operation of APL, Henry F. Grady, lately undersecretary of state, became the president of APL. The latter and American Mail continued for a while to add modern tonnage, but by midsummer of 1941 APL suspended all TransPacific schedules, as did American Mail shortly afterward, round-the-world service continuing a little longer. After Pearl Harbor the armed forces took over all ships remaining iin private hands, APL and American Mail becoming, like other shipping lines, general agents for the War Shipping Administration, whose fleet increased from 11,850,000 tons to 45 million tons by the end of the War. Both APL and American Mail earned revenues during the war sufficient to liquidate their debts to the government and to pay a modest dividend. At this point Ralph Davies, president of the American Independent Oil Co., took an interest in the affairs of APL, whose government-held stock Stanley Dollar was trying to recover. APL had by then acquired a fleet of new C-3 cargo vessels and was bareboat chartering the P2-type ships *President Wilson* (II) and *President Cleveland* (II), and laid down as troopships but completed to APL specifications, from the WSA. When Henry Grady resigned the presidency in 1947 APL owned fifteen ships, none more than eight years old, and operated thirty-six others on bareboat charters or general agency agreement. Grady was succeeded by George Killion, who supported a proposed settlement with the Dollar interests, whereby the government would put up APL for sale and divide the proceeds

evenly with the Dollars. Stanley Dollar agreed and the line was sold to the winning bidder, APL Associates, headed by Ralph Davies, who became chairman of the board of APL and was effectively in charge of the Company. Three passenger and cargo vessels built in 1952 for APL's round-the-world service were taken over while under construction by the navy as transports in the Korean War, but APL acquired four "Mariner" type vessels, newly developed by the U. S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). In 1954 APL acquired 80% of the stock of AML. About this time, APL Associates, which had the status of a personal holding company, avoided this by acquiring a two-thirds interest in the Natomas Company, a gold mining enterprise, of which APL and AML now became subsidiairies. During the middle 50's APL added eight "Mariners", modified to its requirements. AML also required new tonnage and in 1962 Ralph Davies, through Natomas, acquired the Pacific Far East Line, which was in difficulties. APL's passenger service was flourishing in the late 1950's and enjoyed the support of Ralph Davies. By 1961 they were operating four vessels and contemplated the construction of a ship of 43,000 tons gross, but by then it was obvious that most passengers would in the future be traveling by air, so the large liner was never built, limited accomodations being provided in two new "Searacer" type cargo ships. therse were built for partial container and partial break bulk cargo, but the combination did not work out well. George Killion, who had become increasingly involved in the movie industry, was eased out as president of APL and replaced by Raymond W. Ickes, president of PFEL and an enthusiast for barge-carrying LASH ships. But there were misgivings about them and it was left to PFEL to acquire two. Containeriziation and automation had by now made great strides and large payments were made by APL and other members of the Pacific Maritime Association to the various labor unions to compensate for the loss of jobs.

During 1967–68 APL took delivery of five new "Seamasters." Similarly, AML had in November 1969 completed its replacement program with five "Mailiner" class freighters. These were break bulk ships, but designed for possible conversion to full container ships, which was done in 1970, whereupon APL and AML were committed to complete containerization. Ralph Davies, whose health had gradually been failing, died on 19 September 1971, ten days after his 74th birthday, ending an era in APL history. Chandler Ide, who had long been a close associate of Davies, was elected president of Natomas Company and chairman of APL and AML [PFEL had previously been sold) had had five "Seamasters," and three "Master Mariners" lengthened and converted to full container ships. Under Norman Scott, who assumed the presidency of APL on 1 May 1983, the line moved its operations from San Francisco to Oakland. In 1974, four "Pacesetters" were added to APL, well over a year beyoind their contract date. Other changes abnout this time include the merger of APL and AML and the modification of the round-the-world service which elmimated the voyage around the Cape of Good Hope while the Suez Canal was closed. The Canal reopened in 1975, but the advantages from this were partially offset by the rapid rise in the price of fuel oil. APL had various problems, especially that of unprofitable routes, and had had three cheif executives in less than ten years. In August 1977 Bruce Seaton, who had been with Natomas, became president of APL. In the winter of 1977 domestic transportation in the U. S. was disorganized by blizzards. APL had developed an efficient electronic data system for traffic control over its own lines but not beyond and as a result of the confusion of 1977 extended it to intermodal operations throughout the United States and into Asia and made arrangements with Transway, forwarder, that secured very nearly complete utilization of APL's containers. Meanwhile APL was replacing older vessels with three LASH ships purchased at bargain prices from the bankrupt PFEL and converted to full container ships. In 1978 three C-9 container ships, powered by Sulzer Diesel engines were built in the U. S. by the Allis-Chalmer Co., were ordered and were built in 1982–83, being followed by two large and fast container ships acquired from another company. Bruce Seaton, who was still president of APL when the present book was written, reorganized the Company into three divisions: North America, North Asia and South Asia.

In 1983 Natomas was faced with a hostile takeover by Diamond Shamrock Corporation and an agreement was reached whereby APL and Natomas' real estate properties were spun off before the transfer of the oil, gas and coal business to Diamond Shamrock. APL retained its name, but its parent organization became American President Companies. Seaton was elected its president and chief executive officer and it began again

to do business on its own, reverting to what it had been prior to 1956, with a bright future before it.

This is an unusual shipping history in that emphasis, especially with respect to APL, is on people, though its marine operations are well covered, a very complete fleet list being given in Appendix A. The result is the emphasis is on personal characteristics and on the importance of having good connections in Washington, D. C.

Printing is excellent and there are few misprints, although on page 133 *Sartatia* should read *Sartartia*. Illustrations are numerous, especially of later ships, and of good quality. Altogether this is an excellent book and can be highly recommended to all interested in ocean merchant steam navigation, particularly from the American West Coast.

E. K. HAVILAND

Baltimore, Maryland

OLE CRUMLIN-PEDERSEN and MAX VINNER, *Sailing into the Past* (Roskilde, Denmark, The Viking Ship Museum, 1986.) 8¼" by 10¼", paper, 237 pages, extensive photographs and drawings. 200 DKR.

"Sailing into the past may actually give us some useful guidelines to our common voyage into the future," says Ole Crumlin-Pedersen of the Danish National Museum Historic Ship Laboratory in Roskilde. And out of this belief came the first International Ship Replica Seminar at Roskilde in 1984. Sixty experts from Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden attended. Speakers, who were seminar participants too, presented twenty-three papers on the subject of creating and sailing replicas of old ships from ancient to medieval times. Experts who presented papers included such well-known authorities as Thor Heyerdahl and Colin Mudie. Now, from the conference Crumlin-Pedersen and Vinner have created an amazing, "first time ever" book based on the papers presented and on the questions and discussions. The book is made more interesting by the extensive use of pictures and diagrams. Virtually every replica of any significance built in North Europe was discussed at the seminar, usually by a person involved in a given project; and Heyerdahl had a chance to talk about his three "wash through watercraft" in three oceans.

The somewhat awesome nature of the task was summed up by Crumlin-Pedersen this way: "The ships of the past that we try to recreate and study in action were the largest movable constructions and most complex tools of ancient man. They were based on age-long traditions of builders and navigators. Therefore our studies will often fall short of providing us with information of the optimal performance of the vessels.

"First and foremost, we had to realize the highly sophisticated level of Nordic tradition of building and handling square-rigged boats as it could be traced in Western Norway. But how could we then hope to achieve the results comparable to those of our Viking forefathers who had life-long experience with the boats?" Crumlin-Pedersen asks.

Typical of the faithfulness to the concept of creating an accurate replica in every way possible is the Roar project, which is reported on at some length in the book. To go back a bit, in 1962 the Danes excavated Skuldelev 3, a 1000-year-old coastal trading ship with an overall length of 14 meters.

When it was decided to build a replica of Skuldelev 3, the project had a special sentimental touch. Roar was king of the mythical Scylding royal family. (He was also know as Hrothgar in the Beowolf story.) Roskilde, today's center for Danish interest in Viking ships, was named for King Roar—Roars-kilde or Roar's Spring.

But to get back to accuracy in creating a replica, the Skuldelev project received a grant to build a replica of the old ship. One item demonstrates the work that went into a faithful replica. The Viking ships used sails made of wool. Crumlin-Pedersen says, "The sheep bred today do not grow wool of the quality of Viking age sheep." The problem was resolved when "old fashioned" sheep were found in Western Norway and 50 meters of sailcloth were produced for the Roar. In a strong wind, the builders hope the Roar will move at 10 knots. The book's subjects are many and varied, such as: the human body as a rowing engine; measuring rig performance; steering; and reed boats sailing on the wind. This latter subject was studied with test models ordered from the Aymara Indians at Lake Titicaca.

Crumlin-Pedersen and Vinner have created a great book that is a joy to read for anyone interested in the sea but more important, the book is a valuable research tool for those wanting to build a replica to full scale or in model form.

JOHN R. HERBERT

Spring Hill, Florida

JIM MCNEIL. *Charleston's Navy Yard: a picture history*. Charleston: CokerCraft [*sic*], 1985. 217 pp., illus., index, $18.00. ISBN 0-914432-02-8.

When the energetic history-conscious managers of the Charleston Naval Shipyard, spearheaded by Palmer W. Olliff, set out to do something, it gets done. Their first project led to a museum within a museum at Patriots Point on board the aircraft carrier *Yorktown* at Charleston. Their second is this charming, attractive volume, compiled and written by Jim McNeil, a nuclear engineer at the yard since 1964. Although it is not a scholarly work, the information is completely reliable and serves as an introduction to the subject.

The pictures predominate and are a wonderful collection indeed, supplemented by text and captions which are often a delight to read. The early maritime and naval history of Charleston includes woodcuts and charts which amplify the colonial period and campaigns against the notorious pirates Blackbeard and Stede Bonnet. Several shipyards appeared, the most enduring that of Stewart and Rose in the 1750s which passed into the hands of the Pritchard family before the American Revolution. Special coverage is given the Pritchard-built frigate *John Adams* of 1799 which ended its active career blockading its city of origin in 1865. The familiar account of the Confederate submersibles is here too, along with the not-so-well known fact that General Q. A. Gillmore, whose guns bombarded rebel defenses from Morris Island, also designed and built the jetties which greatly improved harbor navigation in the 1880s.

The bulk of the book focuses on the current century, for the Charleston Navy Yard was founded in 1901 through the efforts of South Carolina's venerable Senator "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman. Many photographs show ships at the Yard (renamed the Naval Shipyard in 1945) during both world wars, including those built there, beginning with the World War I gunboat *Asheville* and ending with the World War II destroyer, destroyer escort, and amphibious LSM(R) rocket-firing vessels. A particularly telling photo essay covers the conversion of the submarine tender *Proteus* into a Polaris-missile sub tender in 1959-60. Since 1948 the major work of the shipyard has been submarine maintenance and repair.

Among the gems which accentuate the book are cartoons and reminiscences of Norman Rockwell, stationed at the Charleston Naval Training Camp during World War I, and a World War II clerk whose actual name was Pearl Harbour Jenkins, part of a photo essay on women war workers. This lovingly-written tome is a model of the introductory work designed to arouse the lay reader to an appreciation of ships through their construction, upkeep, and history—using well-chosen and -captioned illustrations.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS

The College of Charleston

J. R. BRUÏJN, F. S. GAASTRA, and I. SCHÖFFER, *Dutch Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries* 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) hard cover, 1747 pages, bibliographies, illustrations, indices, tables, maps.

The appearance of these three volumes concerning voyages from the Netherlands to the East and return over a period of some two centuries from 1595 to 1794 are an extraordinary scholarly event for maritime, economic and colonial historians alike. They consist of an introductory volume and two others—one listing every East India Company ship setting sail from Holland to the Cape of Good Hope and the Orient, and the next which does the same for return voyages.

The introductory volume contains a discussion of a number of surveys and other elements. These include the home organization of the Dutch East India Company, its shipping business in Holland and the ships which were used in this commerce. Then we have surveys of the routes taken to Asiatic ports and those used in return voyages, and comparisons between the Dutch East India Company and its European rivals. We then get a view of how the Cape of Good Hope stopover was organized and the major centers of company shipping in the Orient as well. Next this volume explains who were carried as passengers and crew on Dutch East Indiamen, and the volume and value of goods shipped and the sources of information on this traffic in Dutch archives. All this is followed by some valuable appendices on seafaring personnel, victualling and rationing, the cargoes of two representative outbound vessels, the export of precious metals and copper coinages during the whole period, and naval vessels sent to Asia between 1783 and 1794.

Volume Two lists in detail the outward voyages of

some 4789 ships to the west, ship by ship. Each ship has listed when it was built and what type of ship it was, when it sailed from Holland and which port it left from, whether or not it called at the Cape and when it arrived in its final destination in the Orient. Each ship also has details on the number of seamen, soldiers and passengers it carried and other special information on each voyage.

Volume Three gives the same sort of information for some 3401 returning vessels listing vessels' tonnage, where built and time of departure from an Oriental port. Each entry goes on to explain whether or not the ship concerned here stopped at the Cape on its return, where it landed in the Netherlands, the value of its cargo and other special particulars of each voyage.

It is hard to give any over-all view of the remarkable materials in these volumes which will engage scholars for years to come. But a few points are worth making in a preliminary way. Careful reading of the introductory volume and the other two reveals a number of patterns of trade through the years. Down to the 1620s Batavia was the major port for incoming and outgoing East Indiamen, though from the 1660s on Ceylon handled between 20 to 30% of the company's shipping direct to and from Holland. Late in the 1680s some ships sailed direct to and from some Indian ports, especially those in Bengal, and from the 1730s direct voyages to and from Canton became relatively numerous.

At the same time, although a few other ports like Mauritius and St. Helena were in use, after the 1680s most ships stopped at the Cape of Good Hope on their way to and from the East. And some vessels, especially after 1700, only went to Capetown and then returned to Holland without going any further.

Equally important is the fact that these voyages make clear, that the volume and value of shipping increased throughout the entire period of the eighteenth century. And all this took place at a time when the British and French East India Companies were growing in importance, as well. It is unclear what the causes of this were, but it seems that it may have been due to the better organization of trade within the realms of the Moghuls in India and the Manchus in China which made traffic with both more lucrative.

There can be little doubt, however, that careful use of these volumes may well cause us to modify or expand the insights on the trade of Europe with the Orient during these years, as presented by scholars like Boxer, Furber and others as well. We are in debt to the authors for a wonderful job of research and the presentation of this research in a usable form for years to come.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, Massachusetts

MARTIN ACERRA AND JEAN MEYER, *La Grande époque de la Marine á voile* (Rennes: Ouest, France, 1987), 9″ x 6″, 216 pages, bibliography, many illustrations, paperback, 78 francs.

Those who, since the time of Mahan, have concerned themselves with the history of naval power in modern Europe before the coming of steam, should welcome this excellent volume by Martine Accera and Jean Meyer which provides us with a broad view of the history of the French sailing navy from the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. Until its appearance, information on this subject has been scattered and hard to come by as the critical bibliography listed by its authors at the end of this study make very clear.

The book is divided into three parts. The first is concerned with technical matters: the types of war vessels in use during these years and how they changed, as well as the armament they carried, the arsenals that kept them in operation, and the cost of the navy to the French government. All of this is sketched in some detail.

Then the authors turn to an examination of naval personnel afloat and ashore during these years. They emphasize in this not only the naval officer class, but the common seamen themselves and their economic and family relationships which were very different.

Next they tell of the war at sea, especially the campaigns between the French and their Dutch and English opponents and something about the importance of maritime commerce, especially in the Atlantic and how it affected France. And they end this section with an account of voyages by French naval vessels engaged in scientific surveys in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The volume then concludes with a list of French naval actions from the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century, a selective bibliography, and lists of important Pacific voyages and of the secretaries who headed the French Navy during these centuries.

The authors are to be commended for their excellent

maps, plans and illustrations. They are also to be congratulated on the way they have woven into their narrative what was going on in the world of France's naval rivals, especially in Britain and Holland. In short anyone interested in modern naval history will find this volume a useful and important source of information on all aspects of France's modern sailing navy.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, MA

N. A. M. RODGER, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (Annapolis, Maryland, United States Naval Institute Press, 1986). 6½" x 9½", cloth, 445 pages, 15 black and white illustrations; appendices; sources, notes and references, bibliography, glossary and index. Endpaper drawings by James Dodds, $21.95.

In the field of maritime history the area of administrative studies has emerged as one of the the most important and rewarding research topics. Navies are probably the first complex bureaucratic structures to evolve with the emergence of nation-states in the Western World and, as such, they represent our first real effort to manage a large governmental enterprise. European admiralties of the Eighteenth Century generated a vast quantity of documents, letters, records and plans which are now available to the dedicated researcher. When these collections are properly exploited they provide a wealth of detail and often contain material that upsets or profoundly modifies long held assumptions about navy life in the age of the "wooden walls."

N. A. M. Rodger's volume is an excellent example of this trend. *The Wooden World* is a detailed description of the British Navy as it was during the period of the Seven Years' War, 1755-1763. As such it covers a chronological gap between Daniel Baugh's *Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole* and Dudley Pope's *Life in Nelson's Navy*. It is entirely orthodox in its organization, containing chapters on shipboard life, victualling and health, career profiles for officers and enlisted ratings, manning, discipline and the inner workings of the Admiralty. What is unorthodox and even revisionist in its significance are the conclusions that the author draws from his study of the great mass of materials he has located, principally in the Public Record Office in London and the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich.

According to Rodger, the Royal Navy was not the harsh and unyielding service of popular legend nor was there the absolute and unbridgable gap between the officers and the lower deck ratings that is usually ascribed to the era. The navy that Rodger has discovered was actually much more like the society that it served, chaotic, loosely disciplined, containing many layers and shadings of status and featuring definite opportunities for upward mobility and well understood career tracks for persons who wished to improve their stations in life at all levels of naval society. Men were attracted to the navy because it was a viable option that compared favorably with prospects ashore, particularly in the matter of winning wealth through prize money and securing promotion through the mastery of valued skills. Living conditions were tolerable within the limitations of the ships themselves, larger vessels being considerably more comfortable than smaller ones, and the navy's diet may actually have been superior to that obtaining on land among the lower classes because it relied heavily on meat which was a scarce item and some attempt was made to balance it and provide anti-scorbutics.

The real factor that served to ameliorate the harshness of the Royal Navy, however, was the pervasive atmosphere of patronage that governed the entire service. To a large degree successful naval career depended on the weaving of a vast and complex network of interpersonal relationships. An ambitious commander avid for honors and promotion could seldom rise in the service unless he had a loyal and talented corps of subordinates on hand to see that his ships and fleets performed well in battle. Junior officers and even enlisted ratings consciously sought to attach themselves to the followings of men who were regarded as having great potential on the assumption that the commander's good fortune would be shared by all of his subordinates. These expectant subordinates followed their chosen mentor from ship to ship and station to station growing in number as the great man prospered. In his turn, the successful commander took pains to see that his party of followers was well taken care of and often used his influence to get them out of scrapes when they occasionally lapsed. Even common seamen could count on such treatment after long service, particularly when they committed the most common of all naval offences, failing to return to their ship on time after a run ashore.

In developing this more humane and liberal picture of the Royal Navy, Rodger has made use of a significant amount of quantitative data which has been represented in extensive appendices. His conclusions are drawn in part from these statistics and in part from qualitative data in the form of letters, memoranda and Admiralty minutes. He recognizes that his conclusions, while defensible, would be made much more secure if the statistical data in the archives could be computerized and organized to make cross comparisons possible between different eras. This, of course, would be a monumental undertaking beyond the capabilities of an individual scholar but if it could be done, it could well lead to sweeping new interpretations of British naval history and provide a wealth of fresh information. It is possible that the real lesson contained in the Admiralty collections is that the Royal Navy was evolving from a looser and more humane organization towards ever greater harshness and rigidity and that the navy of Nelson's day was more like the "floating concentration camp" image we harbor than the earlier fleets were. Certainly the British Navy of the Napoleonic Wars was much more severely strained than was the fleet of the Seven Years' War. It was larger and served under wartime conditions for considerably longer. With the publication of *The Wooden World* N. A. M. Rodger has given us the incentive to re-examine the issue on a more comparitive basis.

JAMES E. VALLE

Delaware State College

DAVID C. HOLLY, *Steamboat on the Chesapeake Emma Giles and the Tolchester Line* (Centreville, Maryland: Tidewater Publishers, 1987). 7¼" x 10¼", cloth, xvi + 347 pages, 81 illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, bibliography, index. $24.95.

Maritime historians are attracted to the field by a variety of different experiences. Some thrill to the accounts of great naval conflicts that feature the clash of battlelines and alter the course of human events. Others are inspired by the man-killing drive of the great windjammers as they battled for westing around Cape Horn. Yet others may have been captivated in their youth by the prosaic comings and goings of some obscure but much beloved vessel that punctuated the days of their lives with the mellow sound of a steam whistle floating over the salt marshes on a balmy summer evening. The call of the sea comes in a variety of forms and pulls in a diverse and varigated following.

David Holly is obviously a member of the nostalgic school of maritime historians. He has seen deep meaning and significance in the life of medium sized Chesapeake steamboats that made the rounds of dozens of small landings along the shores of the upper bay and its tributaries for almost three-quarters of a century. The *Emma Giles* began life in 1887 as a proud excursion steamer plying between Baltimore and Tolchester Beach. When not engaged in the holiday trade she freighted around the landings of Eastern Bay, the Little Choptank River and the Western Shore south of Annapolis. Her cargoes were livestock, farm produce, barrels of oysters and crabs and passengers travelling from their remote and waterbound villages to the big city on their various errands. In later years she was converted to an automobile ferry and, when that did not pan out, she was ultimately cut down to a barge for a few final years of usefulness. She was a paddle wheeler with a majestic walking beam engine that had already served in two earlier boats. Such engines never really wore out and were only scrapped because time and technology had passed them by.

Using the life of the *Emma Giles* as his anchor, Professor Holly takes the opportunity to relate a full economic and social history of tidewater steamboating, a field of study which he believes has been neglected in favor of the better known lore of the western river steamboats. He points out that western river boats, the giant "floating palaces" popularized by Mark Twain and others, were actually far less admirable craft than his beloved Chesapeake boats. They were lightly built, blew up or caught fire with distressing frequency, and rarely lasted long enough to become objects of real affection to the people they served. Tidewater steamers, on the other hand, were strongly built and powered by safe and reliable machinery. Much more consideration was given to safety in terms of watertight integrity and iron or steel hull construction. Moreover, the era of the tidewater steamboats lasted much longer than the heyday of the western boats, extending well into the post-World War II years on a few routes.

Although the subject matter of *Steamboat on the Chesapeake* is charming and the author's love for his chosen topic is manifest throughout, there are a few annoying lapses and omissions that need to be mentioned. The book is not developed along rigorously

chronological lines and consequently the text seems to be a bit digressive. The launching of the *Emma Giles* is described in at least three or four different places in the text as is the account of her collision with the freighter *Steel Trader*, the one moment of real excitement in her long years of service. That kind of repetitiousness can be annoying to some readers. Another problem is the omission of a really detailed set of line drawings or plans for the *Emma Giles* sufficient to provide guidance for model makers and artists. Since part of the purpose of the book is to thoroughly delineate the *Emma Giles* as an artifact the lack of plans is really a handicap. A very fine effort is made to describe the workings of the beam engine in prose but the accompanying drawings and diagrams are somewhat anemic. A high quality draftsman's rendering of a typical beam engine, such as can be found in almost any old marine engineering textbook, would have been a welcome addition. Finally, some attempt should have been made to provide at least one full color illustration of the vessel. An excellent oil painting of the *Giles* by Paul McGehee exists and should have been incorporated into the book, perhaps on the dust jacket or as a centerspread. It may be objected that commissioning a draftsman to provide plans and including color illustrations would drive up the cost of the book but how many more volumes on the *Emma Giles* will ever come out. It just stands to reason that Holly's treatment of his subject should be as complete as possible and that the requirements of modelers and other antiquarian researchers should not have been neglected.

JAMES E. VALLE

Delaware State College

TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN, ed., *Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays in Maritime History* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987), 9″ x 6″, 366 pages, notes, index, many illustrations, cloth $22.50, paper $13.50.

More than a decade ago a group of enthusiastic naval and maritime historians formed the North American Society for Oceanic History which today has about three hundred members. Now Timothy J. Runyan, who has long been one of the guiding spirits of this group has edited a number of the papers given at meetings of this organization during recent years under the title of *Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays in Maritime History*. Some idea of the scope of these essays can be gained by examining the authors themselves. Some are academics in a number of disciplines, some are naval officers, and some are active in museums and maritime and naval organizations of various sorts. Two authors are from Canada, two from Britain and seventeen are from the United States. They thus reflect some of the broad background of those who are concerned with maritime studies in the world today.

The essays themselves reflect the same broad interests. They range in time from the world of the Middle Ages in the Mediterranean and Northern Seas of Europe to the modern era of navies and maritime commerce. And they are divided into four groupings: ships and fleets, fishing and trade, community and the sea, and seafaring in the Americas. The volume includes excellent maps and other illustrations and a preface giving a brief history of the North American Society for Oceanic History and short *vitae* of the authors themselves.

It is difficult to single out any special articles which are outstanding in a collection of such excellence. For this reviewer, however, a few seems of special interest for any maritime or naval enthusiast. They include Richard Steffey's reconstruction of the medieval Serce Liman vessel found off the coast of Turkey, Timothy Runyan's discussion of the raising of fleets in Medieval England, Virginia Wood's essay on the use of southern U.S. live oak for ship timbers, and Barry Gough's article on early Canadian contacts with China. To them should be added Lawrence Allen's discussion of the history of Maine's "Lime Coast," Linda Mahoney's view of nineteenth century prostitution in U.S. ports, James Bradford's essay on new perspectives on the life of John Paul Jones and Gaddis Smith's article on black seamen and federal courts during the period from 1789 to 1860.

Nobody interested in the sea should fail to add this volume to their library. It can be savoured for enjoyment and profit by all who find the history of the world's oceans and those who sail on them an exciting and rewarding experience.

ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS

Salem, MA

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



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

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

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

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

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